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GOVERNMENTAL AND PRIVATE ADVOCATES
FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN CIVIL
LITIGATION: A COMPARATIVE

STUDY
Mauro Cappelletti*
I suggest that there is something fundamentally wrong in our
legal system .... If a man's pocket is picked, the government brings
a criminal suit, and accepts responsibility for its prosecution. If a
man loses his life's savings through a breach of a contract, the government accepts no such responsibility. Shouldn't the government
perhaps assume some of the burden of enforcing what we call
"private rights"?
... I do suggest that we should consider whether it is not feasible
to provide impartial government officials-who are not court employees, and who act on their own initiative-to dig up, and present to
the courts, significant evidence which one or the other of the parties
may overlook or be unable to procure.t
The last ones to see clearly society's interests are generally those
who are paid to do so.tt

T

article1 examines the means by which public and group
interests are represented in civil proceedings throughout the

HIS

• Professor of Law, University of Florence and Stanford University; Director,
Institute of Comparative Law of the University of Florence. D. Jur. 1952, University
of Florence.-Ed.
This study has been prepared within the framework of group research projects on
the basic characteristics of civil procedure and "access to justice" in contemporary
societies, conducted at the Florence Institute of Comparative Law under the sponsorship of the Italian Research Council, the Ford Foundation, and the Fondazione G.
Agnelli of Turin.
The author wishes to thank Mr. Leo C. Farrenkopf, J.D. 1974, Columbia University, for lingnistic and editorial assistance.
t J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 97-98 (1963).
:j: Verri, Pensees detachees, in Mil.ANO IN EUROPA 138 (M. Schettini ed. 1963).
1. This article is a revised version of the general report prepared for Section II.C.I
("The Role of the Ministere public in Civil Proceedings") of the Ninth Congress of
the International Academy of Comparative Law, held in Tehran from September 27
through October 4, 1974. The report is based upon 26 national reports, representing
each of the major legal families of our contemporary world.
The Latin, Germanic, and Scandinavian areas of the civil-law world were covered
by ten reports on the following countries: Austria (Professor W. Kralik, Vienna),
Belgium (Professor J.E. Krings, Brussels), Brazil (Professor J.F. da Silva Lopes, Sao
Paulo), France (Procureur General J. Jegu, Lyon), the Federal Republic of Germany
(Professor W.J. Habscheid, Wiinburg), Italy (Professor V. Vigoriti, Florence), Mexico
(Dr. S. Oiiate, Mexico), Spain (Professor V. Fairen Guillen, Valencia), Sweden (Pro
fessor P.O. Bolding, Lund), and Uruguay (Professor E. Vescovi, Montevideo). Professor
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wor~d. I have focused particular attention upon the Ministere public
-a French institution imported by a large number of countries-'
Vescovi's report dealt with a number of other Latin American countries in addition
to Uruguay.
An eleventh report covered Japan (Dr. C. Suzuki, Tokyo), where strong influences
of French and German elements are still apparent in so far as the role of the Ministere public in civil litigation is concerned.
The common-law world was represented by three national reports, covering Australia (Dr. G.D.S. Taylor, Clayton, Victoria), England (Master I.H. Jacob, London),
and the United States of America (Professor J.N. Hazard, New York). In addition, a
fourth report covered Scotland (Professor J.M. Thomson, Birmingham) and a fifth,
Quebec (Professor Michele Rivet, Quebec). To be sure, the civil-law tradition maintains strong roots in Quebec, Canada; and Scotland is, to say the least, an anomalous
member of the common-law world. It should be noted, however, that from both
reports there emerges a greater resemblance to common-law solutions than to those
prevailing in France and, generally, in the civil-law world.
The socialist world was covered by five national reports, on Bulgaria (Professor Z.
Stalev, Sofia), Czechoslovakia (Professor V. Steiner, Prague), Hungary (Professor L.
Nevai, Budapest), Poland (Professor J. Jodlowski, Warsaw), and Yugoslavia (Professor
S. Triva, Zagreb). Professor Stalev's report also briefly discusses most of the other
socialist countries of Eastern Europe.
Also, I was fortunate to receive five remarkable reports that discuss very important
areas of the "developing world:" Ethiopia (Professor J. Harrison, Addis Ababa),
Ghana CTustice N.A. Ollennu, Accra), India (Advocate-General and Hon. Professor
L.M. Singhvi, New Dehli), Kenya CTustice J. Spry, Nairobi), and Tanzania CTustice
G.C.M. Onyiuke, Dar es Salaam). The last four countries bear strong influences of the
common-law approach to the problems treated in this article; Ethiopia, on the other
hand, appears to have a mixture of civil- and common-law influences. In addition, I
have used an article by P. Gulphe, Le role du ministere public en matiere civile, in 2
REVUE SENEGALAISE DE DRorr 32 (1968), although it was not specifically prepared for
the Congress. It covers Senegal, whose approach is patterned after the French.
Only a few of the national reports have been published; the rest are on file both
at the Institute of Comparative Law of the University of Florence and at the International Academy of Comparative Law.
On file both at the Florence Institute and at the law library of Stanford University
are three unpublished research papers prepared for me in the spring of 1974 by Stanford law students working at the Florence Institute under a special externship program of Stanford Law School: N. Havranek, Representation of Group, Collective and
Public Interests by Associations and Organizations in Civil Litigation: Western and
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union; A. Nicholson, "Italia Nostra" and Problems
of Standing in Italian Public Interest Litigation in the Environmental Sector; and
R. Whidden, The Ministere Public and the Attorney General as Advocates for the
Public Interest. Also at the Florence Institute are three unpublished research papers
that have been prepared by members of the Institute: A. De Vita, La tutela giurisdizionale degli interessi "collettivi" in diritto francese (1974); V. Grementieri, Memorandum sugli aspetti internazionali della protezione degli interessi collettivi (1974);
and N. Trocker, La tutela dell' "interesse pubblico" nel diritto processuale tedesco
(1974). Another unpublished paper was prepared for me at Stanford bv A.M. Paul,
entitled Judicial Protection of Intermediate Societies in the United States (1974).
In addition, information on specific topics has kindly been provided by seve~l
colleagues, whom I wish to mention and thank especially: Mr. C.R. Halpern of the
Center for Law and Social Policy in Washington, who submitted a paper, on file at
the Florence Institute, entitled Some Observations on Developments in the United
States Regarding Representation of Public Interests in Civil Litigation (June 1974);
Professor A. Hamburger of Buffalo and Professor H. Kotz of Constance, who were
the Reporters at a conference of the German "Gesellschaft fiir Rechtsvergleichung"
held in Hamburg in September 1973, on the subject "Private Suits in the Public
Interest" (see Hamburger, Private Suits in the Public Interest in the United States
of America, 23 BUFFALO L. REv. 343 (1974); H. Kotz, Klagen Privater im offentlichen
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and its analogues, the Attorney General in the common-law countries and the Prokuratura in the socialist world. The Ministere
public is, and has been through its centuries-long history, 2 an instiInteresse (to be published in "Arbeiten zur Rechtsvergleichung"; cited in this article
from the manuscript)); Professor T, Kojima of Tokyo, who submitted a paper, on
file at the Florence Institute, entitled Private and Public Elements in Uapanesc] Civil
Litigation CTuly 1974); Professor V.K. Puchinskii of Moscow, who prepared two memo•
randa dated May 4, 1974 and June 7, 1974, both of which are on file at the Florence
Institute; Professor P.H. Sand of the Environment Law Office of the Food and Agricul•
ture Organization of the United Nations, who kindly submitted to me a copy of his
unpublished report, entitled Legal Means To Control and Avoid Trans-Frontier
Pollution, which was prepared for the Colloquium of the International Association of
Legal Science on "Environmental Problems in Developing Countries" (Mexico City,
August 1974); and Dr. P. Thery of Paris, who submitted a paper, on file at the Florence
Institute, entitled L'evolution recentc de la jurisprudence ct de la legislation [fran~ises]
en matiere d'actions collectives.
Major lacunae, of course, still remain in the coverage of this study. My efforts to
secure ad hoc reports covering such major countries as the Soviet Union, China, and
Indonesia have been unsuccessful. As a substitute for a special report on the Soviet
Union, however, I have used-in addition to the valuable information provided by
Professor Puchinskii of Moscow-the chapters on "Participation of the Procurator in
Soviet Civil Proceedings" and "Participation in Soviet Civil Proceedings of Organs of
State Administration, Trade Unions, State Institutions, Enterprises, Social Organlza•
tions, and Individual Third Parties," authored by M.A. Vikut for the treatise
GRAZHDANCKil PROTSESS 108 (K. Judel'son ed. 1972) (Moskva, Iuridicheskaja Litcratura).
I have also used the chapters under almost identical titles by N.S. Shakarian in tllc
treatise DEREcHo PROCESAL CIVIL SoVIETico (M. Gurvich ed. 1971) (transl. from Russian
by M. Luban) (Mexico, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurfdicas). In addition, I have
used the doctoral dissertation by A. Ferrucci, La Prokuratura nel diritto sovietico (Uni•
versity of Florence 1968) (unpublished manuscript on file at the Florence Institute).
As for Indonesia, A.B. Nasution, Director of the Institute of Legal Aid of Indonesia
and a courageous fighter for the plight of the poor against public and private abuse,
had kindly accepted my invitation to prepare a report. In the meantime, however,
he has been jailed for political reasons.
Although the article has derived enormous benefit from the national reports and
the additional materials mentioned above, it does not purport to be a conglomeration,
or a summary, of the information they provide. I have tried to utilize this unique
wealth of information not for an abridged country-by-country description, but rather
for both a comparative analysis of "typical solutions" emerging from the national
re_ports and other materials, and an evaluation of such solutions. While I am greatly
indebted to the national reporters and to the other scholars who have been of
assistance in my research, I alone bear all responsibility for any errors incurred in
the choice of solutions that I thought to be significant, successful, promising, or
othenvise "typical'' enough to deserve description, analysis, and evaluation.
2. See, e.g., Bekaert, La mission du ministere public en droit privi!, in 2 MELANGES
L'HONNEUR DE JEAN DABIN 419 (1963) (Bruxelles/Paris, Bruylant/Sircy). The autl1or
writes:
[U]nder the Ancien Regime [the right of action of the Ministere public] allowed
!1im "to ,?ring suit whenever the public authority thought a public interest was
mvolved.•••
"Through this officer, the King saw everything, knew everything, was present
everywhere. He watched over the enforcement of the laws, tlle behavior of the
judges, the conduct of all citizens ••••"
The Ministere public acted therefore in defense of the "interests of tllc
King," gathered [and embodied] in a vague whole which did not involve all the
meanings that we attribute today to the needs of the public good. These in•
terests included at the same time the interests of the royal domain, of the ordrc
public, and even that ancient right coupled with a duty of protection, the
EN
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tutional method for assuring that the "public interest"3-or the
"collective" or "general interest,''4 or the "social concem" 5-is adequately represented in civil litigation. Yet, other solutions have
been utilized-to some extent, even in France-in lieu of (or in
addition to) the Ministere public for providing adequate representation of meta-individual interests in civil proceedings.6
"mundium," which the King exercised over the incompetents, and for their own
welfare.

Id. at 434-35 (emphasis original) (footnotes omitted).
3. This language is used, for instance, in the Italian C. PRO. CIV. art. 70, ,r 3.
See also P. HERZOG &: M. WESER, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE 121•22 (1967) (The Hague,
Nijhoff); W. Kralik, Die Wahrung offentlicher Interessen im osterreichischen Zivilverfahren 1 (unpublished Austrian report, see note 1 supra); S. Ofiate, El Pape! del
Ministerio Publico Dentro del Proceso Civil Mexicano 9 &: n.20 (unpublished Mexican
report, see note I supra); C. Suzuki, The Role of the "Minister Public" in Civil Proceedings in Japan I, 10 (unpublished Japanese report, see note I supra); Hazard, The
Role of the Ministere Public in Civil Proceedings, in LAw IN 'fHE UNITED STATES OF
A.MERlcA IN SOCIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL REvol.UTION 209, 226 CT• Hazard &: W, Waguer
ed. 1974) (Brussels, Etablissements Emile Bruylant) (United States report) ("a means
of representing the public interest in civil matters''). For the Socialist countries, see
text at note 112 infra. In Spain, the basic legislative provision concerning the Ministere public (Ministerio Fiscal) speaks, in one breath, of "public interest," "ordre
public," and "social interest." See v. Fairen Guillen, Le role du ministere public
dans le proces civil espagnol I (unpublished Spanish report, see note I supra).
4. See, e.g, Bekaert, supra note 2, at 420, 432, 447-49. Bekaert views the evolution
of the Ministere public as a transformation from a "representative of the executive
power" to a "natural defender of the collective interest." Id, at 420. But see Krings,
Le role du ministere public dans le proces civil, in RAPPORTS BELGES AU !Xe CoNGRES
INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT COMPARE 139, 166 (1974) {Bruxelles, Centre Interuniversitaire
de Droit Compare) (Belgian report) (interet general is a "vague and confused notion").
I wonder, however, whether other concepts, such as ordre public, see Decret Imperiale
No. 5351, April 20, 1810, art. 46, 12 BULLETINS DES LOIS DE L'EMPIRE FRANCAIS, 4e Serie
291, 301, are less vague and open to debate than interet general. See Bekaert, supra,
at 420, 448. Perhaps only concepts such as ordre public, public interest, and the ancient
"interests of the King," see note 2 supra, are broad and vague enough to reflect the
transformations that characterize any living society. It would be a mistake to try to
define them in abstracto, once and forever. See note 87 infra and accompanying text.
Concerning the role of the Ministere public in civil litigation, any of these concepts
seems adequate to indicate that, although civil proceedings usually involve private
law, there are some cases in which a public interest, or even the ordre public, is
involved. Certain legal systems may see a public interest and/or an ordre public
element in cases involving, for instance, problems of nationality, personal status and
family, or the correct and uniform interpretation of the law by certain appellate
courts. Others may see that interest involved in different areas, for instance, bankruptcy proceedings. Given the tremendous social significance of such contemporary
mass phenomena as labor conflicts, pollution, chaotic urban development, and unfair
competition and marketing, should not a modem legal system recognize a strong
public interest aspect, or even an element of ordre public, in the observance of labor,
environmental, urban development, and marketing regulations? This is, I believe, the
central question in coming to grips with contemporary realities. See Bekaert, supra,
at 432: "Today .•• the legislature orders the Ministere public to intervene in some
matters which previously involved only private interests."
5. See, e.g., Hazard, supra note 3, at 210.
6. If put in the dichotomous terms of "public" versus "private" interests, the
problem of representing public and group interests in civil litigation is unduly oversimplified in a modern world characterized, inter alia, by the ever-increasing inter-
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In fact, our contemporary world presents at least three typical
solutions to this societal problem. Somewhat arbitrarily, I denomi~
nate them as follows:
(1) The "public (governmental) attorney general." The
French Ministere public, the Soviet Prokuratura, and the AngloAmerican attorney general are the most representative species;
the Swedish Ombudsman may be considered, in part, another
interesting example.
(2) The individual "private attorney general." 1 Relator,
class, and public-interest actions in the common-law world are
the foremost examples, but other examples of exceptional
interest have emerged, and are growing, elsewhere.
(3) The organizational "private attorney general.'' Certain
social organizations or organized groups act as representatives of
public, collective, and group interests in civil litigation. Most
modem nations present this growing phenomenon to some degree.
This article discusses each of these three typical solutions, with
somewhat greater attention given to the first. The conclusions to be
drawn from this comparative study may have particular relevance for
an appraisal of current developments in the United States. Two recent Supreme Court decisions, Zahn v. International Paper Co. 8 and
Eisen v. Carlisle &- ]acquelin,9 have placed severe limitations on the
class action. Without entering the debate as to whether these decisions were correct, they clearly place a greater burden on more traditional institutions-such as state and federal attorneys generalto represent public and group interests in court. 10
vention of the state into individual and group spheres. There has been an unprecedented expansion of the gray areas where public and private interests merge and
overlap. Therefore, the problem of representing "meta-individual" interests in civil
litigation must be put in much more sophisticated terms to reflect the vast spectrum
from individual to group, collective, and ultimately national, or even supranational,
interests-in sum, all the interests that the ordinary individual acting by and for
himself is not able to represent and protect.
7. For the source of this term, see text at note 165 infra.
8. 414 U.S. 291 (1973) (class action may be maintained only if each unnamed
member of the class has the requisite amount in controversy, regardless of whether
the named class members have satisfied the amount in controversy requirement).
9. 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (rule 23(c)(2) requires that individual notice be sent, at the
plaintiff's expense, to all class members who can be identified through reasonable
effort).
IO. Some commentators have in fact advocated that restrictions be placed upon
the use of class actions on the basis that, with more funding, the attorneys general
and administrative agencies would help fill the gap. See, e.g., Labowitz, Class Actions
in the Federal System and California: Shattering the Impossible Dream, 23 BUFFALO
L. REv. 601, 636 (1974).
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This article raises serious doubts as to whether attorneys general
will be able effectively to fill this void. The Ministere public-the
civilian analogue of the attorney general-possesses very broad power
to .commence and intervene in civil cases on behalf of the public
interest. In France,11 Belgium,12 an9- Italy,13 for instance, the Ministere public has the power to participate in any suit in which he recognizes an element of public interest or ordre public; yet in areas where
the public interest is in great need of a forceful representative-as
in consumer and environmental protection matters-the Ministere
public has done very little. Virtually insurmountable organizational,
educational, and psychological barriers stand in the way of his becoming the effective champion of newly emerged collective interests.14
To be sure, the attorney general does not share some of the shortcomings of the Ministere public. The latter is a career officer in a
hierarchical, bureaucratic structure that tends not only to insulate
him from contemporary problems affecting the public, but also to
hamper actions he does take.15 But the possibly greater efficiency
of the attorney general must be weighed against the heavy cost of
being more subject to political interference,16 which may stifle his
efforts to protect the public interest, particularly in .areas where
powerful special interest groups are involved. Furthermore, attorney
general offices are frequently understaffed and underfunded.17 If
a choice must be made between prosecuting a common crime and
instituting a civil (or even a criminal) suit against a business engaged
in unfair consumer practices, for example, it is the former action
that probably will be brought.18 The class action, on the other hand,
requires neither the initiative of a public official subject to political
pressure nor any disbursement from the public coffers, other than for
court time. In fact, while critics of the class action have suggested
that attorneys are the main beneficiaries of the class suit,19 they
usually neglect to point out that at least the public interest is being
represented (if the suit has metjt) and that this representation is
being provided without substantial cost to the public.
11. See text at notes 83-85 infra.
12. See text at note 83 infra.
13. See text at note 86 infra.
14. See sections IA2, 3 infra.
15. See text at notes 81-82 infra.
16. See notes 159-60 infra and accompanying text.
17. Cf. Note, The Role of the Michigan Attorney General in Consumer and Environmental Protection, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1030, 1054-55 (1974).
·
·
18. See note 204 infra.
19. See, e.g., Labowitz, supra note 10, at 634, 644-48.
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This is not to suggest that the class action is the only adequate
answer to ensuring that public and group interests are ably represented in civil proceedings. Rather, the thrust of this article, drawn
from the experience of so many nations, is that the activity of attorneys general and their analogues must be supplemented, both at the
governmental level (by highly specialized administrative agencies, for
instance) and at the level of private initiative (by individuals and
groups).

I.

THE PUBLIC (GOVERNMENTAL) ATTORNEY GENERAL

The Ministere Public
One solution to the problem of adequate representation of the
public interest in civil cases, used in France for several centuries and
adopted in many other countries,20 is a special office of public attorneys, now called the Ministere public or Parquet. One of its main
tasks is to commence or, more frequently, to intervene in civil cases,21
A.

20. See, e.g., 1 M. VELLANI, IL PUBBLICO MINISTERO NEL PROCES.50 18-19 (1965) (Bologna,
Zanichelli) (Italy); V. Fairen Guillen, supra note 3, at 7 (Spain): C. Suzuki, supra
note 3, at 1, 15 Gapan); E. Vescovi, El Ministerio Publico en el Proceso Civil 4, 6·8,
11 (unpublished Uruguaian report, see note 1 supra) (Uruguay and other Latin
American countries, including Brazil); Habscheid, Le role du ministere public dans le
proces civil, in DEUTSCHE l.ANDESBERICHTE ZUM IX. INTERNATIONALEN KONGRE8 FilR
REcHTSVERGLEICHUNG 176, 176-77 (1974) (Tiibingen, J.C.B. Mohr) (German report).
The French institution itself may have had more ancient origins (probably tl1e
Roman Procuratores Caesaris and Advocati fisci). Cf. M. VELLANI, supra, at 19;
E. Vescovi, supra, at 6.
21. This article is not directly concerned witll the role of the Ministere public in
criminal cases, tlle prosecution of which is tllat office's principal function in most
countries. Cf. notes 186, 204 infra. Nor is it concerned witll tlle Ministere public's
nonjudicial tasks, such as surveillance over penitentiaries, asylums, and tlle insane.
See, e.g., Vigoriti, The Role of the "Ministere Public" in Civil Proceedings: Italy, in
ITALIAN NATIONAL REPORTS TO THE NINTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE
I.Aw 269, 274 n.16 (1974) (Milano, Giuffre Editore).
We are interested here only in civil litigation, where tlle Ministere public's role is,
on tlle whole, merely supplementary and his participation infrequent. For example,
in one typical region of Italy-Tuscany-only about one per cent of tlle workload of
tlle Ministere public's officers is spent on civil litigation. Vigoriti, supra, at 284. The
German Reporter informs us tllat in his 12 years of practice as an attorney, he has
never encountered tlle Ministere public in a civil case, Habscheid, supra note 20, at
178, and tlle Austrian Reporter gives us precise statistical data tllat amply demon•
strate tlle same point. W. Kralik, supra note 3, at 11, 13. The Mexican Reporter con•
trasts tlle "hypertrophy" of tlle functions of tlle Ministere public in criminal litigation
witll his "scarce relevance" in civil litigation. S. Ofiate, supra note 3, at 4, 10. Harrison
informs us tllat in Etltlopia "tllere are practically no examples" of participation of the
Ministere public in civil litigation, notwitllstanding tlle fact tllat tlle Civil Code and
tlle Code of Civil Procedure authorize such participation in a number of matters,
such as declarations of deatll, absence and insanity, appointment or removal of
guardians or tutors; and, in general, civil status, incapacity, marriage, and bank•
ruptcy. J. Harrison, Notes on tlle Office of tlle Ministere Public in Ethiopia I (unpublished Etltlopian report, see note 1 supra). Professor Harrison indicates that the
Ministere public's office is understaffed; tlle office has slightly more than 100 officers,
most of whom have no legal education, for a population of 25 million. Id, at 3.4,
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sometimes with the powers of a full-fledged party (partie principale),
and sometimes with powers somewhat similar to those of an amicus
curiae (partie jointe).22

I. Origins, Historical Development, and Traditional Roles
The Ministere public is rooted in thirteenth- and fourteenthcentury France.23 Private litigants then were represented in court by
procureurs and avocats, a distinction reminiscent of the dichotomies
between avoues and avocats in modem France and solicitors and
barristers in modem England. Even the King had to retain a procureur and an avocat as his counsel when he wanted to defend his
"private interest" in court.24 These procureurs du roi and avocats du
roi (or gens du roi) were originally called procureurs speciaux and
avocats speciaux, because their appointment was made ad hoc for one
or more specified proceedings; later, when they became the general
representatives of the Crmm in all proceedings involving the Crmm's
interests, they were called procureurs generaux and avocats generaux:
With the gradual expansion and consolidation of the monarchy, the
Crmm's interests were progressively identified with the interests of
the country.25
By the sixteenth century, this "publicization" of the Crmm's
attorneys brought about a collateral development that has left its
mark on the present institution: the integration of the procureurs
In Italy, however, where there are about 1500 such officers {all of whom are law
graduates) for a population of 55 million, the situation as described by Professor
Vigoriti does not seem to be much brighter.
·
As for Senegal, Chief Justice K, M'Baye notes that both the role of the Ministere
public in civil litigation and judicial activism have been increased to compensate
for the insufficiencies, ignorance, and poverty of the parties and to ensure party
equality. See M'Baye, Discussion, in FUNDAMENTAL GUARANTEES OF THE PARTIES IN
CIVIL LmGATION '790, '795-96 (M. Cappelletti & D. Tallon ed. 1973) (Milan/Dobbs Ferry,
N.Y., Giuffre/ Oceana) [hereinafter FUNDAMENTAL GUARANTEES]. But cf. Gulphe, supra
note 1, at 32.
22. On the powers and duties of the Ministere public as partie principale and as
partie jointe, see, for example, P. HERzoc &: M. WESER, supra note 3, at 122-24; Krings,
supra note 4, at 153-54. See also section IA4 infra. For analognes in Spain and Latin
America, see V. Fairen Guillen, supra note 3, at 10-11, 14, 16; E. Vescovi, supra note
20, at 15-16. For analogues in Senegal, see Gulphe, supra note 1, at 33-40.
23, J. Jegu, Le rl>le du ministere public dans le proces civil 1 (unpublished French
report, see note 1 supra). Cf. M.-L. RAssAT, LE MINISTERE PUBLIC ENTRE SON PASSE ET
SON AVENIR 13, 16 (1967) (Paris, Pichon et Durand-Auzias).
24. This dual (private and royal) origin of the Ministere public is still reflected
in the name that the institution retains in Spain-Ministerio Fiscal. The name indicates that he was the legal defender of the royal patrimony, identified with the
treasury of the state or fisc. See V. Fairen Guillen, supra note 3, at I.
25. See, e.g., E. Vescovi, supra note 20, at 6. A foremost expression of this general
or public interest-"le bien-etre commun"-was the assurance that laws and customs
were observed and that ordre public was maintained. J. Jegu, supra note 23, at I.
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generaux and avocats generaux with the judiciary rather than with
the normal attorneys.28 In fact, the procureurs generaux and avocats
generaux became permanent public officers attached to the courts
("aupres des Tribunaux"), acting as the delegates of the King, by
whom they were appointed. 27 Their role was midway between that
of the judges and that of the parties (and the parties' Ia-wyers); their
status was midway between that of the judiciary and that of the
executive. Like the judges, they were (and are) members of the
magistrature, although called "magistrats debout" (standing judges)
rather than "magistrats assis" or "magistrats du siege" (sitting judges),
to indicate that they made (and make) their arguments "standing"
before the "sitting" court. They also were (and are) called Parquet,
to indicate that, when arguing in court, they did (and do) not sit on
. the bench but rather, like private attorneys, stand on the floor or
parquet.28
Whereas the Parquet's function in criminal litigation was broad,
in civil litigation its role was essentially "protecting the weak and
safeguarding the public welfare." 29 These areas of concern were comprehensively defined by an ordinance of 1493, which required the
gens du roi to take an oath to "safeguard the rights of the crown,
punish crimes, protect widows and orphans, and conduct themselves
as good officers of the crown."80
Practically speaking, the Ministere public's participation in civil
litigation was limited to intervention as a "partie jointe"81 in cases
involving the protection of minors, widows, absentees, and incompetents and generally in cases concerning the validity of marriages,
legitimacy, and adoptions8 2-in sum, instances that involved the protection of the "weak" and reflected a strong, direct commitment of
the "state" in certain areas. Within these limits, the Ministere public's
mission and usefulness apparently were not contested, as confirmed
by the fact that the institution, in so far as its noncriminal role was
concerned, happily survived the cataclysms of the bourgeois Revolution.88
To be sure, the pre-Revolutionary role of the Ministere public
was not entirely confined to the subject matters just mentioned.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

See, e.g., 1 M. VELLANI, supra note 20, at 122.
J. Jegu, supra note 23, at 1-2.
Id. at 2.
Id.
M.-L. R.AssAT, supra note 23, at 21-22 & n.86.
See id. at 15, 26, 143. Cf. Bekaert, supra note 2, at 429-30.
J. Jegu, supra note 23, at 2.
Id. at 2-3. Cf. M.•L R.AssAT, supra note 23, at 15, 31 and references therein.
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Another task-no less important, although less openly recognizedwas to act as a royal surveillant over the judges.34 Even today one
function of the Ministere public in Belgium is to serve as an "intermediary" between the executive and the_ judiciary35 and as a guardian against judicial abuse.36
Another traditional role of the Ministere public in France, Italy,
Belgium, and a number of other countries is to ensure that the
courts correctly and uniformly apply the laws, principally by participating in appellate proceedings for the review of errors of law committed by the lower courts. In France, Belgium, and Italy (although
not in Germany),37 an amicus curiae appearance ("intervention par
voie d'avis") by the Ministere public attached to the Supreme Court
of Cassation is required in civil proceedings before that court;38 in
Belgium and Italy (although not in France),39 the Ministere public
not only argues in open court but also participates, albeit with no
vote, in the in camera deliberations of the Court of Cassation.40
34. See, e.g., I M. VELLANI, supra note 20, at 123-24, 185-86. This task was particu•
larly important vis-a-vis those judges, especially the Parlementaires, who tried to maintain a high degree of independence from the sovereign. Cf. Habscheid, supra note
20, at 178.
35. Krings, supra note 4, at 162.
36. Id. at 151, 163. For instance, the Ministere public is required to participate in
proceedings concerning the disqualification of a judge for such reasons as relationship,
friendship, or a common interest with one of the parties. See id. at 150. The same is
true for France, see J. Jegu, supra note 23, at 11, and for other countries. See, e.g., E.
Vescovi, supra note 20, at n.34 (Uruguay). The significance of this function should
not be overlooked. In Italy, for instance, the conservative side of the political spectrum
has been strongly complaining that the judiciary has become an uncontrollable ivory
tower ever since the 1948 Constitution severed the ties between the Ministere public
and the executive. See note 50 infra. As a remedy, the suggestion has repeatedly been
made that the Ministere public should be subjected again, to some degree, to the
authority of the political branches of government. Cf. Vigoriti, supra note 21, at
273-74.
37. See Habscheid, supra note 20, at 176, 184.
38. See J. Jegu, supra note 23, at 14 ("Oral conclusions [closing arguments] are
always used in proceedings before the Court of Cassation. • • • In these proceedings
the conclusions of the Ministere public constitute a remarkable contribution that has
often been the starting point of new trends in case law''); Krings, supra note 4, at 142
("In the proceedings before the Court of Cassation the Ministere public gives his
advice in all cases in the form of conclusions"); Vigoriti, supra note 21, at 282-83
(usefulness of such participation by Ministere public questionable). See also ,M. CAPPELLETl'I &: J. PERILLO, CML PROCEDURE IN ITALY 273 (1965) (The Hague, Nijhoff);
P. HERZOG&: M. WESER, supra note 3, at 122, 444-45, 453. In Belgium, the presence of
the Ministere public was required even at the hearings before the Cours d'appel; in
most cases this participation proved to be both useless and burdensome, however,
and accordingly the Code judiciaire of 1967 abolished this requirement. Krings, supra,
at 162 n.29.
39. See J. Jegu, supra note 23, at 14.
40. C. PRO. CIV. art. 380 (Italy); CODE JUDICIAIRE art. 1109 (Belgium). This remnant
of the past has been challenged as violative of the parties' right to a fair hearing.
The European Court of Human Rights, in a much criticized decision, Delcourt Case,
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Moreover, in France, as in Italy, Spain, and Belgium (although not
in Germany),41 the Ministere public attached to the Court of Cassation may file an autonomous recourse "dans l'interet de la loi" ("in
the interest of the law") against judgments that the parties can no
longer attack due to the lapse of time. Even if the Ministere public's
attack is upheld, however, the lower court's decision remains binding
on the parties; 42 the only purpose of the "recourse in the interest of
the law" is to prevent the perpetuation of erroneous judicial precedents in the legal system at large. 43 Since judicial decisions, especially those of lower and intermediate courts, have little precedential
value in civil-law countries, this additional power of the Ministere
public is rarely e:xercised and of little practical significance.
2. Limitations and Ambiguities

The ambiguity of the role and status of the Ministere public
remains a typical feature of the institution.44 There is still a great
temptation to consider the officers of the Ministere public as mere
"agents of the executive, at the risk of violating the principle of
separation of powers,"45 notwithstanding that these officers "are
Judgment of Jan. 17, 1970, upheld the Belgian provision, whereas the Italian Constitutional Court recently struck down similar Ita1ian provisions as violative of the
parties' equal opportunity to be heard. Corte costituzionale, Decision No. 2'7 of Feb.
17, 1972, {1972] Foro. Ital. I 568, 17 Giur. Cost. 113 (1972) (disbarment proceedings):
Corte costituzionale, Decision No. 2 of Jan. 14, 1974, [19'74] Foro. Ital. l 287, 19 Giur.
Cost. 8 (1974) (disciplinary proceedings against judges). See Vigoriti, supra note 21,
at 283 n.56. For criticism of the European Court's decision, see, for e..xamplc, Cappelletti &: Vigoriti, Fundamental Guarantees of the Litigants in Civil Proceedings: Italy,
in FUNDAMENTAL GUARANTEES, supra note 21, at 511, 551-52; Nadelmann, Due Process of
Law Before the European Court of Human Rights: The Secret Deliberation, 66 AM.
J. INTL. L. !i09 (1972). But see J. VELO, L'AFFAIRE DELCOURT 61-62 (1972) (Bruxelles,
Editions de l'Universite); Krings, supra note 4, at 142, 158-59.
To be sure, the Ministere public at the French, Belgian, and Italian Courts of
Cassation is not a party in any real sense of the word. Rather, as stated by the
European Court of Human Rights in the Delcourt case, he is "an auxiliary and legal
advisor" of the supreme national court, vested with a "quasi-judicial function," However, since he is not even a full-fledged member of the Court, it is hard to see why,
after having openly argued in court, he should be allowed to argue again in camera,
in the absence of the parties. See Vigoriti, supra note 21, at 282-83.
41. See Habscheid, supra note 20, at 184.
42. See, e.g., CODE JUDiciAIRE art. 1090 (Belgium).
43. See M. CAPPELLEITI &: J, PERILLO, supra note 38, at 273; P. HERZoc &: M. WEStn,
supra note 3, at 445; V. Fairen Guillen, supra note !l, at Ill.
44. See, e.g., Vigoriti, supra note 21, at 279, 288. CJ. V. Fairen Guillen, supra note
3, at 4; E. Vescovi, supra note 20, at 12, 13.
45. J. Jegu, supra note 23, at 3. See also, e.g., R. DAVID &: H. DEVRIES, THE FRENCH
LEGAL SYSTEM 20 (1958) (New York, Oceana) ("a hierarchy of public officials who arc
agents of the executive and yet, as part of the maglstrature, are appointed and classified as judges'); M.-L. RAssAT, supra note 23, at 247-48. Cf. C. Suzuki, supra note 3,
at· 15 (participation of the Ministere public in civil litigation a "residue of the time
when the separation of powers was not established yet'), Bekaert perhaps somewhat

April 19'7!i]

Advocates for the Public Interest

805

magistrates subject to the same requirements for admission, the same
obligations and disqualifications as the 'sitting' magisttates."46 This
ambiguous status is further evidenced by the fact that in the course of
their careers, judges can-and not infrequently do-switch from the
Parquet to the bench47 and 'Vice versa.48 This situation creates a
strong "unite d' esprit" among the "sitting" and the "standing" magistrates, which in turn promotes a de facto independence of the Parquet from the executive.49 For several reasons, however, this independence is quite limited and not firmly rooted in the law.50
First, the organization of the Parquet is strictly hierarchical. The
offices of the Ministere public form a unit for the entire nation,51 and
each of its numerous members is under the direction and control of
his superior, up to the Procureurs Generaux at the Cours d'Appel}2
optimistically stresses the fact that, unlike the situation more than one and a half
centuries ago, the Ministere public is today generally regarded as independent and
no longer as a mere "representative of the executive power." Bekaert, supra no~e 2,
at 420, 433.
46. J. Jegu, supra note 23, at 4. See also P. HERZOG&: M. WESER, supra note 3, at
121. For analogies in other countries, see V. Fairen Guillen, supra note 3, at 8 (Spain);
W. Kralik, supra note 3, at 12 (Austria); S. Ofiate, supra note 3, at 2-3 (Latin America);
E, Vescovi, supra note 20, at 22, 26·27 (Latin America); Habscheid, supra note 20, at
178, 180 (Federal Republic of Germany); Krings, supra note 4, at 144 (Belgium).
"Scholars illustrate the strange position of the officers of the Ministere public by noting that at the same time they are both 'civil servants,' which explains their subordination [to the executive branch], and judges, which allows them a certain degree
of independence." M.-L. RAssAT, supra note 23, at 247-48.
47. R. DAVID &: H, DEVRIES, supra note 45, at 21; J. Jegu, supra note 23, at 5.
Movement is probably even more frequent in Germany, see Habscheid, supra note 20,
at 180, and in Italy. See Vigoriti, supra note 21, at 270, A somewhat similar situation
exists in Uruguay. See E. Vescovi, supra note 20, at 26.
48, J. Jegu, supra note 23, at 5; E, Vescovi, supra note 20, at 26. But see R. DAVID
&: H, DEVRIES, supra note 45, at 21 ("a judge rarely transfers to the ministere public").
49. J. Jegu, supra note 23, at 5.
50. Id. at 6 ("The independence of the Ministere public vis-a-vis the central government ••• is not expressly provided for in the written law''). For the situation in
Belgium, see Krings, supra note 4, at 143-4'7. The situation is different in Italy, however, since the 1948 Constitution prescribes a large degree of independence for the
Parquet vis-a-vis the executive. See Vigoriti, supra note 21, at 270. This constitutional
mandate was, of course, a· reaction to abuses under fascism. See C. Giannattasio, in 2
COMMENTARIO SISTEMATlCO AILA CoSTlTUZIONE lTALIANA 191, 197 (P. Calamandrei &: A.
Levi ed. 1950) (Firenze, Barbera).
51. See M.-L. RAssAT, supra note 23, at 82-8!i; J. Jegu, supra note 23, at 5. The
same is also true for Belgium, see Krings, supra note 4, at 139, and for Spain. See V.
F'airen Guillen, supra note 3, at 1, 3, 7. A similar situation exists in Germany, see
Habscheid, supra note 20, at 178-79; in Austria, see W. Kralik, supra note 3, at 12;
and in Japan. See C. Suzuki, supra note 3, at 5. For most practical purposes, this also
holds for Italy, see Vigoriti, supra note 21, at 272-73 &: n.10, but not £or Uruguay.
See E. Vescovi, supra note 20, at 23-24.
52. There is one Procureur General for each of the French Cours d'appel (intermediate appellate courts); his senior assistants are called Avocats ·Generaux. P. HmtzoG
&: M. WESER, supra note 3, at 120 &: n.47. For analogues in other countries, see Hab-
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the Procureur General at the Gour de Cassation, ua and, at the top of
the structure, the Minister of Justice (Garde des Sceaux). Thus, a
member of the Cabinet "has authority over the Procureurs Generaux
a,nd, through them, over all officers of the Ministere public."ti4.
Second, the members of the Parquet do not have the security of
"sitting" judges. While the "sitting" magistrates enjoy the guarantee
of inamovibilite-meaning that, under normal circumstances, no one
has authority to transfer a judge without his consent-the members
of the Parquet are subject to transfer from one court to another,lili
Only in the most dictatorial civil-law countries, however, can an
officer of the Ministere public be dismissed from office at the will of
the executive. 56
The ambiguous status of the Parquet is, one might say, the clever
result of a centuries-long compromise, best reflected by some additional features of the Ministere public's status of hierarchical semi•
dependence. For one thing, while the Minister of Justice can give
"instructions" to a Procureur General, he cannot act in the latter's
scheid, supra note 20, at 179 (Germany); Krings, supra note 4, at 139-40 (Belgium);
Vigoriti, supra note 21, at 272 (Italy).
'
53. The Procureur General has a rnther large staff of Avocats Generaux and other
Parquet officers. P. HERzoc 8: M. WESER, supra note 3, at 120. For analogues in other
countries, see V. Fairen Guillen, supra note 3, at 7-8 (Spain); Krings, supra note 4, at
141 (Belgium); Vigoriti, supra note 21, at 272 (Italy). For similarities in the Federal
Republic of Germany, see Habscheid, supra note 20, at 179.
54. J. Jegu, supra note 23, at 5. Substantially the same is true for Spain, see V.
Fairen Guillen, supra note 3, at 7; for Austria, see W. Kralik, supra note 3, at 12; for
Latin America, see S. Ofiate, supra note 3, at 2-3; E. Vescovi, supra note 20, at 22;
for Germany, see Habscheid, supra note 20, at 179; and for Delgium. See Krings,
supra note 23, at 145-46.
It has been recognized, however, that in France "[i]n actual practice, interference
of the Minister of Justice in the work of the members of the ministere public is
quite unusual, especially in civil matters." P. HERZOG 8: M. WESER, supra note 3, at
121. As for Italy, while the hierarchical structure of the Parquet keeps the lower
officers dependent upon the Procuratori generali, the ties of the latter to the Min•
ister of Justice have been severed. See note 36 supra.
55. See J. Jegu, supra note 23, at 6. The same is true for Germany, see Habscheid,
supra note 20, at 180, and for Delgium. See Krings, supra note 4, at 145. Professor
Krings, however,·states that in fact transfers never occur without the officer's consent;
even though in Belgium appointments are not for life, thereby making the officers
of the Parquet theoretically subject to dismissal from their office, Krings, supra, at
143, in fact "they are dismissed only for disciplinary reasons duly established, and
after an official hearing which, according to the law, must respect the party's right
to be heard [les droits de la defense]." Krings, supra, at 145. But see M.-L. RASSAT,
supra note 23, at 49-51, where a bleaker picture is given with regard to France.
56. CJ. J. da Silva Lopes, Communication au sujet du ministere public dans le
proces civil bresilien 1-2 (unpublished Drazilian report, see note I supra). As a rule,
in Continental Europe both judges and Ministere public officers are appointed for
life; dismissal is extremely Tare and must be based on disciplinary proceedings strictly
regulated by law. See, e.g., Habscheid, supra note 20, at 180. Cf. note 55 supra.
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place.u7 The same is true for the relationship between a Procureur
General and the Procureur de la Republique. 58 Moreover, an act by
an officer of the Parquet is not ·without legal effect merely because of
the failure of the officer to follow his superior's instructions; sanctions
are available, but only at the disciplinary level.59 This relative independence is magnified with regard to oral arguments. A pre-Revolutionary adage, still valid, proclaims that "la plume est serve, mais la
parole est libre," meaning that, although the officers of the Ministere
public are obliged to follow the instructions of their superiors when
they prepare and file written papers, "[a]t the hearing, they regain
total independence in their oral arguments and conclusions." 60 This
proud if illogical61 affirmation of at least a limited degree of independence for the Ministere public was consecrated in the Gaullist
decree of December 22, 1958, on the reorganization of the French
judiciary.62
3. Obstacles to Transformation

For about a century the state has been extending its commitment
into areas far beyond those of personal status, capacity, and family. In
fact, at least one of the traditional areas, marriage, has undergone a
partial de-publicization in modern times.63 Litigation in matters of
57. See J. Jegu, supra note 23, at 6.
58. See id. The Procureur de la Rt!publique is the head of the Parquet at all
Tribunaux de grande instance (superior courts of first instance); his assistants are
called substituts. P. HERzoG & M. WESER, supra note 3, at 120.
59. See J. Jegu, supra note 23, at 6. Cf. P. HERZOG & M. WESER, supra note 3, at
121; M.-L. RAssAT, supra note 23, at 49-51; Krings, supra note 4, at 146-47.
60. J. Jegu, supra note 23, at 6. See P. HERZOG & M. WESER, supra note 3, at 121.
For a more detailed analysis, see M.-L. RAssAT, supra note 23, at 119-35.
61. On the illogical character of the rule expressed by the pre-Revolutionary
adage, see, e.g., M.-L. R.AssAT, supra note 23, at 139-40, 248. It is impossible not to
share the skepticism of Whidden: "The ancient adage ••• is an expression of [the]
idea that the members of the Ministere public are government functionaries when in
their own offices, but servants of justice when in court. It is hard to imagine the
mental gymnastics that would be required if such were truly the case." R. Whidden,
supra note 1, at 11.
62. Ordonnance No. 58-1270 of Dec. 22, 1958, art. 5 [1958] J.O. 11551, [1959] J.C.P.
III No. 24106. See P. HERzoG & M. WESER, supra note 3, at 121; M.-L. R.AssAT, supra
note 23, at 129; J. Jegu, supra note 23, at 3, 6.
63. This process is reflected, for instance, in recent French legislation. Jegu remarks that "article 8 of the Decree of July 20, 1972 [introducing new provisions in
civil procedure] seems to reduce the number of cases in which the Ministere public
can intervene. In particular, the fact that divorce and separation suits have been
filed need no longer be communicated to the Ministere public ••• .'' J. Jegu, supra
note 23, at 12. As for Germany, Professor Habscheid informs us that the Ministere
public's role in divorce proceedings is totally insignificant. Habscheid, supra note 20,
at 178 n.3. The same is true for Austria. See W. Kralik, supra note 3, at 10. Similar
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civil rights, labor, social assistance, antitrust, unfair competition,
consumer protection, securities regulation, environmental protection, and urban development have forcefully emerged as major
candidates for public concern and state control.64 As stated by Master
Jacob:
[W]e may be said to be on the threshold of a vast new e.xpanse of
"interests" which will become the subject of legal control, and which
will very likely in due time greatly increase the volume of civil
proceedings containing an element of public interest, so that the
balance and the character of civil proceedings would change from
the system where the private interest of litigants pre-dominates to
one where the public interest will play the primary part.61;
Unless the Ministere public can adapt itself to these new tasks, it
will prove incapable of meeting the real public needs of our time.
The ambiguity of the status and role of the Ministere public
represents a first obstacle to that kind of evolution and adaptation.
On the one hand, the Ministere public is too much of a judge-too
much "above the crowd"66-to be psychologically and educationally
suited to becoming the champion of local, economic, religious, racial,
or other communities, let alone "classes." The Ministere public
"could not be the spokesman of a class, a group of citizens or group
interests."67 This unsuitability for partisan advocacy has become so
accentuated and officially recognized that-contrary to his historical
origins-as a rule68 the Ministere public does not serve as an attorney
for the state, or for other public entities such as local municipalities
(communes). 69 In France, these entities are represented in court by a
normal attorney. 70
developments are apparent in a number of other countries, including England and
Canada. See note 151 infra; I. Jacob, The Representation of the Public Interest in
English Civil Proceedings 31-32 (unpublished English report, see note 1 supra); Rivet,
Le role du "ministere public" dans le proces civil au Quebec, 8 REVUE JURIDIQUE
THEMIS 237-38, 243-44 (1973). See also note 151 infra (Kenya and Tanzania). The
Italian provision requiring the Ministere public's intervention in divorce cases, Law
of Dec. 1, 1970, No. 898, art. 5, [1970] Rae. Uff. 2359, [1970] Gaz. Uff. No. 806 at
8047, is but one remnant of a grotesque governmental concern for marriage stability
in that country. Cf. M. RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE, AND THE LAW 158•
93 (1972) (Chicago &: London, University of Chicago Press).
64. Cf., e.g., P. Bolding, Protection of the Public Interest in Civil Litigation in
Sweden 1, 5 (unpublished Swedish report, see note 1 supra}, See also note 4 supra.
65. I. Jacob, supra note 63, at 92.
66. Krings, supra note 4, at 166.
67. J. Jegu, supra note 23, at 7. See also Krings, supra note 4, at 147, 165-66,
68. There are a few exceptions in France. See J. Jegu, supra note 23, at 7, 11.
69. The same is true for countries other than France. In Italy and Spain, for
instance, that task has been entrusted to a special body of state attorneys (Awocati
dello Stato, Abogados del Estado) entirely separate from the office of the Minist~re
public. M. CAl>l'ELLETII &: J. PERILLO, supra note 38, at 64-65; V. Faircn Guillen,
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On the other hand, the Ministere public is too much of an executive officer to be institutionally and organizationally suited to becoming the champion of constitutional or otherwise prominent interests that need protection against abuses by the political branches of
government. In fact, when in the nineteenth century Continental
Europe recognized the fundamental principle that administrative
action must be subject to judicial review-a major achievement of
legal civilization in which France was the great pioneer-no right to
commence, or even to intervene in suits against the executive was
entrusted to the Ministere public. Rather, standing to attack the
legality (vires) of administrative action before the Conseil d'Etat and
other administrative courts was conferred upon the private person
aggrieved by the challenged action. The direct and personal interest
of the injured person thus becomes the motivation for his becoming
involved in what is, in a sense, a public-interest suit.71
The Ministere public thus appears inherently unsuited to becoming the forceful promoter of the type of group, class, and publicinterest actions that are most important in modem societies.72
Rather, the Ministere public's main responsibility has remained
supra note 3, at 5. See also W. Kralik, supra note 3, at 1-2, 12 (Austrian Finanzprokuratur). A different solution, however, has been adopted in Mexico. See S. Ofiate,
supra note 3, at 4-5.
70. See P. liERZ0G & M. WESER, supra note 3, at 123; J. Jegu, supra note 23, at 7.
A similar situation exists in Germany. See Habscheid, supra note 20, at 180-81.
A different development in Japan is worth noting. After World War II, under
American influence, see C. Suzuki, supra note 3, at 16, a law was passed that authorizes the Minister of Justice to make use of the Ministere public's officers as attorneys
for the state (or other governmental entities) in civil cases. To this end, the "public
procurators" act as "subordinate agents" of the Minister of Justice and are organized
in a "Litigation Division, legal affairs bureaux and district legal affairs bureaux"
within the department of the Minister of Justice. Id.
71. See, e.g., R. DAVID & H. DEVRIES, supra note 45, at 39. To be sure, there is
attached to the Conseil d'Etat an office of Commissaires du Gouvernement, which
bears some resemblance to the Parquet; the same is also true, for instance, for the
German office of the Oberbundesanwalt, which is attached to the Federal Administrative Court and modeled after the French institution. See E. REHBINDER, H. BURGBACHER & R. KNIEPER, BiiRGERKLAGE n.r UMWELTRl!CHT 26 (1972) (Berlin, Schmidt). The
Commissaires du gouvernement "are appointed by governmental decree from among
members of the Conseil d'Etat." R. DAVID &: H. DEVRIES, suprtr, at 39. They "present
their objective, independent arguments in administrative matters, just as the representatives of the ministere public do in the ordinary law courts and, like the latter,
despite their title they do not represent governmental interests but frequently advocate annulment of administrative measures. The governmental department concerned
normally is represented by its own legal counsel." Id. See also M.-L. RAssAT, supra
note 23, at 254. The fact remains, however, that the private parties alone, and not
the Commissaires, may commence proceedings to review the legality of administrative
action; the same is true both in Germany and Italy.
'12. Professor Vigoriti goes so far as to propose the elimination of any role of the ·
Ministere public in civil litigation, basing his view on the ambiguities and inefficiency
of that institution. Vigoriti, supra note 21, at 288. See text at note 246 infra.
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criminal prosecution,73 a role in which the "historic compromise"
makes a great deal of sense. It is very important that the prosecutors
have some degree of independence vis-a-vis the government, and impartiality vis-a-vis the accused; that they be professionally akin to
judges rather than to lawyers; and that they not be psychologically
trained and selected in view of their becoming the champions of any
partisan cause. Their "cause" is two-headed: to prosecute criminal
conduct, and to assure both fairness in the prosecution and an imw
partial, judicial-like check on police abuses.
The key to the French Ministere public's success is that he is not
a partisan party. To borrow (for a somewhat different meaning) the
incisive terminology of my eminent former colleague, Louis Jaffe of
Harvard, the Ministere public is, par excellence, a "non-ideological"
plaintiff.74 Or, in Professor Krings' words, the Ministere public is
"an element that provides balance and measure, a guarantee against
arbitrariness." 75 His "neutral" duty is to argue for the innocent accused, not to maintain and "win" an ungrounded prosecution,7°
Indeed, he is not even a plaintiff in a full sense, let alone an ideological plaintiff; rather, even when the Ministere public prosecutes, he
remains an "auxiliary" of the judge,77 the court's assistant and objective advisor, an "impartial party." 78
The centuries-long development of the French Parquet is the
expression of a highly refined legal civilization. Much could be
learned, especially in the United States, by a thorough comparison
between the Ministere public and the prosecutorial officers of the
common-law countries.79 While I recognize great merit in the French
73. "The main function of the Ministere public is to find and to prosecute criminals." M.-L. RASSAT, supra note 23, at 2. Cf., e.g., Vigoriti, supra note 21, at 2'14-'15,
284, 287.
74. See Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or
Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033 (1968).
75. Krings, supra note 4, at 162. Rassat quotes Merlin's definition of the Ministere public as an "organ of the law, as 'impassive as the law.'" M.-L. RAssAT, supra
note 23, at 253.
76. See, e.g., Corte costituzionale, Decision No. 190 of Dec. 16, 19'10, [19'11] Foro. Ital.
I 8, 15 Giur. Cost. 2188-90 (19'10), quoted in Vigoriti, supra note 21, at 2'15 n,17;
M.-L. RASSAT, supra note 23, at 239.
77. See, e.g., Bekaert, supra note 2, at 435.
78. See, e.g., V. Fairen Guillen, supra note 3, at 10. See id. at IO n.23 for a
bibliography of the often rather academic discussion on whether the Ministere
public is a true party.
79. Presumably, most conclusions from such a comparison would not tum in favor
of the American institution. For instance, things as unacceptable (to most Europeans)
as widespread selective enforcement of the criminal law and plea bargaining are out
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institution, however, I have strong doubts that it could be easily
adapted-in fact, that it should be adapted-to a new and greatly
expanded role in civil litigation, requiring its participation in areas
far beyond the traditional cases of personal status, capacity, and
family. Unlike the emerging public interest litigation, these tradi.:
tional cases pose the problem of representing the "public" interest in
a perspective much akin to that of criminal prosecution. They do
not require a "fighter," a partisan "champion," an "ideological"
plaintiff. Rather, like criminal prosecution, they require an objective
and neutral plaintiff, more reminiscent of an auxiliary of the judge
than of a real party.80
There are other, perhaps no less telling, obstacles to an adaptation
of the Parquet, resulting from the structure of the Parquet's organization and the "career" of its personnel. The Parquet is, as we have
seen, a unitary, nationwide, bureaucratic public agency. Without
profound structural changes, I doubt that such a machinery could
prove flexible enough to come to grips with such new, variable, and
highly specialized problems as marketing regulations, unfair competition, and environmental protection-let alone labor or racial conflicts. 81 Even if the machinery should prove flexible enough, the
fact remains that the Ministere public's training and expertise are
essentially legal. He may be a very valuable bridge between an
attorney and a judge, but he certainly is not a suitable mediator between law and society. The structure of the organization in which the
Ministere public lives does not provide him with any more knowledge and direct expertise than any normal citizen about the problems
of our urban, industrial, and "conflictual" civilization. In fact, being
a member of a "career judiciary"-:with all of the advantages and the
shortcomings of this typically Continental, bureaucratic institution82
-makes him, on the average, even more insulated from these problems of life than a businessman, a labor unionist, a builder, or even
a normal advocate.
of place with an institution such as the Ministere public. Cf. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY
191-95, 224, 230-31 (1969) (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University -Press).
80. Continental terminology recognizes this fact by calling most of these cases
"voluntary" (or ''noncontentious'') proceedings, that is, proceedings that do not involve a real dispute. The same is true for Japan, see C. Suzuki, supra note 3, at· 1,
9-13, and, more generally, for the civil-law world.
81. Cf., e.g., S. Ofiate, supra note 3, at 8, 12-13.
82. Like all members of the magistrature, the officers of the Parquet are law
graduates who entered the judiciary at a young age as a life career. See, e.g., J. Jegu,
supra note 23, at 4-5. Of course, this fact makes judges and members of the Ministere public in Continental Europe very different persons from their Anglo-American
counterparts. See note 159 infra.
JUS'I'ICE
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4. Western Attempts To Expand the Traditional Role
in Civil Proceedings
The doubts manifested above concerning the suitability of the
Ministere public, as a career member of the judiciary, for a substantial role in representing newly emerged public and community interests in civil litigation seem confirmed by the following empirical
consideratons.
Since 1913 in France (and since 1881 in Belgium), the courts have
adhered to the principle that, in addition to the right to participate
in cases specifically indicated by legislation, 83 the Ministere public
has a general droit d' action. This means that he has the right to
bring to court any civil case in which, in his evaluation, an important
element of ordre public is directly at stake. 84 If such a case already
has been commenced by others, the Ministere public apparently has
the right to join as a full-fledged party. 85 The Italian Code of Civil
Procedure of 1940 went even further, giving the Ministere public
the power to intervene in-but not to commence-"all civil cases in
which he recognizes a public interest."86
83. These cases cover, essentially, the traditional matters of personal status, infants,
incompetents, marriage, filiation, and adoption. See the lists in P. HERZOG &: M. WESER,
supra note 3, at 123, and J. Jegu, supra note 23, at 10-11 (France); Krings, supra
note 4, at 149 n.18 (Belgium). See Krings, supra, at 150, for the list of cases, covering
essentially these same areas, in which at least an amicus curiae appearance of the
Ministere public is compulsory. For the situation in Senegal, one of the African legal
systems directly influenced by France, see Gulphe, supra note 1, at 35-38.
84. See Bekaert, supra note 2, at 425-26, 427 n.1, 433, 435.37 (and the court deci•
sions cited therein), 447-48 (prevailing doctrine has long opposed such an extension
of the Ministere public's powers). See also P. HERZOG &: M. WESER, supra note 8, at
123-24; M.-L. RASSAT, supra note 23, at 5-6; J. Jegu, supra note 23, at 9-10; Krings,
supra note 4, at 142, 148-49. Jegu informs us that the long controversy between the
courts and doctrine has now become moot, for a French decree explicitly gives the
Ministere public the power ("il peut") to bring suit "for the defense of the ordre
public whenever there are circumstances that directly and primarily endanger the
ordre public." J. Jegu, supra, at 10, quoting Decree No. '12--684 of July 20, 1972, art.
7, [1972] J.O. 7860, [1972] J.C.P. III No. 39368 bis, This power is, of course, in addi•
tion to those cases "specifically established by law" in which the Ministere public
is statutorily required, or allowed, to bring an action to court. See text at note 83
supra.
85. Cf. Bekaert, supra note 2, at 429; Krings, supra note 4, at 156.
86. C. PRo. CIV. art. 70, ,r 5. The new Brazilian Code of Civil Procedure, in force
since January 1, 1974, contains a similar provision, See CODIGO DE PRoCESSO CIVIL
art. 82 m (1974); J. da Silva Lopes, supra note 56, at 4, 7.
In addition to the power mentioned in the text, the Italian Ministere publiclike his French and Belgian counterparts-has the power (or the duty) to commence
(or to intervene in) cases specifically indicated by legislation. As in the other civil law
countries (including Spain and Latin American countries, see J. da Silva Lopes, supra,
at 5-7; V. Fairen Guillen, supra note 3, at 12-13, 16-17; S. Ofiate, supra note 3, at
6-8, 10; E. Vescovi, supra note 20, at 14 &: n.36, 26), these cases involve, above all,
the usual matters: status of persons, bankrupts, incompetents and minors, and marriage and family. C. PRO. CIV. art. 70 (Italy); Vigoriti, supra note 21, at 276-'77, 285.
When the Ministere public intervenes in cases that he could have commenced by
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"Ordre public" and "public interest" are, of course, vague and
flexible concepts.87 Since the Ministere public has ample discretion
himself, he has the same powers as the principal parties. In cases that he could not
have commenced, he still has extensive procedural powers. He may, for instance,
introduce evidence, make motions, present written and oral arguments, and in certain
cases, even appeal; however, he is not allowed to go beyond the scope of the cause
of action and the prayer for relief that have been specified by the principal parties.
C. PRo. CIV, art. 72 (Italy). See Vigoriti, supra, at 280, For analogues in France and
Belgium, see P. HERzoc &: M. WESER, supra note 3, at 122 &: n.58; J. Jegu, supra
note 23, at 13, 15; Krings, supra note 4, at 154-56, 163-65. The Italian Ministere
public rarely exercises his power to intervene, however, and even when he does, he
feebly exercises his procedural powers:
During the proof-taking stage, the activity of the p[ubblico] m[inistero] is minimal .•••
• • • [He] almost never intervenes during the final hearing •••• Even when
he intervenes [he] refrains from using his powers and instead leaves the [private]
parties absolutely free to handle the case as they see fit, ..•
[As for his written conclusions, he] [u]sually ••• limits himself to requesting
a judgment either for or against the plaintiff, generally in not more than a
couple of sentences at the end of the record of the hearing. Exceptions to this
practice infrequently occur,
Vigoriti, supra, at 285-86. An even more radical, though short-lived, development
occurred in Nazi Germany in 1941. See Habscheid, supra note 20, at 178, 184. See
also C. Suzuki, supra note 3, at 2-3; E. Vescovi, supra, at 30 &: n.77. A statute of
July 15, 1941, gave the Ministere public the power ''to represent state and societal
interests" in any civil case. The statute also gave him the power to attac;k befor~ the
Supreme Court (Reichsgericht), by means of an extraordinary recourse, civil judgments violative of ordre public; this power could be exercised within one year after
the judgment had become res judicata between the parties. For a socialist analogue,
see text at notes 117-22 infra.
Having leamed from the political abuses committed by a politicized, inquisitorial
Ministere public ("Staatsanwalt') acting as the long arm of a dictatorial executive,
post-World War II Germany drastically reduced the role of the Ministen: public in
civil litigation to a very few matters expressly established by law (essentially, only
matrimonial and incompetency matters). See Habscheid, supra, at 176,77, 181-84. See
also Hazard, supra note 3, at 209 &: n.3. Even in these matters, the role of the Ministere public in the Federal Republic of Germany is, in fact, minimal. In Professor
Habscheid's words, the participation of the Ministere public in proceedings involving
divorce and other family matters "has hardly any significance"; such participation is
not compulsory and rarely occurs. Habscheid, supra, at 178 n.3, 181-82, For analogues
in Austria, see W. Kralik, supra note 3, at I, 3-11. Japan did not follow the German
and Italian path in expanding the role of the Ministere public to all civil cases
involving a public interest, but rather continued to limit his role to cases specifically
enumerated in statutes. C. Suzuki, supra, at 3. Moreover, after World War II that
role, already limited, has gradually become even narrower. Id. at 2, 15. It is virtually
limited to a list of traditional matters relating to marriage, personal status and capacity, and a number of noncontentious cases, most of which involve domestic relations. Id. at I, 3-13. Even in these matters, the Ministerc public's participation, which
is usually not a requisite for entering a valid decision, is infrequent and ineffective.
T. Kojima, supra note 1, at 2; C. Suzuki, supra, at ll}-15,
87. See note 4 supra. In the words of Jegu, "[i]n civil matters the concept of
ordre public is difficult to define because, since it includes all the interests of society,
it changes, as society itself, according to time and place." J. Jegu, supra note 23, at
8. Attempting to give a less vague definition, he adds that "all actions that are likely
to endanger the general organization of the state and of public services, the social
or economic equilibrium of the country, and the integrity, liberty and dignity of
the human person, are considered to be against the ordre public in private law."
Id. Vigoriti states;
The question arises, what constitutes such a public interest sufficient to warrant
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in determining the scope of these concepts in concrete cases,88 he
doubtless ,;vould have the power to act in cases involving the most
fundamental problems of modem societies, such as civil liberties,
frauds in commerce and industry, and environmental pollution. "To
grant .the Ministere public the right to bring suit in the interest of
ordre public is to give him a power whose definition changes as a
function of time and space and whose scope is always variable." 80 Yet
it frequently has been complained that the Ministere public rarely
takes any initiative in these fundamental areas, even where he could
initiate a criminal suit, and not merely participate in a civil suit.
"Experience has sufficiently demonstrated that, in these types of cases,
the Ministere public is too often inclined not to act," writes one
French author with regard to racial defamation. 00
intervention by the p[ubblico] m[inistero]? The answer has not been precisely
given either by the legislature or by the courts; in fact, it is doubtful that a
rigorous definition would be useful, or even possible. The legislature prefers,
therefore, to assign to the p[ubblico] m[inistero] the rcsponsibilitl of evaluating
th·e presence of such an interest according to the circumstances o each case and
in view of the "fundamental values" shared in the community.
Vigoriti, supra note 21, at 281-82 (footnotes omitted). See also S. Oiiate, supra note 3,
at 9. For a multi-disciplinary discussion by a number of authors, see NolllOS V: THE
Ptmuc INTEREsr (C. Friedrich ed. 1962) (New York, Atherton Press) (yearbook of the
American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy).
88. Cf., e.g., Vigoriti, supra note 21, at 281-82.
89. Bekaert, supra note 2, at 436. Bekaert clarifies that "due to its flexibility and
the changeable nature of its contents, the concept of ordre public has succeeded in
finding a place in the political, economic, and social structures of the past." Id. at
448. Professor Bekaert's thesis, however, is that this notion is no longer able to reflect
the needs of society. Therefore, he proposes that the Ministere public's droit d'action
should be expanded to include all cases in which a "general" or "collective" interest
is at stake. In all these cases the Ministere public should have the power (and duty)
to commence proceedings, or to intervene with all the prerogatives of a full-fledged
party (Partie principale). The problem with this thesis is its failure to consider
whether the institution would be capable of making effective use of the increased
powers entrusted to it. The Italian experience seems to demonstrate that a mere
change in the wording of the law-from "ordre public" to a more general concept
of "public interest"-does not per se bring about any real change. See note 92 infra
and accompanying text.
90. Foulon-Piganiol, La lutte contre le racisme, 1972 REcuEIL DALLoz SIREY, CHRO•
NIQUE 261, 263. Cf. Foulon-Piganiol, Reflexions sur la diffamation raciale, 1970 RE·cuEIL DALLoz SIREY, CHRONIQUE 133; Foulon-Piganiol, Nouvelles reflexions sur la
diffamation raciale, 1970 R.ECUEIL DALLOZ SIREY, CHRONIQUE 163.
Another author makes a similar complaint with regard to commercial frauds: after
taking note that the repression of such frauds by special public agents is inadequate,
due to the insufficient number of such agents, he remarks that "[t]he Ministcre
public, in contrast, is generally not inclined to bring a criminal suit on his own
initiative in matters that are so foreign to the concerns of traditional justice."
Calais-Auloy, Les ventes aggressives, 1970 R.EcUEIL DALLOZ SIREY, CHRONIQUE 37, 39,
See also M.-L. R.ASSAT, supra note 23, at 220-21:
It is well known ••• that the Ministere public often refrains from prosecuting
those violations that only slightly upset ordre public when the evidence concerning the elements of the violation is awkward. This happens for almost all
violations of commercial legislation and, particularly, of corporate legislation,
since in order to prove such violations, much expert evidence on accounting is
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The disappointment, then, of an American observer can hardly
be blamed. He notes that, although the definition of ordre public
is very broad and could potentially serve as the basis for the initiation
of suits in many areas of social significance, the Ministere public has
in £act taken a conservative attitude •.•• [His] activity in civil litigation mainly involves the protection of individuals unable to protect
their own interests (e.g., minors ,;\Tithout parents, incompetents, and
absentees) or the control of personal status and family law transactions (e.g., correction of vital statistics, adoption, and divorce).
These are matters of importance to the individuals involved, of
course, and also to the state; they are not, however, the areas of the
law which present much challenge either to the legal system or to
society in general ..••01
The Italian experience is no better, and perhaps even worse.
The broad wording of article 70 of the 1940 Code of Civil Procedure
has not prompted the Ministere public to expand to any discernible
needed, which is complicated and expensive; therefore, they prefer to leave the
burden upon the injured party.
Still another French author concludes that the legal protection of the environment
can be made effective only by allowing citizen and group actions in addition to, or
in lieu of, action by public agents:
Official declarations often emphasize the need for the citizens, who are directly
concerned with the degradation of their surroundings, to supplement at every
level the initiative of public officers. While the policy of prevention and repression is substantially the sphere of public officials, the reparation of damages primarily concerns • • • those who suffer them • • • •
• • • In order to substitute effectively for the public powers and to watch
over the enforcement of laws that, in the present administrative situation, are
too often not enforced, environmental protection groups could be legally granted
the same power to sue that, for instance, has been granted to the anti-alcoholic
associations ("associations de lutte contre l'alcoolisme") or to family associations
("unions d'associations familiales'').
Despax, La defense juridique de l'environnement, 44 LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE, JurusCr.AssEUR PfruoDIQUE No. 2359 (1970) (footnotes omitted).
Another French commentator speaks in even stronger terms:
[I]t is enough to mention, for instance, the case of false advertising, where the
inactivity of the Parquet gives consumers the impression that any advertising
can be done with impunity, or the case of industrial pollution. To the contrary,
the civil actions brought by trade unions for violations of regulations for the
protection of employees has built up a body of case law that guarantees the
enforcement of the law; the effectiveness of these laws could have been seriously
threatened by the absence of criminal suits by the Parquet if some groups had
not been granted a civil action in this matter to insure that a criminal action
is initiated.
Bihl, L'action "syndicale" des associations, 93 GAZE1TE nu PALAIS, DoC'I'RINE 523, 527
(1973). For a discussion of this procedure, see note 204 infra.
Finally, a Belgian author-a law professor and former Procureur General-wrote
in 1963 that the droit d'action of the Ministere public in all civil cases involving an
element of ordre public, was more a theory than a reality: "But, let us admit it,
what has come into practice is only the fact that a communication is made [by
the judge] to the Ministere public [calling attention to the filing of lawsuits involving
a public interest]; but the Ministere public's passivity in defending collective interests
is often bewildering." Bekaert, supra note 2, at 441.
91. R. Whidden, supra note 1, at 14. Whidden cites a few cases in which the
Ministere public has shown a more active posture. Id. at 15. For instance, in 1956 the
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degree his role in civil litigation,02 a role once again traditionally
limited to such matters as personal status, incompetency, insanity,
family, marriage, and bankruptcy.03 Even provisions that expressly
grant to the Ministere public the power to initiate or to intervene in
cases involving less traditional matters have remained "law on the
books," rarely (if ever) applied. For instance, article 2409 of the 1942
Codice civile gives to both the shareholders representing at least one
tenth of a corporation's capital and the Ministere public the power to
set in motion proceedings to redress serious irregularities on the part
of the corporation's administrators. A field inquiry by Professor
Vigoriti has shown that some officers of the Italian Parquet are not
even aware of their power in a field of such great importance. Whereas
proceedings promoted by "ten per cent shareholders" are not rare,9'1
proceedings commenced by the Ministere public are virtually un•
known.05
French Ministere public initiated suit against a firm that had illegally converted an
apartment building into an office building. The court granted him standing to compel reconversion, holding that housing matters were affected with public interest
because of a shortage caused by the war. Ministl!re public v. Societe d'armement
maritime et de transports, [1956] D.S. Jur. 632 (with note by R. Lindon). In an older
case, the Cour de cassation upheld the bringing of an action by the Ministere public
to impose a civil fine on a landlord who had violated a law requiring the posting
of a notice whenever an apartment became vacant. Ministl!re public v. Chambronty,
[1931] D.H. Jur. 329. In an even older case, the Ministere public brought suit to
annul an agreement between a worker and his' employer; since the agreement was
contrary to legislation on work-related injuries, there was deemed to be a "general
interest" to protect and therefore the action was held to be within the Jt.!inistcre
public's power. See 3 A. SACHET, TRArrt THEORIQUE ET l'RATIQUE DE LA LEGISLATION
SUR LES ACCIDENTS DU TRAVAIL 21 (8th ed. 1937) (Paris, Sirey).
92. The hope of a substantial increase of the' Ministere public's role in civil liti•
gation, shared by many when the Code of Civil Procedure went into force in 1942,
"has never been realized; in fact, the participation of the p[ubblico] m[inistero] in
civil litigation seems, with rare exceptions, only an empty formality." Vigorlti, supra
note 21, at 287,
93, Even in these matters, only rarely does the Ministere public commence a
civil case, and when he intervenes in a case commenced by the private parties, in
practice his role remains minimal. Vigoriti, supra note 21, at 285-86, See note 86 supra.
94. They are reminiscent of the very important-and much more flexible-"shareholders' derivative actions" in common-law countries. See note 280 infra,
95. [O]ne question [submitted by the Italian Reporter to a number of officers
of the Ministere public in Tuscany] requested information concerning suits
brought by the p[ubblicol m[inistero] to control corporate behavior. In theory,
this activity of the p[ubb1ico] mfinistero] is a very important aspect of his role
in civil cases, since corporate behavior affects not only the property of all the
stock-holders but the entire economy. The answers to the question indicated that
such actions are never undertaken, because officers of the p[ubblico] m[inistero]
lack the technical expertise necessary to deal with such matters and because •••
they fear becoming an instrument of merely private interests.
Vigoriti, supra note 21, at 285.
Another less traditional field into which Italian legislation has attempted to
expand the Ministere public's role has been labor disputes. The law in force from
1942 until December 13, 1973, established the duty of the Ministere public to par-
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B. The Prokuratura in the Socialist Countries
Professor John N. Hazard, the noted Sovietologist, recalls that
it was Lenin, in 1922, who "created an Office of the Procurator with
the right to intervene in civil suits."96 Lenin's logic in doing so is
quite understandable. As explained by Professor J odlowski, in a
socialist system droit civil, the subject matter of civil litigation, can
no longer be considered merely private law.97 On the contrary, it
always involves public and social interests that cannot be left to the
sole initiative and disposition of private parties. As a consequence, in
addition to strong judicial control, the participation of a "public
party" in socialist civil litigation frequently is thought essential.98
ticipate in all labor disputes in the appellate stage. C. PRo. CIV. art. 70, ,r 1, No. 4.
Experience has demonstrated this compulsory intervention to be both useless and
unduly burdensome-a mere delaying device. The Ministere public is neither an
expert in labor problems nor a welcome and willing participant in labor disputes.
Only a radical change both in his training and in the structure of his office could
possibly make his participation of some worth. Cf. S. Ofiate, supra note 3, at 12-13.
This is, perhaps, what Belgian legislation recently recognized when a special
branch of the Parquet was attached to labor courts. See Krings, supra note '4, at
139-41 ("[T]he Ministere public includes two different branches: the general office of
the Parquet and the [special] office for labor matters''). For a similar solution in
Uruguay, see E. Vescovi, supra note 20, at 27-28. In social security matters and cases
based on violations of labor regulations, an amicus curiae appearance ("interoention
par voie d'avis'') of the Ministere public is required in Belgium. Krings, supra, at
150-51, 153-54, 156, 159, 161-62, 164. Krings states that this requirement is an innovation of the Code judiciaire of 1967, which has thus expanded the participation
of the Ministere public into an area in which traditionally "the members of the
Parquet had very little knowledge even if they were supposed to prosecute criminal
infractions" in that same area. Id. at 161.
In France, on the other hand, a decree of July 10, 1970, has expanded the participation powers of the Ministere public without creating branches specially trained
in the new areas. The Procureurs de la Republique (the Parquet's officers attached
to the superior courts of first instance or Tribunaux de Grande Instance) can now
appear before all courts of first instance, including commercial and labor courts (Tribunaux de commerce, Conseils des Prud'hommes), See J. Jegu, supra note 23, at 4.
As for the Italian experience, the thirty-year-long failure was acknowledged and
terminated by a 1973 statute that abolished the intervention of the Ministere public
in labor disputes. Law of August 11, 1973, No. 533, art. 2, [1973] Gaz. Uff. No. 237
at 6282, 6286.
96. Hazard, supra note 3, at 209. See also Z. Stalev, The Prokuratura 3 n.1 (unpublished Bulgarian report, see note 1 supra).
97. Jodlowski, Le role du ministere public dans le proces civil, in RAPPORTS PoLONAIS PRESENTES AU NEUVIEME CoNGRES INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT COMPARE 87, 87 (1974)
(Warsaw, Polska Akademia Nauk) (Polish report).
98, Although the need for such participation may have been present even in the
pre-socialist state, it was limited to a few areas of droit civil-in particular, some
aspects of family law and the law of persons. In the socialist state, however, this form
of "publicization" has grown immensely to include, above all, the law of property
and all legal-economic relations, that is, the bulk of droit civil. It is interesting to
note that in Poland, whereas the procurator is granted a general power to bring
suit "in all cases involving property rights with no exception," he has no such
general power in family cases that do not involve property rights. In these latter
cases "he can bring a suit only in the instances specifically provided by statute,"
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It is a matter of fact, however, that Lenin's logic did not create
an entirely new institution. The Soviet institution is rooted in the
pre-Revolutionary Russian procuracy,99 which, in turn, was manifestly influenced by the French Ministere public.100 This French
derivation is even clearer, and openly recognized, with respect to the
Prokuratura offices of the other socialist countries of Eastern
Europe.101 Indeed, many characteristics typical of the Western Parquet reappear, in part, in the socialist institution. Among these similarities are (I) the unitary and centralized structure of the Prokuratura,102 the offices of which are all hierarchically organized103 and
subject to the directives of the Soviet Procurator General, or the
Chief Procurator of each of the other socialist countries; 104 (2) the
independence of the Procurator General and his subordinate officers
from both the executive and the judicial branches of government, including the Council of Ministers and the Minister of Justice,10G
although not from the legislative branch;106 and (3) the nature of the
which instances, however, are numerous. Jodlowski, supra note 97, at 93. PousH ConE
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 7 (1965). This Polish provision is not surprising, since in
socialist countries property rights, rather than family relationships, arc the main
focus of de-privatization. It should be added, however, that the Polish Prolmratura
has an unlimited power to intervene even in those cases which it could not have
commenced. Jodlowski, supra, at 96-97.
99. See H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R. 237, 240 (1963) (New York, Vintage
Books).
100. Cf. id. at 241; A. Ferrucci, supra note 1, at 5, 12.
101. See Nevai, The Function of the Procurator in Civil Procedure in Hungary, in
THE COMPARISON OF LAw 115, 115 (Z. Petcri ed. 1974) (Budapest, Akademiai Kiad6)
(Hungarian report); Triva, Public Prosecutor in Civil Procedure, in YUGOSLAV REPORTS
FOR THE NINTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW '71, '71 (1974) (Beograd,
Yugoslav Association of Comparative Law) (Yugoslav report).
102. "The Prokuratura is a unified and centralized body of procurators, appointed
and headed by the General (Chief) Procurator •••• Every procurator can substitute for
the procurator below and cancel his acts." Z. Stalcv, supra note 96, at 1. See also H.
BERMAN, supra note 99, at 242; Jodlowski, supra note 97, at 89; Nevai, supra note 101,
at 119-20; Triva, supra note 101, at 73; Vikut, supra note 1, at 111. Compare text at
note 51 supra.
103. See Z. Stalev, supra note 96, at l; Jodlowski, supra note 97, at 89; Ncvai,
supra note 101, at 119-20; Triva, supra note 101, at 73-74; Vikut, supra note 1, at 111.
104. See Jodlowski, supra note 97, at 89; Vikut, supra note 1, at 111. Compare text
at notes 52-53 supra.
105. See text at note 134 infra. In this regard there is a resemblance to post-World
War II developments in Italy, see notes 36 and 50 supra, but a notable deviation
from the original French schemes, see text at notes 54-62 supra, and also a profound
difference from the Anglo-American attorney general. See section IC infra, especially
notes 156-60 and accompanying text. See also Z. Stalev, supra note 96, at I &: nn.l, 3.
Also, unlike their civilian counterparts, the socialist procurators are not members of
the judiciary; nevertheless, there is a functional link between judges and procurators.
See id. at l nn.3, 6. Compare note 46 supra and accompanying text.
106. In the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries of Eastern Europe, the
Prokuratura is subordinated to the Soviet and its Presidium (or, in the People's De-
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Prokuratura's function, which, in principle, is not advocacy of a partisan interest107 but impartial supervision of the scrupulous observance of the law by individuals, social organizations, courts, and administrative agencies.108
At the same time, it is clear that the socialist institution presents
very radical changes vis-a-vis its Western model,109 epitomized by a
remarkable potential expansion of the socialist Prokuratura's role
in civil litigation. Again in Professor Hazard's words:

In both Western and Eastern Europe a state official currently
has the duty to represent society's interests not only in criminal
matters but also in civil suits.
While the institution is little used in Germanic systems, although
existing as an optional method of protecting social interests in
matrimonial .contests and suits to deprive an individual of legal
capacity because of insanity, feeble mindedness, drunkenness, or
spendthrift tendencies, it is still a vital force in France and in states
where the French legal influence has been dominant. It is even more
prominent in countries of Eastern Europe where emphasis upon the
ever-present concern of procurators for social interests emerging in
the civil proceedings of private parties makes the Office of the
Procurator General of the U.S.S.R. and his counterparts in the
Marxian socialist states an institution of considerable importance in
the conduct of a civil law suit.110
A glance at the basic legislative texts in force in the Soviet Union
and in most of the European People's Democracieslll confirms that,
in theory at least, the socialist analogue of the Ministere public has
grown to almost unlimited proportions. His power to commence or
intervene in civil cases whenever dictated by "public interest" conmocracies, to the National Assembly and the State Council); the latter acts when the
Soviet (or the Assembly) is not in session, which is most of the time. See Z. Stalev,
supra note 96, at I &: n.4. The General (Chief) Procurator is appointed for a fixed
time by, and is always responsible to, those two bodies. See id. at I; Jodlowski, supra
note 97, at 88 &: n.l; Nevai, supra note 101, at 119-20; Triva, supra note 101, at 73.
107. See, e.g., Vikut, supra note I, at 111-12. Compare section IA3 supra, especially
text at notes 74-78.
108. See Jodlowski, supra note 97, at 89, 96, 98; Nevai, supra note 101, at 119, 121,
123; Vikut, supra note I, at 108. Stalev indicates that the Prokuratura's function is
fulfilled by "a) discovery of the violations of the law and b}" initiation of proceedings
for imposing sanctions and for restoration of legality." Z. Stalev, supra note 96, at I
&: n.6. It s.hould be noted, however, that the Council of Ministers, individual Ministers, "and other central state officials" are not subject to any control by the Prokurat1:1ra. Id. at I &: n.5 (Bulgaria). See also H. BERMAN, supra note 99, at 245-46 (Russia).
109. Nevai, supra note 101, at 115-16.
110. Hazard, supra note 3, at 209 · (footnote omitted).
Ill. Yugoslavia, Rumania, and the German Democratic Republic are exceptions.
See text at note 125 infra.
·
·
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siderations112 has gone far beyond those Western developments described above. 113 For instance, section 29 of the Soviet Union's Principles of Civil Procedure provides:
The procurator has the right to commence an action or intervene
in a case at any stage if this is required to protect State or public
interests or the rights and legally protected interests of citizens.114
The procurator must participate [in civil cases] where the law so
provides or where the court considers it to be necessary.
Where the procurator appears in a case, he familiarizes himself
with the materials [of the case], makes objections, presents evidence,
takes part in the examination of the evidence, makes applications,
states his conclusions on questions arising in the course of the trial
and on the substance of the case generally, and takes other procedural
steps laid down by law.115

In addition, article 44, paragraph 2, of the Soviet Union's Principles
grants the Prokuratura a virtually unlimited right to appeal court
decisions, whether or not the Prokuratura participated in the lower
court's proceedings.116
112. Cf. Z. Stalev, supra note 96, at 1-2 &: n.10; Jodlowski, supra note 97, at 87-88,
96, 98; Nevai, supra note 101, at 121 ("the safeguard of the public interest [is] the
core of the Procurator's participation in civil procedure"), 128.
113. See section IA4 supra.
U4. When the Prokuratura brings suit on behalf of a citizen (or of a social organization), the latter is joined, or is given an opportunity to join. See Jodlowski, supra
note 97, at 93 &: n.8. The res judicata effects bind both the state (a new action by
the Prokuratura would be inadmissible) and the citizen (or the social organization).
However, if the latter has been denied an opportunity to join due to lack of adequate
notice of the proceeding, he can have the judgment vacated, Z, Stalcv, supra note 96,
at 5-6 n,14. See also Jodlowski, supra, at 95-96.
115. Law of the U.S.S.R. No. 526, enacting the Principles of Civil Procedure of the
Soviet Union and the Union Republics § 29, in 7 LAW IN EASJ'ERN EUROPE 299, 306
(Z. Szirmai ed. 1963) (A. Kiralfy transl.) (Leyden, Sythoff). This federal statute estab•
lished standards for the various Union Republics to follow in recodlfying their laws
of civil procedure. For instance, section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.), in force since October I,
1964, copies word for word section 29 of the Principles, with the following additional
sentence at the end of paragraph 3: "The abandonment by the procurator of an
action brought by him does not deprive the person in whose interest the action was
brought of the right to demand an examination of the case on its merits," See 11
LAW IN EAS'J'),RN EtmoP.i;; (1966), supra, at 168. The codes of civil procedure of the
other socialist countries of Eastern Europe contain similar provisions. See, e.g., CODE
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 35, 23 BULLETIN OF CzECHOSLOVAK LAW 187, 193 (1965);
V. Steiner, Le rC>le du Ministl!re public dans le procl!s civil, passim (unpublished
Czechoslovakian report, see note 1 supra).
116. 7 LAw IN EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 115, at 310. The provision is repeated
in section 282, paragraph 2, of the R.S.F.S,R. Code of Civil Procedure: "The procurator [in addition to the parties and other persons taking part in the case] may also
lodge a protest against an unlawful or ill-founded judgment of a court whether or
not he participated in the case in question." 11 LAw IN EAsrERN EUROPE (1966), supra,
at 231. For analogues in other socialist states, see, for example, z. Stalev, supra note
96, at 2; V. Steiner, supra note 115, at 8-9; Jodlowski, supra note 97, at 97.
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Even with regard to the traditional role of the Ministere pub-lie
in ensuring that the courts correctly apply the laws,117 the Prokuratura reveals a remarkable growth vis-a-vis its Western counterparts:
The recourse "in the interest of the law," which is rarely exercised
and of minimal practical importance in the West,118 has become a
very important means of attacking final judgments of lower courts
in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, including Yugoslavia.119 An extraordinary appeal can be brought before the highest
courts by the Prokuratura120 to assure that judges do not deviate from
"Socialist legality"; unlike the situation in France, Italy, and other
Western countries,121 the appeal also affects the parties in the case.122
Clearly, the potential exists for th.e Prokuratura to play a role
that extends far beyond the traditional matters of marriage and
family, infants, bankrupts, absentees, and incompetents. Even for
the French, Belgian, and Italian institutions, however, such potential-albeit to a lesser degree-has existed for many years; yet we
have seen that it is optimistic, to say the least, to proclaim the French
institution (in Professor Hazard's words) "a vital force" 123 in civil
litigation. The question then arises whether the Marxian socialist
countries have more forcefully implemented in actual practice the
Prokuratura's theoretical role.
The answer seems, in part at least, negative. Even the "more
prominent"124 socialist analogue of the Western Ministere public
is apparently far from being a really vital institution in so far as
most civil proceedings are concerned.
'
In his study on the People's Democracies, submitted to the 1971
Florence Conference of the International Association of Legal Science, Professor Stalev, the leading socialist expert, stated tl;iat while
117. See text at notes 37-43 supra.
118. See text following note 43 supra.
119. See Triva, supra note 101, at 80.
120. The private parties in the case are not entitled to bring this. extraordinary
recourse. See, e.g., Triva, supra note 101, at 80-81. In addition to the Prokuratura, the
recourse can also be brought by the President of the Supreme Court. R.S.F.S.R. CODE
OF C1vir. PROCEDURE §§ 319-20, 11 LAW IN EAs:rERN EUROPE (1966), supra note 115, at
240. See Vikut, supra note 1, at 113; Nevai, supra note 101, at 134 (Hungary). In
Poland, the Minister of Justice is also empowered to bring the recourse. See Jodlowski,
supra note 97, at 98.
121. See text at note 42 supra.
122. See, e.g., Nevai, supra note 101, at 135. In Hungary, the decision of the Supreme Court affects the parties only when the extraordinary appeal is brought by the
Chief Procurator within one year from the time that the judgment below has become
final and enforceable. Id.
123. Hazard, supra note 3, at 209.

124. Id.
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theProkuratura's virtually unlimited right "to bring actions [in court]
in defense of the rights of the citizens and socialist organizations" is
"an important feature" of the civil procedure of several socialist
countries, this could not be said of the German Democratic Republic,
Rumania, and Yugoslavia, where the Prokuratura has a right to bring
suit "only in the cases provided by law." 126 As in most Western European nations, such cases almost exclusively concern annulments of
marriages, declarations of incompetency, and, more generally, the
legal status of persons.126 Even in those socialist countries where the
Prokuratura has the unlimited right to commence or intervene in
actions affecting the public interest,127 this right is rarely exercised.
For instance, only "about [0.3%] of all [civil] actions in Bulgaria are
[initiated] yearly by the Prokuratura,"128 and even this usually occurs
125. Stalev, Fundamental Guarantees of Litigants in Civil Proceedings: A Survey of
the Laws of the European People's Democracies, in FUNDAMENTAL GUARANTEES, supra
note 21, at 355, 384. See also Triva, supra note IOI, at 72-76. Triva states that the solution adopted in Yugoslavia in 1946 was to empower the Prokuratura to bring suits "in
all civil matters," as well as to intervene "in every judicial proceeding." Id. at 74.
These broad powers were drastically reduced, first in 1954 and again in 1965, as a
"reflection of [the] political and legal evolution of the Yugoslav socialist state," the
"gradual abandonment of ••• administrative and centralist management of the State
and of the economy," and a "trend towards self-managing socialism • • • , greater
decentralization [and] autonomy." Id. at 72. As a result, the Prokuratura's tasks were
"gradually reduced to the primary function of criminal prosecution," with some addi•
tional powers "to protect the public interest" in civil matters "strictly enumerated
by the law." Id. These matters, in tum, were gradually reduced in number to allow
"working organizations, social institutions, and citizens to freely determine [their]
mutual rights and duties." Id.
126. See Z. Stalev, supra note 96, at 5 n.10. See also Nevai, supra note 101, at 128·
29, 131; Triva, supra note 101, at 75-78.
127. E.g., Hungary, see Nevai, supra note 101, at 126-27, and, of course, the Soviet
Union. See Vikut, supra note I, at 109-10.
128. Stalev, supra note 125, at 384. Due to a clerical error, the figure given at page
384 is 0.03%, but it has been corrected (for the year 1972) as 0,3%. See Z. Stalcv,
supra note 96, at 5 n.10. In addition, Stalev notes that the Prolmratura intervenes in
"less than 1%" of all civil cases. He concludes that "[o]ne can see therefore how far
from the reality are the voices of some proceduralists in the West according to whom
the participation of the Prokuratura displaces the initiative of the parties in civil
proceedings ••••" Z. Stalev, Supplement to Bulgarian Report at 2 (Jan. 25, 1974).
As for Poland, Professor Jodlowski provides figures that increase rapidly in the
years from 1968 to 1972: 746 cases were commenced by the Polish Prokuratura in 1968,
2,794 in 1970, 3,619 in 1971 and 5,405 in 1972, out of a total of between 400,000 and
500,000 civil cases initiated annually (thus, about 1% in 1972, up from about 0.2%
in 1968). In addition, the number of noncontentious cases initiated by the Prolmratura has increased from 745 in 1970 to 1,276 in 1972 (from about 0,3% to about 0,6%
of the total). There has been, however, a decrease in the number of interventions in
civil cases; from 7,837 in 1970 to 6,834 in 1972. Jodlowski, supra note 97, at 99-100.
Professor Nevai confirms for Hungary the meager figures found for other socialist
countries. Nevai, supra note 101, at 126 ("[I']he number of interventions by the
Procurator is insignificant as compared with the [total] number of civil suits ••••
What is essential here is not the number of the interventions • • • but the policymaking significance of the socialist institution") (emphasis original). See also id. at
128, 137-38, where Nevai notes a drop in the frequency of the Prohuratura's partici-
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only "when the interested party is unable to defend his rights."129
As in the West, the typical example is "an infant represented by a
negligent parent or tutor."130
Thus, the overall impression is that, notwithstanding its ample
powers to commence or intervene in civil cases, the socialist Prokuratura makes use of these powers more frequently in the traditional
fields of personal status and capacity, family, and marriage131 than in
fields that more closely reflect the basic needs and interests of contemporary societies. As authoritatively reported by Professor Nevai,
for instance, in Hungary "more than one half of the actions instituted
by the Procurator" are in the field of "legal status of -persons."
Another portion concerns socialist property rights, whereas "[o]nly
a small number" challenge "decisions and resolutions of the public
administration.''132
As with the Ministere public, so for the Prokuratura I must
hasten to say that the above conclusions are not meant to detract
from the institution's practical importance.133 The Prokuratura's
eminence in the criminal field is not contested. Also uncontested is
the usefulness of delegating to a state attorney the task of defending
pation in civil cases during recent years, particularly since the political and economic
reforms of 1968.
For Czechoslovakia, Professor Steiner informs us that in 1972, out of a total of
603,466 civil cases, the Prokuratura participated in 10,266. V. Steiner, supra note 115,
at 18.
129. Stalev, supra note 125, at 384-85 n.71. This information-has been substantially
confirmed to me by in loco inquiry and personal discussion with experts, including
leading procurators, in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria.
130. Id. See also Z. Stalev, supra note 96, at 1-2 & n.10, where these additional
examples are given: "nonfulfillment of obligations for alimony; damages caused on
socialist property; [and] unlawful dismissal of workers." The author concludes that,
in addition to cases of annulment of marriage, declaration of incompetency, and the
like-cases in which normally even the Western Ministere public has a power to
participate-"[u]sually the Prokuratura exercises its power [only] when the bearer of
the violated right is unable to [defend himself] (minor represented by a negligent
parent or guardian, socialist organization having claims for damages against its manager, etc.)."
131. Cf., e.g., Jodlowski, supra note 97, at 94-95, 97; Nevai, supra note 101, at
128-29; Triva, supra note 101, at 76, 85; Vikut, supra note 1, at 111-12. The powers
of the Prokuratura seem also to be used with some frequency (1) for the protection
of "social property" (cf. Jodlowski, supra, at 93; Nevai, supra, at 129; Vikut, supra, at
111-12), (2) in labor disputes, especially those concerning dismissal of workers, see
note 130 supra, and (3) as a safeguard of the citizens' rights to housing, especially
against administrative abuses. See A. Ferrucci, supra note 1, at 175-77, 200, and the
Russian bibliography cited therein.
132. Nevai, supra note 101, at 129. It is also interesting to note that in Czechoslovakia the Prokuratura is not authorized to participate in proceedings before the
labor tribunals and the courts of commercial arbitration. V. Steiner, supra note 115,
at 13-14.
133. H. BERllrAN, supra note 99, at 238, considers the Soviet Prokuratura to be "in
many ways ••• the most important institution of the whole system."
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and representing in court the "weak" as well as the most basic
societal unit, the family. Moreover, it is very significant that in the
socialist countries the Prokuratura has maintained a high degree of
independence from both the executive and the judiciary. The hierarchical structure of the Prokuratura culminates in a Procurator
General who is connected with, but independent from, the Supreme
Court; he is also independent from the Council of Ministers and its
departments, although not from the Soviet and its Presidium,134
nor from the omnipotent Party.135 In this way, the Prokuratura, to
which every citizen may address petitions, has been able to assume
the significant role of controlling both executive and judicial illegality and abuses.186
The fact remains, however, that not even this "prominent" socialist institution seems suitable for assuming, let alone monopolizing,
the representation in court of certain basic, though relatively new,
societal interests-interests that, at the same time, can hardly be left
to the exclusive initiative of private individuals acting by and for
themselves. Like his Western counterpart, the socialist procurator
lacks specialization and motivation in such fields as marketing, urban
development, and pollution; like that of the Parquet, the Prokuratura's bureaucratic structure can hardly be flexible enough to act
promptly and efficiently in these rapidly changing areas. Only specialized agencies,137 as well as individuals and organizations ideologically
motivated to act not merely for themselves but for a community,188
can provide an effective solution. The Prokuratura, like the Western
Ministere public, may be of great use in channeling and controlling
the efforts of other entities and individuals, but it cannot substitute
entirely for them.139 Perhaps even more than other countries, the
134. See notes 105-06 supra and accompanying text; Z. Stalev, supra note 96, at 1
&: nn.3-4; Jodlowski, supra note 97, at 88; Nevai, supra note 101, at 119·20. See also
H. BERMAN, supra note 99, at 246; Hazard, supra note 3, at 210-11.
135. Nevai states that the Prokuratura must base its activities upon "the policy of
the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party," since the Party's policy "has to prevail in
all spheres"; however, the Party cannot give "'instructions' ••• to the Procurators"
in their handling of "concrete matters." Nevai, supra note 101, at 120. Similar state•
ments are made about the Soviet Union. Shakarian, supra note 1, at 114, 119. See also
H. BERMAN, supra note 99, at 247; w. GELLHORN, OMBUDSMAN AND OTHERS 349 (1966)
(Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press).
136. See, e.g., H. BERMAN, supra note 99, at 238-40, 244-46.
137. See section IE infra.
138. See section II infra.
139. Interestingly, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the R.S.F.S.R., in a
decree of October 26, 1965, complained that "[p]olice agencies, the procuracy, and the
courts are not taking all the necessary measures with regard to violators of the [1960]
Law on nature conservation.'' 9 SOVIET STATUTES &: DECISIONS 24, 27 (1972). In the same
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socialist countries must have learned the heavy costs of bureaucratic
centralization. This may explain 'lvhy recent socialist legislationespecially (but not exclusively) in countries, like Yugoslavia, Poland,
and Czechoslovakia, that have made serious decentralizing effortsgives a potentially large role to social organizations as "participants"
in civil litigation, in addition to private parties and the Prokuratura.140
A further dramatic growth of the role of such organizations might
well represent "the future" of socialist legal systems,141 and of modem
conceptions of civil procedure within those systems.
C.

The Anglo-American Attorney General

The common-law analogue of the French Ministere public and
the Socialist Prokuratura is the office of the attorney general in
England, the United States, Canada, Australia, and other commonlaw nations.142 One may doubt, however, whether the common-law
attorney general is more than a merely formal analogue of the
Continental European institutions.
This doubt proves well-founded at least in so far as the United
States is concerned. As described by Hazard, the role of the American
attorney general in civil litigation is very modest, especially (but not
decree, the Presidium also complained about inefficiency and tardiness on the part of
the local soviets and the administration in the field of anti-pollution and environmental protection. Id. According to Nevai, the leading Hungarian proceduralist, the
thrust of the 1968 "reform of the system of economic management" in Hungary has
been an insistence "on a higher degree of responsibility of all political, social and
economic agencies • • • for the observance of the law," with the consequence that
guaranteeing such observance is no longer the exclusive province of the Prokuratura.
The principle of legality is now "guaranteed by the Procurator in conjunction with
all other political or administrative agencies." Nevai, supra note IOI, at 136 (emphasis
added). There has been, in other words, a contraction of the role of the Prokuratura.
See also note 128 supra.
140. See section IIB2 infra.
141. This is, in fact, the prediction I have heard repeatedly during my recent visits
to socialist countries.
142. The office includes the Solicitor General, "who may be regarded as the deputy
of the Attorney," I. Jacob, supra note 63, at 19, and a number of subordinate officers.
The Scottish counterpart is the Lord Advocate. See generally J. Thomson, The
Power of the Lord Advocate To Intervene in Civil Litigation in Scotland passim
(unpublished Scottish report, see note I supra). Like the attorney general and the
Ministere public, the Lord Advocate's principal role is the prosecution of crimes. Nevertheless, he also has a role in civil litigation because, like the attorney general, "he is
responsible for conducting any litigation in the Scottish courts to which the Crown
or any Government department is a party." Id. at I. In addition, by virtue of specific
statutory provisions, the Lord Advocate can intervene in civil proceedings "to which no
Government department is a party but in which the general public interest is involved."
Id.; Scottish Law Commission, Memorandum No. 14: Remedies in Administrative Law
48 (n.d.). This power is exercised, albeit infrequently, in such matters as annulment
and divorce, in order to prevent collusion, J. Thomson, supra, at 1-2, matters involving
charitable trusts, id. at 2, and in certain quasi-criminal proceedings involving allegedly
forged documents, id. at 3, and breach of injunctions. Id. at 3-4.

826

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. '13:'193

only) at the federal level.148 His role is essentially restricted to sporadic appearances as amicus curiae in "matters of very narrow and
easily identified interests of the federal state";144 interestingly, these
matters do not include most of the traditional areas of interest of the
European Ministere public.145 Even in constitutional cases involving
such important matters as racial discrimination, school desegregation,
and reapportionment, the federal Attorney General appears only
from time to time, on his own motion or on the court's request, to
argue and present evidence on the side of op.e or another civil
litigant.146 It is doubtful that civil litigation has ever been the arena
in which the Attorney General has initiated, or in fact promoted,
any landmark civil rights cases,147 notwithstanding the efforts of such
143. Hazard, supra note 3, passim, especially at 212-13, 217-18.
[T]he federal Attorney General ••• has discovered "public interest" in civil suits
[only] when the suit puts in question the constitutional rights of one of the parties,
the [constitutionality] of an Act of Congress, the peaceful relations of the United
States with foreign powers, and the validity of land transfers by the federal govern•
ment to individuals. There is no "public interest" requiring the Attorney General's
intervention merely because one of the parties seems to be inadequately represented
on a non-constitutional issue, or when parties seem to have colluded in establishing
a property right •••• He is not defender of a generalized concept of fair play
or of "justice."
Id. at 217-18.
144. Id. at 213. As for the state level, the participation of state attorneys general in
civil litigation to protect a "public interest" has occurred, particularly in cases involving
usury and charitable trusts, and whenever issues of constitutionality of state laws arise
in civil proceedings. Id. at 219-25. In some states the attorney general is allowed to
bring, or to intervene in, antitrust cases to dissolve monopolies and cases concerning
regulation of the sale of securities to avoid frauds. Id. at 225-26, Hazard, however, cites
only a few, old examples of such lawsuits, so that one may wonder whether the attorneys
general have ever played any effective role in these fields, e.xcept perhaps in connection
with criminal violations. The same conclusion may be inferred with regard to environmental protection, a field in which Hazard mentions only one old instance of a suit
brought by a state attorney general against a copper producer to forbid emission of
fumes containing more than the permissible percentage of sulphur. Id. at 220 &: n.41,
citing Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 240 U.S. 650 (1916). Whidden recognizes that
"[s]tate attorneys general have generally done little as advocates for the public interest
in civil litigation." R. Whidden, supra note I, at 28. The facts that, for instance, "in
Illinois there were only 22 appearances [of the state attorney general in civil cases] in
the twenty years between 1938-1958," Hazard, supra, at 219, and that, in general, "[t]he
offices of the State Attorneys General are not large,'' id., may sufficiently demonstrate
the modest role of these offices in civil litigation.
145. "[T]he Attorney General at the federal level may concern himself only with
those civil matters that impinge upon the interests of the United States as those interests are defined by the Constitution. This excludes matters [such as] the legal capacity
of the mentally infirm, drunkards and spendthrifts ••• ," Id. at 213. For England,
see note 151 infra.
146. Cf. Hazard, supra note 3, at 215-17 (citing cases). "By statute the Congress has
authorized the Attorney General 'to intervene for the presentation of evidence ••• and
for argument on the question of constitutionality' in any federal suit in which the
United States or an agency, officer or employee thereof is not a party if the constitu•
tionality of the Act of Congress affecting the public interest is questioned,'' Id, at 21516 & n.26, quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2403 (1970). See FED, R. Civ. P. 24(c).
147. 2 T. EMERSON, D. HABER & N. DORSEN, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGIITS IN THE UNITED
STATES 1518-20 (3d ed. 1967) (Boston, Little, Brown & Co.). The authors indicate that
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activist Attorneys General as Robert F. Kennedy and Ramsey Clark.148
In addition, a criminal prosecution instituted by an American attorney general provides a victim with no framework in which to sue for
restitution or damages derived from the crime, because, unlike in
France, Belgium, Italy, and other civil-law countries,1;49 no joinder of
a criminal and civil proceeding is possible, as a rule, in the United
States.150 Hence, even in this indirect way, the attorney general has
no "public interest" role in connection with civil litigation.
The situation in England,151 Australia, and other common-law
"[t]he important innovation" of the Civil Rights Act of 1957 was the conferral upon the
Attorney General of the authority to bring suit to enforce the right to vote. Id. at 1518.
The Civil Rights Act of 1960 went even further, substantially expanding the Attorney
General's civil powers. As a result, vindication of the right to vote was no longer
dependent exclusively on suits brought by private persons at their own expense and,
possibly, at their peril. Yet, from 1957 to 1963 only 42 such suits were instituted by the
Attorney General, and only 6,000 black people were registered as a result of this
litigation-little more than a drop in the ocean considering "the masses of Negro
citizens who remained unregistered in some states." Id. at 1520.
Unfortunately, I was unable to obtain statistics concerning the civil litigation instituted by the Attorney General under the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968. The 1964
Act gave him broad powers "to institute suits to protect constitutional rights in public
facilities and public education" if he obtains (a) a written complaint from an individual
to the effect that he is being illegally deprived or threatened with the loss of certain
rights, and (b) evidence that the complainant is unable to initiate and maintain the
proceeding himself. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000b(a), (b) (1970). Moreover, the Attorney General
was given authority to intervene in civil suits involving employment discrimination "if
he certifies that the case is of general public importance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1970).
The 1968 Act extended the power of the Attorney General to initiate civil litigation to
the field of housing. 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1970).
148. Cf. Hazard, supra note 3, at 216-17, and the two interesting cases described
therein. Halpern states that "[t]he attorney general could not be said to be on the
cutting edge of new developments in the representation of public and group interests
in civil litigation. More often, he is to be found representing government agencies
against allegations that they have been insufficiently effective in guarding the public
interest. In the Wyatt case [Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972),
affd. sub. nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974)], the role of the attorney
general is notable in large part because it is unusual." C. Halpern, supra note 1, at 7.
(In Wyatt-a class action brought in a federal court on behalf of all of the residents of
the public mental institutions of Alabama, seeking to require that state to improve the
residents' conditions-the United States Department of Justice participated as an amicus
curiae in support of the plaintiffs.)
149. See M. CAPPELLETII, J. MERRYl\lAN & J. PERILLO, THE ITALIAN LEGAL SYSI'EM 113
& n.9 (1967) (Stanford, Cal., Stanford University Press); P. HERZOG &: M. WESER, supra
note 3, at 138; Krings, supra note 4, at 141. See also R. DAVID & H. DEVRIES, supra note
45, at 56; note 204 infra.
150. Cf., e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 18(a).
151. Note that in England, one typical function of the Continental Ministere public
has been assumed not directly by the Attorney General, but by a special law officer, the
Queen's Proctor, who operates under the direction (more formal than real) of the
Attorney General. (Significantly, the word "proctor" comes from procurator or procureur.) The Queen's Proctor represents the Crown in divorce courts and has a duty to
expose collusion. See J. EDWARDS, THE I.Aw OFFICERS OF THE CROWN 152-53 (1964)
(London, Sweet & Maxwell); I. Jacob, supra note 63, at 29-32. Jacob informs us, how. ever, that "[s]ince 1969 ••• by reason of the fundamental changes in' the divorce laws,
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nations seems similar to that prevailing in the United States. There,
too, the principal roles of the Attorney General are out of court
(as a minister of the Crown and a legal advisor of the Crown and its
ministers) and in criminal prosecutions-not in civil litigation.m
Even if, in theory, the Attorney General has a broad dual capacity
in civil litigation-to be the representative of the Crown as well as
the representative of a vaguely defined "public interest"1 1i8-his infrequent participation in civil proceedings is usually as a merely
nominal party in "relator actions" involving the public interest.m
Even from a structural point of view, there is a great difference
between the common-law institution and the Continental European
institutions. Historical research might well demonstrate that, as the
title would suggest, the French archetype was imported into England
and, through England, to the rest of the common-law world.11i 0 The
the scope for the exercise of the functions and duties of the Queen's Proctor to represent
and protect the public interest in matrimonial proceedings has been considerably
narrowed." Id. at 31-32.
In other common-law countries, however, the Proctor's role has been directly assumed by the Attorney General. See, e.g., J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 9'1 (1963) (New
York, Atheneum) (some American states); G. Taylor, The Role of the Ministcre Public
in Civil Proceedings 5-6 (unpublished Australian report, see note !,supra), Taylor informs us that even in matrimonial matters "[t]here are few cases of intervention" of
the Attorney General in civil litigation. Id. at 6.
A situation similar, in theory, to that in England exists in a number of countries
influenced by English law, such as Kenya, see J. Spry, The Role of the Ministm-c
Public in Kenya 3 (unpublished Kenyan report, see note 1 supra), and, until recently,
Tanzania. See G. Onyiuke, The Role of the Ministcre Public in Civil Proceedings in
the United Republic of Tanzania 3-4 (unpublished Tanzanian report, see note 1
supra).
Interestingly, however, the power of the Kenyan "President's Proctor" to participate
in annulment and divorce cases when he suspects collusion "seems to be a dead letter";
in fact, it has been officially recommended that the office of the Proctor be abolished,
See J. Spry, supra, at 3. As for Tanzania, the "Republic Proctor" was abolished by
the Law of Marriage Act 1971; his function to prevent collusion is now entrusted to
the court. G. Onyiuke, supra, at 4.
152. The same is true for Quebec, see Rivet, supra note 63, at 248, and even more
so for India, see L. Singhvi, Representation of Public Interest in the Indian Legal
System 2-4 (unpublished Indian report, see note l supra), and for Kenya, where civil
proceedings instituted by the Attorney General, or by individuals ("relators') acting
in his name and with his consent, are "extremely rare" and "of more academic interest
than practical importance." J. Spry, supra note 151, at 1-3. See also G. Onyiuke, supra
note 151, at 2-3.
153. See, e.g., G. Taylor, supra note 151, at 2, See also I. Jacob, supra note 63, at
20-21.
·
154. See section IIAI infra.
155. In the thirteenth century, the King of England employed counsel-king's attorneys and serjeants, corresponding to the French procureurs and avocats du roi-to de•
fend his interests in court, just as any other civil litigant. In the fifteenth century, this
task was entrusted to a single attorney, who was empowered to appoint deputies; the
holder of this permanent office was called the Attorney General. So far, the similarity
to the developments in France seems remarkable. See section IAI supra. By the sixteenth century, however, a great divergence occurred; the Attorney General developed
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fact remains, however, that thereafter the institution underwent different and, on the whole, less fundamental developments in England
and her legal heirs. The attorneys general and their subordinate officers form a department of the executive, of which they have remained
mere members, agents, or representatives.156 Being the "attorneys of
the Crmvn" or of the executive, they generally are responsible for
conducting any litigation to which the Crown, the executive, or any
government department is a party,157 and are subject to change, with
any change of government.158 In Professor Hazard's description,
these officers ... are in no sense "magistrates"159 as their counterparts
in Western Europe are said to be, nor are they creations of the legislature responsible solely to it, as are the Procurators General of
Eastern Europe. They are not "judges" in the sense of the word commonly accepted in the constitutional system of the United States,
for they enjoy none of the independence accorded the judicial
power ...•160
into an advisor to the Crown, rather than a full-time governmental officer integrated
with the judiciary, like his French counterpart. See 6 w. HOLDSWORTH, A HISI'ORY OF
ENGLISH LAw 458-66 (2d ed. 1937) (London, Methuen &: Co.). Cf. I. Jacob, supra note
63, at 19-20.

156. See, e.g., I. Jacob, supra note 63, at 20; G. Taylor, supra note 151, at 2-3;
Hazard, supra note 3, at 211-12. This connection between the executive and the attorney general is best illustrated by the fact that in many common-law countries the
attorney general, far from being a high member of the judiciary, is a member of the
cabinet, roughly corresponding to the Minister of Justice in civilian countries. This
applies also to Quebec. See Rivet, supra note 63, at 237. In the United States, however,
there are interesting variations at the state level; most of the fifty state attorneys general are elected (only four of them are appointed by the state governors). See Hazard,
supra, at 218.
157. See, e.g., G. Taylor, supra note 151, at _I, 3. Cf. Rivet, supra note 63, at 239-41.
Contrast with the Ministere public, notes 68-70 supra and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., I. Jacob, supra note 63, at 20. Contrast with the Ministere public,
notes 55-56 supra and accompanying text.
159. Even less are they "career magistrates" in the Continental European sense of
that expression. See text following note 80 supra. This lack of tenure may further detract, of course, from the attorney general's independence. At the same time, however,
the fact that he is not a lifetime "career" member of the judiciary may make him less
bureaucratic than his Continental European counterpart. Thus, under favorable political circumstances, the attorney general may more likely reveal that kind of dynamic
activism that is necessary for the effective protection of nontraditional public interests.
But we must recognize that in the common-law world such activism is virtually confined, by law and tradition, to criminal prosecution, even though through criminal
prosecution some attorneys general have made significant contributions in these new
areas.
160. Hazard, supra note 3, at 210-11. The profound difference betlveen the relative
independence of the civilian Parquet (especially in its recent developments outside
France, see note 50 supra) and the executive dependence of the prosecutorial officers
in the United States has been brought to the world's attention by the Watergate affair.
There seems to be no serious doubt that the United States Chief Executive has the
power not only to select and appoint ("by and with the advice and consent" of the
Senate, U.S. CoNsr. art. II, § 2), but also to dismiss (with no control by the Senate) a
federal prosecutor. CJ. Hazard, supra, at 212. This idea of executive dependence is so
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It may well be that the Parquet, the Prokuratura, and attorneys
general have the same historical matrix: the ancient French Procureurs Generaux. It may also be correct to say that all three are
''.means of representing the public interest in civil matters,"161 and
thus, that the difference among them is one of degree-one of frequency of intervention and amount of power-rather than one of
function. As Professor Hazard sums up:
The contrast ..• is to be found largely in the degree of concern
in civil matters exhibited by the officer [the American Attorney
General, the French Ministere public, or the Soviet Procurator General] representing the public. In the United States it is assumed that
... the state official need intervene only if there be a direct state or
public interest that would not be represented without the AttorneJ
General's participation.
. . . [T]he French-type official appears in court often to advise the
judge of his considered view in many types of situations. The Attorneys General in the United States have no such broad function. The
federal Attorney General is concerned with problems only if some
constitutional issue or some federal action is involved, and the State
Attorneys General likewise have limited functions, although their
inheritance from the English law gives them duties to protect borrowers from usury, beneficiaries from the maladministration of a
public trust, and the public generally from nuisances162 and from
monopolies in the economic sphere.103 The position in the United
States seems to be that private citizens should protect their own
interests unless as a class they are clearly incompetent, as with
illiterate borrowers and members of minorities, or can show no
special damage to themselves.164

Professor Hazard's final statement, however, leads to the conclusion that, even if the common-law institution may be considered the
formal analogue of the Prokuratura and the Ministere public, at
deeply ingrained in America as to allow the absurd situation of a Chief Executive SC•
lecting and appointing the special prosecutor in charge, in every real sense, of investigating possible criminal activities committed by the Chief Executive himself. It is little
wonder that, in such a situation, the special prosecutor encountered not a few ob•
stacles.
In the civil-law world, the power of the chief executive to dismiss officers of the
Ministere public ad nutum is accepted only in such dictatorial regimes as that presently
governing in Brazil. Cf. J. da Silva Lopes, supra note 56, at 1-2.
161. Hazard, supra note 3, at 226. Taylor distinguishes two roles of the attorney
general: representation of the Crown in litigation and representation of the public
interest. G. Taylor, supra note 151, at 2-3. The two roles do not necessarily coincide,
and it seems possible-although not without some complications-that the attorney
general can represent the public interest against the government. Id. at 3-4.
162. See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 240 U.S. 650 (1916).
163. But see note 144 supra.
164. Hazard, supra note 3, at 226.
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least one fundamental difference exists. In the common-law world,
and most particularly in the United States, the function of representing the public and community interest in civil litigation is• exercised
only in minor part by the attorneys general and their subordinate
officers. The real, powerful, and successful-if not uncontroversialcommon-law counterpart to the Continental institutions is what more
than thirty years ago a great American jurist called the "private
Attorney General."165 This often-repeated definition can apply both
to the class and public-interest suitor (especially •in America)166 and
to the relator suitor (especially in England).167
D.

The Ministere Public, the Prokuratura, and the "Active Role;'
of the Judge

The "active role" of the judge has become a momentous problem
in civil procedure.168 Does the function of the Ministere public and
his analogues (especially the Prokuratura) go hand in hand with
judicial activism? Or does it, on the contrary, reduce or eliminate
the need for judicial activism? Time and again we have heard of the
need for-as well as the risks involved in-expanding the judicial
role and encouraging judicial activism. For many yea.rs a growing
number of countries have overcome those fears and, after balancing
costs and benefits, have fostered "activism" in lieu of the traditional
passivity or "neutrality" of the judge. This trend has been particularly marked in small-claims proceedings169 and in proceedings involving labor disputes.170
Judicial activism is now fully accepted in all of the socialist
countries,171 but also in many civil-law nations (from Austria since
165. Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134- F.2d 694-, 704 (2d Cir.) (Frank, J.), vacated, 320
U.S. 707 (194-3). See Hamburger, supra note 1, at 392-93.
166. See section IIA2 infra._
167. See section IIAl infra.
168. Indeed, the International Academy of Comparative Law chose this as one of
the two topics discussed at its Ninth Congress (Tehran, 1974).
169. In a perfect system of legal aid, there would be effective access to courts and
parties would be equal without the need to resort to judicial activism. However, such
a system may be unreasonably expensive in so far as small claims are concerned. In
fact, representation by legal counsel has even been partially forbidden in some systems,
to reduce costs in small-claims cases. Hence, the growing trend is to turn to judicial
activism as a substitute for legal representation in such cases. See Jolowicz, The Active
Role of the Court in Civil Litigation, in M. CAPPELLETTI & J. JoLOWICZ, PUBLIC INTEREST
PARTIES AND THE ACTIVE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN ClvIL LITIGATION 155, 248-53 (1975)
(Milan/Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., Giuffre/ Oceana) (general report for Section II.C.2. of the
Ninth Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law, Tehran, 1974) •.
170. See generally M. CAPPELLETTI, GIUSTIZIA E SOCIETA 285-331 (1972) (Milano,
Edizioni di Comunita).
171. Cf. Jodlowski, supra note 97, at 88.
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the end of the nineteenth century, to most of Central Europe and,
more recently, France and Italy)172 and in a growing number of
"developing" nations.173 Even in common-law countries, the "sacred"
principle of adversariness has long been subject to the corrosive acid
of criticism-and even of scorn. Who does not remember Roscoe
Pound's contemptuous attack against the American "sporting theory"
of civil litigation?174
Judicial activism, of course, is a multi-dimensional term. It may
simply mean that the judge has powers and responsibilities to assure
an orderly, speedy, effective unfolding of the proceeding (what German terminology would call formelle Prozessleitung). A more radical
meaning, however, is that the judge's powers and responsibilities go
beyond the "formal" control of the proceeding to encompass also
(1) the search for the truth and (2) the determination of the scope of
the litigation (traditionally governed by the parties' allegations and
prayer for relief).
So long as the powers of the judge and judicial activism are limited to the formal unfolding of the proceeding, they have no direct
impact on the substantive law involved. The parties are still the
"masters" of the content of the litigation, deciding whether and on
which grounds to litigate, and what and how much relief to request
from the court. While such judicial activism can be termed "publicization" of th~ law of procedure (in the sense that the formal unfolding of the case is no longer left to the exclusive disposition of the
private parties), the subject matter of the case remains private.
This phenomenon of procedural publicization has occurred, to a
greater or lesser extent, in many of the civil-law countries of Europe.
Austria was the forerunner in 1895.175 As for the common-law world,
there is evidence that centuries-long tradition has favored a certain
measure of judicial control.176 At any rate, it is clear that the modern
172. See, e.g., M. CAl'PELLETII, supra note 170, at 285-331; Cappelletti, Social and
Political Aspects of Civil Procedure-Reforms and Trends in Western and Eastern
Europe, 69 MICH. L. R.Ev. 847 (1971).
173. See, e.g., M'Baye, supra note 21, at 795-96 (Senegal).
174. See Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice, 40 AM. L. R.Ev. 729, 749 (1906), reprinted in 8 BAYLOR L, REv, 1, 14 (1956).
175. See M. CAl'PELLETII, PROCEDURE oRALE ET PROCEDURE ECRITE 58 (19'11) (Milan/
Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., Giuffre/Oceana); Cappelletti, supra note 172, at 854.
176. "[f]here grew up in the King's Court of the Franks a procedure of another
sort ••• incompatible with the principle of unlimited party control. It was this which
furnished the starting point for the Anglo-Norman legal development," Engelmann,
The Mediaeval German Procedure, in A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL C1v1L PROCEDURE 85,
87 (R. Millar ed. &: transl. 1927) (Boston, Little, Brown &: Co.). See also M. CAPPELLETII,
LA TESTIMONIANZA DELLA PARTE NEL SISTEMA DELL'ORALITA 142, 213-14, 223, 452, 465-66,
472-76 (1962) (Milano, Giuffre); I. Jacob, supra note 63, at 58-63; Jacob, The Inherent
Jurisdiction of the Court, 23 CURRENT LEGAL PROB. 23 (1970).
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tendency is "away from the extreme position which would render the
judge a passive umpire."177
Socialist countries and, to a lesser degree, other parts of the world
have gone further, however. "Publicization" has been proclaimed as
an all-encompassing trend. "We acknowledge nothing as 'private,' "
said Lenin.178 Accordingly, judicial control has been extended beyond the mere unfolding of the case to encompass a search for both
the "objective truth" and the "just" scope of the litigation. Under
this conception, civil litigation is the forum for contests in which a
public element is always present, and potentially even prevailing.179
The judge has a duty to see that this prevailing public element is not
sacrificed by the parties' egoism, negligence, weakness, or ignorance.
Hence, the judge may go beyond the parties' allegations of facts and
take evidence ex officio ;180 he may award more than the amount
requested; 181 he may refuse to accept an agreement or conciliation
between the parties;182 in certain cases, he may even commence proceedings on his mm. motion183 and file appeals.184
177. F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 7 (1965) (Boston, Little, Brown & Co.). See also id.
at 4.
178. THE LAw OF THE Sov!E'r STATE 76 (A. Vyshinsky ed. 1961) (New York, Macmillan). Lenin continued: "For us everything in the province of economics is in the domain of public law and not of private law." Id. (emphasis original).
179. Jodlowski, supra note 97, at 87.
180. Section 14, paragraph 1, of the R.S.F.S.R. Code of Civil Procedure of 1964
provides that "[t]he court is bound, without restricting itself to the materials and explanations produced [by the parties], to take all steps provided by law for the allround, full and objective elucidation of the true facts of the case and the rights and
duties of the parties." 11 LAw IN EASTERN EUROPE (1966), supra note 115, at 161 (footnote omitted). See generally Gwiazdomorski &: Cieslak, La preuve judiciaire dans les
pays socialistes a l'epoque contemporaine, in 19 RECUEILS DE LA SoCIETE JEAN BODIN,
LA PREUVE 49, 68-73 (1963) (Bruxelles, Editions de la Librairie Encyclopedique).
181. Section 195 of the R.S.F.S.R. Code of Civil Procedure, entitled "Right of the
court to go beyond the limits of the demands in the action," reads as follows: "Depending on the circumstances elucidated in the case, the court may go beyond the
limits of the demands made by the plaintiff, if such is necessary for the defense of the
rights and legally protected interests of, State institutions, enterprises, collective farms
and other co-operative and public organisations, or citizens." 11 LAw IN EASTERN EuROPE (1966), supra note 115, at 209. See the commentary by Levshin, in NAUCHNOPRAKTICHESKll KOMMENTARII K GPK RSFSR 227 (R. Kallistratova &: v. Puchinskii ed.
1965) (Moskva, Iuridicheskaja Literatura).
182. Section 34, paragraph 2, of the R.S.F.S.R. Code of Civil Procedure provides
that "[t]he court will not accept the withdrawal of his action by a plaintiff, or a concession of the action by the defendant, and will not approve a friendly settlement by
the parties, if such steps violate the law or the rights or legally protected interests of
any person." 11 LAw IN EASTERN EUROPE (1966), supra note 115, at 167. This article
and analogous provisions in the socialist countries have been interpreted to mean that
the judge will not approve party agreements if, although not contrary to binding
rules, they conflict with the "equitable interest of the parties." Nevai, The Authority
of the Court in Conducting Proceedings Under the Hungarian Law of Civil Procedure,
in STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE SIXTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE
LAw 79, 93 (1962) (Budapest, Akademiai Kiad6).
183. See R.S.F.S.R. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 340, ,r 3, § 351, ,r 3, § 407, ,r 2, 11
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Clearly, the philosophical basis of this latter development is profoundly different from that underlying merely procedural publicization. Nevertheless, a common element can be seen in the fact that
in both phenomena, public control is thought necessary to supplement, or substitute for, private initiative.
In theory, at least, the existence of a connection between judicial
activism (in both its forms) and the role of the Ministere public (and
his analogues) in civil litigation is difficult to deny. Whether judicial
activism gives the judge responsibility for the efficient unfolding of
the proceedings, the just determination of their contents, or both,180
it reflects a public (governmental) concern in civil litigation. It ,vould
be perfectly conceivable to substitute a "public party" in place of
judicial activism to act as a representative of the public interest with
respect to either the speedy and orderly unfolding of the case or the
just determination of its merits or both.186
Conversely, the lack of a meaningful role for such a public party
in many countries may be explained by the fact that the judge's role
and authority in those countries are so great as to obviate the need
for outside assistance. In the words of Professor Hazard:
[A leading comparativist, Rene David,] has sought to explain the
absence of an instrument of state intervention in civil proceedings
as the result of the strength of the common law judge. In one of his
books he suggests that the English judge is so strong that he requires
no buttressing by another institution, while the weaker role of the
Continental judge is strengthened by the presence of an official of
LAw IN EASTERN EUROPE (1966), supra note 115, at 248, 250, 265 (enforcement proceedings); CzECHOSLOVAKIAN CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 81, 23 Buu.. OF CzECHOSLOVAK
LAW 187, 202 (1965) (proceedings concerning, for example, minors and incompetents);
Vikut, supra note 1, at 114. Under Hungarian law, however, the courts lack power to
institute civil proceedings ex officio. Nevai, supra note 101, at 116.
184. R.S.F.S.R. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 320, Nos. 2, 4, 5, 6, 11 LAW IN EASCERN
EUROPE (1966), supra note 115, at 240.
185. To be sure, the second phenomenon usually includes the first, as in the so•
cialist countries. On the other hand, comparative analysis reveals that there arc many
procedural systems in whiclI the first phenomenon is not accompanied by the second.
See, e.g., F. JAMES, supra note 177, at 3-8.
186. An analogous phenomenon occurred long ago in criminal procedure. In ancien
regime France, and similarly in other civil-law countries, the court-in addition to the
Ministere public and private persons (the victims)-could commence ex officio criminal
prosecutions. The adage was that "tout juge est procureur general." R. DAVID &: H,
DEVRIES, supra note 45, at 56-57; M.-L. RASSAT, supra note 23, at 27-30, 163, 201. The
elimination of this prosecutorial power of the courts was one of the major cliangcs of
the liberal Revolution, based on the theory of separation of powers and the conception
that prosecution is the province of the executive. R. DAVID &: H. DEVRIES, supra, at
56-57; M.-L. RASSAT, supra, at 33. In Italy, the lower courts of first instance (Pretor1)
still have the prosecutorial initiative in proceedings before them. The Pretori's jurisdiction is limited to minor criminal offenses. C. PRO. PEN, art. 31, 74.
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the state authorized to give advice as to the state's interests in a case
involving private litigants.1 s1

Along the same line of thought, one could explain the substantially lesser role of the Ministere public in Central European countries188 than, say, in France, Belgium, and Italy189 by the fact that the
Austrian and German civil judge has for more than half a century
been granted far-reaching powers to control the unfolding of the
case (formelle Prozessleitung) and even, in part, the contents of the
litigation (so-called "materielle Prozessleitung").190
Similarly, one could surmise that the Marxian socialist countries
went unecessarily far when they greatly expanded not only the role
of the Prokuratura, but also that of the judiciary, entrusting to both
the procurator and the judge bro~d powers to commence, and/or to
control the scope and unfolding of civil cases. One could infer that
the reason why, in practice, the Prokuratura's participation in civil
litigation is so much less frequent than one would expect191 is that
judicial activism makes the demand for such participation much less
pressing. One could even dare to suggest192 that de-privatization of
law, including substantive law-an unavoidable development in
mass-economy societies-should be accompanied by a growing participation in civil litigation of a "public party" (such as the Ministere
public or the Prokuratura),1 93 but that judicial activism, especially if
187. Hazard, supra note 3, at 209-10, referring to R. DAVID & H. DEVRIES, supra note
45, at 21.
188. See Habscheid, supra note 20, at 176, 184-85; Hazard, supra note 3, at 209;
note 86 supra and accompanying text. For Austria, see the telling statistical data in W.
Kralik, supra note 3, at 11.
189. At least for Italy, however, the large role envisaged for the Ministere public
in civil litigation has remained merely law on the books, not corresponding to actual
practice. See note 21 supra.
190. In the German report the thesis is repeatedly stated that, whereas civil litigation as a rule is "the private affair of the parties," when public interests are involved
in a civil proceeding it is for the judge, not for a state attorney, to protect them. Habscheid, supra note 20, at 176, 184-85. The Austrian Reporter also repeatedly emphasizes
the role of the judge in the protection of public interests in civil litigation. W. Kralik,
supra note 3, at 3, 5.
191. See section IB supra, especially note 128 and accompanying text.
192. See my 1962 inaugural lecture Ideologie nel diritto processuale, republished in
M. CAPPELLEITI, PROCESSO E IDEOLOGIE 3, 24 n.39 (1969) (Bologna, II Mulino).
193. See the suggestion made by Judge Frank:
I do not suggest that courts ••• conduct their own investigations through their
own employees. I do suggest that we should consider whether it is not feasible to
provid~ impar~~l _go_vernmen~ officials-who are not court employees, ~nd who act
on their own m1tiative--to dig up, and present to the courts, significant evidence
which ~ne or the other of the parties may overlook or be unable to procure.
J. FRANK, supra note 151, at 97-98. The same thesis seems implicit in Nevai, supra note
101, at 116-17.
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it extends beyond the mere formal unfolding of the litigation, need
not be a concomitant of such growing participation.194
A strong argument can be made in support of this last point. In
the words of Belgian Professor and honorary Procureur General
Hermann Bekaert, the judge is not the right person to choose as a
defender of either the "collective interests" or the interests of those
persons who are "socially, physically, or economically weak": 10u
'_'[The judge] is neither enlightened nor equipped to accomplish this
defense; the law confines the judge 'to the boundaries established by
the pleadings ... .' The fundamental principle of our civil procedure
is that with few exceptions, 'the judge acts only if requested.' " 190
Professor Bekaert's recommendation is to tum with renewed confidence to the old institution-the Ministere public.191 The Ministere
public's powers to participate in civil litigation as a full-fledged party
(partie·principale) should be greatly expanded. He should be made
the general public representative and defender of the "inter~ts collectifs". in civil litigation,198 taking the place of a much too dangerous,
and unnecessary, judicial activism. The participation of a public
party would in no way impair judicial impartiality, whereas judicial
activism would permanently hang like a Damoclean sword over that
impartiality.199
Professor Bekaert's recommendation, however, has one weakness.
He does not examine whether the Ministere public's background and
training, the organization and structure of his office, and his career,
are suitable for harboring and nourishing the kind of "interested zeal"
-"le zele d'une personne interessee"-that is a necessary element of
194. Cf. E. Vescovi, supra note 20, at 12 (with reference to P. Calamandrei).
195. Bekaert, supra note 2, at 444.
196. Id. at 444-45. Bekaert then quotes approvingly the following forceful statements
from an 1823 work by J.D. Meyer:
Leaving the care of public and general interests to the judge is contrary to the
idea of judges' functions, is outside their sphere, and is dangerous due to inevitable abuses; it would require of him greater than usual attention. ·we forget that
impartiality and the strict enforcing of the laws represent all the rights and the
duties of the judge. It is expecting too much [of him] to charge the judge with
the care of unpleaded interests, for we would then expect him to perform the
function both of the judge and the attorney. Each one of these functions, however, requires the entire attention of one person. It is e.xpecting too much from
the strength of his character because we would expect him to combine the zeal of
an interested person and the neutrality of justice; it is expecting too much from
his morality because we would entrust him with unlimited power and we would
expose him to the deadly temptation of abusing it.
Id. at 445, quoting J. Meyer, 6 ESPRIT, ORIGINE ET l'ROGRES DES INSI'ITUTIONS JUDICIAIRES
202, 250, 257 (1823) (La Haye).
197. See also Krings, supra note 4, at 163.
198. Bekaert, supra note 2, at 445-50.
199. See M. CAl'PELLETII, supra note 192, at 24 n.39. See also J. FRANK, supra note
151, at 98.
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that enlarged role. Changing the wording of legislation to allow the

Ministere public to participate in all cases involving a "public" or
"collective" interest is, as we have seen, a useless or at best a largely
insufficient attempt.200 To be effective, the change should reach much
deeper. It should give the Ministere public competence in highly
specialized, nonlegal matters, whereas he, like his socialist201 and
common-law analogues, is essentially a Ia-wyer; it should give him
responsiveness and flexibility, whereas he, like the socialist procurator, is a member of a bureaucratic and centralized machinery; it
should give him deep and lasting contacts with society, and with social
policies and politics, whereas he is a magistrat, the member of a class
that traditionally-and very justifiably-has tended toward independence, autonomy, and isolation.202 In sum, to become suitable for the
new task, the French model of a "public party" should be so radically
transformed as to become an entirely different entity-a public
agency or, more exactly, a number of decentralized public agencies,
so specialized and organized as to be able to take care of all of th~
varied aspects of modem life that involve vital interests of contemporary societies. We will see that a trend in this direction has in fact
emerged in a number of countries,203. but that even in this radically
changed form, the "public (governmental) party" has so far been
unable successfully to assume the entire burden of representing
public and group interests in civil litigation.204
200. See section IA4 supra.
201. For example, in Hungary the requirements for becoming an officer of the
Prokuratura include graduation from law school, completion of a two-year period ·of
legal practice, and passing an examination (which also qualifies the candidate for the
judiciary). Nevai, supra note 101, at 120.
202. See section IA3 supra. "Since the Ministere public is considered a judge,
charged above all with the duty to defend the law, he must have an essentially serene
function. Even if he is a party to the suit, his fundamental character makes him closer
to the judges who decide the case, with whom he participates in the rendering of the
judgment; his function is more akin to judging than to litigating." M.-L. RAssAT, supra
note 23, at 161.
203. See section IE infra.
204. The conclusions in this section ·force us, once again, to recognize that the
Ministere public's real role is, and seems destined to remain, essentially in the field
of criminal prosecution and civil matters akin to criminal proceedings. See notes 21, 80
supra and accompanying text. In this field-but not in civil litigation-the French
institution, even more than its common-law analogue, see section IA3, especially text
at note 79 supra, is of great value. The Ministere public is independent and "judgelike" enough to offer a good chance of conducting an objective prosecution, an attainment much less likely to occur in societies in which the prosecutor has close ties to the
police, the executive, and local, national, or party politics. In the criminal area, the
"interested zeal" is not the Ministere public's, but rather the police's concern.
At this point, a brief note should be added concerning the Ministere public's role in
criminal prosecution. Like its civil counterpart, criminal litigation is in a process of
radical change due to modern societal transformation. Many traditional crimes, of
course, still have their place in criminal courts, but our mass-production and consump-
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Other Governmental Agencies
I. In General
The growing need for governmental intervention in highly specialized fields of social organization and economic development is a
E.

tion "civilization" has brought about the emergence of a new and more sophisticated,
less vulnerable type of criminal-the violator of the criminal aspects of regulations
concerning such matters as securities, antitrust, urban development, and pollution.
At the same time, the emergence of a new sensitivity to the social aspects of civil
rights is bringing to the criminal courts another new type of criminal-the violator
of the rights of groups, classes, races, and sects, rather than merely the rights of
isolated individuals. The traditionalists' conception is incisively described by R. DAVID
& H. DEVRIES, supra note 45, at 56: "Although in theory it is unquestionably a branch
of public law-since theft, murder and assault are not merely offenses against the victim
but also against the State-criminal law is nevertheless ••• a subject for privatistes
rather than publicistes •••• The whole approach is that of the private law." This
might be true for the traditional crimes, but not for the new crimes mentioned above,
which reflect a radically changed conception of ·criminal law in modern societies. Hence
a new question emerges: Is the Ministere public a suitable prosecutor for these new
types of crimes? Should the answer be an unqualified yes, then we should qualify our
negative conclusions concerning the suitability of the Ministere public to be the pro•
tector of the new and vital "interets collectifs." At least in so far as violations of such
interests involve (as they not infrequently do) criminal sanctions, the Ministere public
would appear to be a suitable vindicator. Such a conclusion would be excessively op•
timistic, however.
· French experience in this matter is uniquely enlightening. In France, unlike in
many other nations, the Ministere public does not in a full sense "monopolize" crim•
inal prosecution; in at least one important instance, a criminal proceeding can be
instituted without his initiative. The victim who brings an action civile for damages
caused by criminal conduct "can request the juge d'instmction to institute criminal
proceedings." Id. at 56-57. See C. PRO. PEN. arts. 85-91. (The situation is even more
radical in Spain, where a criminal suit can be brought by any citizen, even if he is
not the victim of the alleged crime. See V. Fairen Guillen, supra note 3, at 6, 11 n.25.
Mexico and other Latin American countries are at the other end of the spectrum,
since only the Ministere public is empowered to institute criminal proceedings. See S.
Ofiate, supra note 3, at 4 & n.7.) The French procedure permits the "setting in mo•
tion" of a criminal prosecution without, and even against, the Ministere public's will.
See C. PRo. PEN. art. 88; M.-L. RASSAT, supra note 23, at 204, 233, 239. Various provisions, however, are designed to prevent abuse of the citizens' right to initiate criminal cases. For instance, the private party ("partie civile") may be obliged to provide
security for costs (article 88), and may be punished for bringing charges known to be
false (article 91).
Time and again it has been proved that, in connection with newly emerged col•
lective interests, the Ministere public's initiative is frequently deficient and must be
supplemented by that of the victim. The Ministere public is quick enough to prosecute
traditional crimes, essentially "individual" in nature, such as murder, theft, and assault.
He is not so quick, however, to act against less traditional, essentially "collective"
crimes, such as racial defamation, fraudulent commercial advertising, abuses in the
sale of securities, invasion of green areas by unauthorized or illegally authorized build•
ings, or pollution by business concerns. Ample documentation of this attitude is provided in section IA4 supra. This applies also, in part, to the police, who are likewise
selected and trained primarily for the discovery and prevention of the traditional
crimes. Most prosecutorial action is dependent, of course, upon the activities of the
police.
Once again, it seems that the Ministere public's limited (essentially legal) specialization, his relative social insulation, his participation in a heavy, centralized, bureaucratic
machinery-in sum, his very nature as an officer of the Parquet-hinder his being a
sensitive, prompt, and effective advocate of nontraditional, newly emerging public
interests. Mutatis mutandis, similar conclusions can be drawn with respect to the
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basic feature of modem societies. Yet, as has been seen, the Ministere
public (and his Anglo-American and socialist analogues) lacks expertise in and sensitivity to these highly specialized, nonlegal matters.
This fact is one of pie basic weaknesses of the Ministere public in
representing public interests in court.
To remedy that weakness, there has been a proliferation of
specialized branches within the office of the Ministere public (and the
attorney general).205 In addition, there has been an even greater
analogues of the Ministere public. Not all of these reservations are applicable to the
common-law attorney general, see notes 82, 159 supra, but the attorney general pays
heavy costs for this possible superiority in efficiency in that he is much more subject to
political interference. See section IA3 supra.
No one could categorically state that the necessary sensitivity that, by and large, has
been missing so far will not emerge in the future. Most human minds take time to
become aware of new social needs. But even if future generations of Ministeres publics
bring a new sensitivity and awareness to their office, delay in modernization will remain
an especially acute problem for this hierarchical organization in which career magistrates assume leading positions through seniority. In a rapidly changing society, an
organization such as the Parquet is destined to be too traditionalist to be the best
possible champion of nontraditional rights. This is why the power of an aggrieved person to initiate criminal prosecution-as an alternative to the initiative of the Ministere public-a power already frequently exercised and susceptible of further
development, is a very fortunate feature of French law. Through this alternative, the
valuable, but insufficient, institution of the Parquet can find precious substitution,
assistance, and stimulus from the persons directly and zealously interested. One important argument made against the further enlargement of the victim's power to
initiate prosecutions is that such enlargement would destroy the discretion, left (to
some extent) with the French Parquet, not to prosecute a case if practical evaluations
so suggest. See generally M.-L. R.AssAT, supra, at 39, 85-103, 162-63, 215-41; H. SoLUs &:
R. PERROT, I DRorr JUDICIAIRE PRIVE 229 (1961) (Paris, Sirey); A. De Vita, supra note I,
at 19. The validity of this argument is doubtful, however. In some other countries, ·such
as post-World War II Italy, an important development has been to make prosecution a
nondiscretional obligation for the Ministere public-even a constitutionally proclaimed
obligation (under article 112 of the Italian Constitution)-in all cases in which there is
reasonable evidence of the commission of a crime. -See Vigoriti, supra note 21, at 275.
Making prosecution a nondiscretional duty was considered both an important guarantee
for the equal treatment of all citizens and a restraint upon prosecutorial and executive
abuses; it was also regarded as an additional guarantee of the Ministere public's independence from his hierarchical superiors, and even more so from the political branches
of government, or from other pressures of any kind. See, e.g., Giannattasio, La magistratura, in CoM?.ffiNTARIO SISTEMATICO ALLA CosrrrUZIONE ITALIANA 193 (P. Calamandrei
&: A. Levi ed. 1950) (Firenze, Barbera). For German analogues, see W. HEYDE, THE
ADMINISI'RATION OF JusnCE IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 71, 109 (1971) (Press
and Information Office of the Federal Government of Germany). See also K. DAVIS,
supra note 79, at 191-95, 224, 230-31.
205. For a European example, see note 95 supra and accompanying text. The phenomenon mentioned in the text is particularly important in the United States. There
are various divisions within the U.S. Attorney General's office, including an Antitrust
Division and a Civil Rights Division. See generally L. HusroN, THE DEPARTMENT OF
JusnCE 54-109 (1967) (New York, Praeger). The Civil Rights Division includes the Office
of Institutions, which has responsibility for protecting the constitutional rights of
residents of mental institutions, prisons, and juvenile detention centers. For instance,
the Office of Institutions recently brought suit against the State of Maryland regarding
conditions in a state institution for the mentally retarded. (Information kindly provided
by l\fr. C.R. Halpern of the Center for Law and Social Policy in Washington, D.C.)
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proliferation of specialized separate agencies entrusted, inter alia,
with tasks akin to those of a Ministere public, that is, commencing or
intervening in civil cases. Examples are countless: from the Jugendamt in the Federal Republic of Germany206 and the Child Welfare
Committees in Sweden207 to the Finanzprokuratur in Austria,208 the
Avvocatura dello Stato in Italy,209 and the Ombudsman in Scandinavian and other nations; 210 from the Queen's Proctor, the Public
Trustee,211 the Director-General of Fair Trading,212 and the Race
Apparently, there is also increasing specialization in the offices of the state attorneys
general. For instance, the office of the Michigan Attorney General has 21 divisions. Note,
supra note 17, at 1053. On the other hand, as reported by Professor Rivet, in Canada,
or at least in Quebec, the office of the Attorney General "is not a structure that permits
specialization of its officers." Rivet, supra note 63, at 249.
206. In Germany, a specialized public agency called the ]ugendamt (Youth Officc)rather than the normal Ministere public-represents juveniles in court on such matters
as their education, protection, and assistance. See Habscheid, supra note 20, at 176-77,
Among other German agencies that have a role in noncriminal litigation, mention
should be made of the so-called "representatives of the public interest" ("Vertreter des
offentlichen Interesses"), who correspond, in some of the German Lander (including
Bavaria and Baden-Wiirttemberg) to the Oberbundesanwalt at the federal level. See
note 71 supra. A major duty of these Land officers is to represent the regional govern•
ment in proceedings before the administrative courts, that is, in proceedings usually
instituted by private persons to challenge the legality of regional administrative action,
Their title is rather misleading, however, since they tend to consider themselves as
merely the attorneys of the defendant-the Land and its agencies, These officers lack
not only the power (inter alia, they cannot commence cases), but also the specialization
and the independence necessary to fulfill the role of real champions of the public
interest. See E. REHBINDER, H. BURGBACHER & R. KNIEPER, supra note 71, at 142-44.
207. See P. Bolding, supra note 64, at 3-5. In Sweden, the role of the Public Prose•
cutor (Ministere public) in civil matters is even more limited than in the Federal
Republic of Germany. See note 86 supra. His role is virtually limited to cases of nullity
of marriage and patria potestas, and is "of very little practical importance." P. Bolding,
supra, at 3. Representation of public interests in and out of court is, instead, the task
of a number of specialized agencies, of which the Child Welfare Committees arc an
example. Id. at 3-5.
208. See W. Kralik, supra note 3, at 1-2, 12; note 69 supra.
209. See note 69 supra,
210. See section IE2 infra. Also to be noted in Sweden is a Nature Conservation
Board for the protection of the environment. See P. Bolding, supra note 64, at 7. As an
additional measure, individuals, whether directly or indirectly aggrieved, may apply to
the "land courts" for injunctions against activities detrimental to the environment. Id.
211. For a discussion of the Queen's Proctor, see note 151 supra; I. Jacob, supra
note 63, at 29-32, 86-87. As for the Public Trustee, see generally 38 THE LAws OF
ENGLAND 892-902 (3d ed. G. Simonds 1962) (London, Buttenvorth). The Public Trustee,
_appointed by the Lord Chancellor, has various functions that correspond to those of
a private trustee; in the fulfillment of such functions, he "may have the same powers,
duties, and rights as a private trustee." G. KEETON, THE LAw OF TRUSTS 184 (8th ed.
1963) (London, Pitman). Mention should also be made of the English office of the
Official Solicitor to the Supreme Court. See I. Jacob, supra, at 24-28,
212. See I. Jacob, supra note 63, at 17-18, 33-38. The Director General of Fair
Trading is an office created in 1973. Its function is to take proceedings before the
Restrictive Practices Court against monopolistic practices and restrictive trading agree•
ments that are "contrary to the public interest," with a view, inter alia, to protecting
consumers.
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Relations Board213 in England to the Legal Services Corporation214
and a number of other governmental agencies in the United States;215
from countless "organs of State administration" and "State institutions and enterprises" in the Soviet Union216 and the other socialist
nations217 to such recent entities as the Registrar of Restrictive Trade
Agreements in India218 and the Environmental Protection Council in
Ghana.219
213. See id. at 17-18, 39-42. Like the Director General of Fair Trading; the Race
Relations Board is a new institution created to represent certain matters of public
interest in civil proceedings. The Race Relations Board has the task of bringing civil
proceedings against various categories of acts of racial discrimination that the law
makes "unlawful" but not criminal. Based on the Race Relations Act of 1965, such
proceedings, like penal proceedings against criminal acts of discrimination, "could only
be brought by the Attorney-General." Id. at 39. The Race Relations Act of 1968,
however, "shifted the responsibility for enforcing its provisions by civil proceedings
from the Attorney-General to the Race Relations Board," id. at 40, which originally
was merely an agency for promoting conciliation. Id. at 39. Jacob indicates that this
"significant change of policy • • •• may perhaps be due to the desire to avoid the
Executive branch of Government being or appearing to be too closely involved or
identified in the enforcement of the law affecting racial discrimination. The Race
Relations Board has thus been constituted . . . as an agency for conciliation and for.
law enforcement." Id. at 40. One may wonder, though, whether there was not also
another reason for that change of policy, namely, the need to entrust the enforcement
of racial legislation to a specialized agency to avoid the proven ineffectiveness of the
Attorney General in newly emerging areas of law.
Interestingly, although the Race Relations Board may claim damages on behalf of
the victim of the unlawful act of discrimination, the victim hintself may not bring
proceedings; the right to go to court is the monopoly of the Board. Id. at 4142.
214. See Legal Services Corporation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-355 (July 25, 1974); M.
CAPPELLETI1, J. GORDLEY&: E. JOHNSON, JR., TOWARD EQUAL JumCE: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF LEGAL Am IN MODERN SOCIETIES 114-28, 452 et passim (1975) (Milano/Dobbs
Ferry, N.Y., Giuffre/ Oceana); E. JOHNSON, JR., JUSTICE AND REFORM (1974) (New York,
Russell Sage Foundation).
215. E.g., the Environmental Protection Agency, the Food and Drug Administration,
the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Federal Trade Commission. Within
their respective areas, these administrative agencies have the power to participate in
civil cases, although their primary role is in administrative regulation. Advocacy before
other administrative agencies and in court, on the other hand, would represent a
major aspect of the role envisaged for the proposed Consumer Protection Agency,
which is likely to be established soon by Congress. See H.R. 2709, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975). This new agency would become a sort of American consumer ombudsman. See
C. Halpern, supra note 1, at 15-18; section IE2 infra,
216. Principles of Civil Procedure of the Soviet Union and the Union Republics
§ 30, 7 LAW IN EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 115, at 306, and R.S.F.S.R. CODE OF CML
PROCEDURE §§ 4, 29, 42, 11 LAW IN EASl'ERN EUROPE (1966), supra, at 158, 165, 168-69,
regulate commencement of, and participation in, civil cases by "organs of State administration, trade unions, State institutions, enterprises, collective farms and other cooperative and public organizations." See Shakarian, supra note 1, at 124-33; Vikut,
supra note 1, at 90-94; section IIB2 infra.
217. See section IIB2 infra.
218. The Indian Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969, has empowered the Registrar of Restrictive Trade Agreements to act as an "advocate of public
interest" by investigating and bringing proceedings against restrictive trade agreements
and practices. The adjudicatory body is the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices
'Commission, which operates under the Code of Civil Procedure. In addition to -the
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While the need for specialization may be fulfilled by these more
articulate solutions, other problems are left unresolved. Even governmental agencies that operate in specialized areas tend to assume a
bureaucratic psychology and a hierarchical structure that often makes
their intervention too rigid and centralized to be effective. The
American experience with the Office of Economic Opportunity's
(OEO) Legal Services Program is illustrative. Although the Program
-especially during its gl_orious years between 1965 and 1970-had
achieved a balance between centralization and localization, preserved
a sufficient degree of autonomy from governmental interference, and
displayed remarkable motivation and aggressiveness, the danger of
centralization and dependence on political pressures still remained.
Fighting against that danger at times absorbed a large portion of the
Program's energies; indeed, centralization, at the state if not at the
federal level, might well prevail with the Program's forthcoming
transformation into a public corporation.220
Moreover, the creation of governmental agencies to deal with new
social problems and needs usually requires legislative action, which,
as a rule, is very slow to materialize and sometimes even slower to
adapt to concrete experience. Perhaps with the sole, but brief,
exception of the OEO Program, no governmental agency has
achieved the same degree of imagination, impetus, and promptness
in dealing with welfare, consumer, environmental, or civil rights
problems as have the individuals and spontaneous organizations
that have been encouraged221 to represent public interests in court.
Once again private initiative, even with all of its inherent risks and
its need for checks against possible abuses, reveals remarkable advantages vis-a-vis governmental regimentation.222
Registrar, who has a staff of professional and administrative officials, complaints to the
Commission can also be brought by trade and consumers' associations or by a group
of no less than 25 consumers. See L. Singhvi, supra note 152, at 8-10.
219. Instituted by the Ghanaian Environmental Protection Council Decree 1974,
the Council is entrusted with a number of tas!<S designed to safeguard the quality of
the environment and to promote environmental education. In Justice Ollennu's
authoritative opinion, the Council is also endowed with the power to conduct civil
litigation for environmental protection. N. Ollennu, Representation of Public, Collective and Group Interests in Civil Litigation 5-6 (unpublished Ghanaian report, sec
note 1 supra).
220. Sec Legal Services Corporation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-355 Uuly 25, 1974).
221. See note 365 infra.
222. Charles Halpern, a leading American expert in public interest problems, writes
that in the United States "there has been considerable disillusionment with governmental agencies with a broad mandate to regulate corporate behavior ••• in the public
interest. These agencies, many of which were begun in the New Deal years, are now
perceived as being 'captured' and being too responsive to the industries which they
are intended to regulate, and too unresponsive to the interests of the general public."
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In fact, most Western experts seem to have reached a consensus,223
at least in recent times, that the public administration acting alone
cannot adequately deal 1vith the "public interest" aspects of the
grmving economic, social, and environmental problems of modern
societies.224 In the United States, for instance, the administrative
agencies themselves are the first to recognize that, due in part to a
personnel shortage, they cannot substitute entirely for the initiative
of individuals and private groups in the protection of the public
interest in such fields as securities and antitrust regulation. Modern
political science, both in Germany and the United States, recognizes
that
in a system of pluralistic democracy, it is difficult to organize efficiently and make politically virulent such diffuse societal interests
(das breitgestreute Allgemeininteresse) as the public's health, the
protection of the environment, traffic safety, and the protection of
consumers. This is the reason why such interests are not taken seriously enough by the public administration in its everyday action. 225

These conclusions should not be interpreted to mean that we
should discard, as useless tools, governmental agencies in such fields
as civil rights, welfare, securities regulation, and environmental and
consumer protection. Private initiative alone, no matter how encouraged, would be too haphazard and open to distortion if it were
not subject to official control and supplementation. However, private
individuals and groups should be allowed and encouraged to make
their contribution in areas too vital to be monopolized by armies of
indifferent governmental bureaucrats.226 Pietro Verri-Beccaria's
great inspirer-summed up this observation with a sentence that
should hang over the doors of most public officers as a reminder
against the dangerous illusion that there exist ever-vigilant governmental guardians of the public interest: "Les derniers qui voyent
C. Halpern, supra note 1, at 6. See also id. at 17; Weinstein, Some Reflections on the
"Abusiveness" of Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 299, 304-05 (1973).
223. The same can be said for Japanese experts. See T. Kojima, supra note 1, at 18,
21. Cf. note 139 supra (Soviet Union).
224. Professor Kotz gives ample documentation of this consensus. H. Kotz, supra
note I, at 16-17 & n.26, 25, 31-32 & n.59.
225. Id. at 32 & n.60 (with bibliographical references).
226. To give one concrete example, the U.S. Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1857a et seq. (1970), while giving to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, inter alia, powers akin to those of a specia14ed "governmental Attorney
General," see note 215 supra, also "assigns an important role to individual citizens in
enforcing a strong federal policy against air pollution. Generally, any citizen may sue
any polluter, including governmental agencies, for a failure to comply with the Act
without demonstrating any direct personal harm resulting from the pollution."
Homburger, supra note I, at 394. See also note 371 infra and accompanying text.
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clair les interc~ts de la societe sont pour l'ordinaire ceux qui sont payes
pour les voir."227

2. The "Mediator' or Ombudsman
One governmental agency, the ombudsman, deserves special attention. The task of this particularly interesting agency is, in part, to
assure that community and public interests have "access to justice."
From its roots in Sweden and Finland, the ombudsman has successfully expanded not only to Denmark and Norway but also, more
recently, to a rapidly growing number of non-Scandinavian countries,
including New Zealand (1962), Great Britain (1967), Quebec (1968),
and other provinces of Canada.228 France, too, recently has been
reached by this great wave,229 as have some jurisdictions in the United
States,230 some regions in Italy,231 and some states in India. 282 In the
Federal Republic of Germany, a Commissioner for Military Affairs
227. "The last ones to see clearly society's interests are generally those who arc paid
to do so." Verri, Pensees detachees, in MILANO IN EUROPA 138 (M. Schettini ed. 1963)
(Milano, Cino del Duca).
228. See, e.g., Legrand, Une institution universelle: l'Ombudsman1, 25 REvUE
INTERNATIONALE DE DRorr COMPARE 851-61 (1973), and the extensive bibliography therein.
See also P. Bolding, supra note 64, at 5-7; I. Jacob, supra note 63, at 90; Rivet, supra
note 63, at 250-51. Interestingly, Professor Rivet closes her report with a strongly nega•
tive appraisal of the role of Quebec's Attorney General in civil litigation, and a strongly
positive appraisal of the role performed by Quebec's Ombudsman in the past few years:
"With the Protecteur du dtoyen, Quebec is avant-garde. Whereas the public interest
is very badly protected by the Ministere public in civil suits, and whereas collective
interests are very difficult to protect before the courts, the citizen at least feels that he
is now protected against the state ••••" Id. at 251.
229. Statute No. 73-6 of Jan. 3, 1973, [1973] J.O. 164, [1973] J.C.P. Ill No. 40037
(creating a mediator). The mediator is appointed for a nonrenewable six-year term by
the Council of Ministers (article I), rather than by Parliament as in most other countries. This provision has been strongly criticized as endangering the mediator's independence from the executive. Once appointed, however, the mediator cannot be
dismissed except through an "impeachment" procedure (article 2). As in England,
see, e.g., I. Jacob, supra note 63, at 90, citizens' complaints arc not directly submitted
to the mediator, but rather to members of Parliament who may forward them to the
mediator (article 6). The role of the French mediator in COUl't proceedings is quite
limited; it is essentially restricted to disciplinary and criminal cases against agents of
the public administration (articles 10, 11). For a critical appraisal, sec, for example,
Amson, L'institution du mediateur: un coup d'epee dans l'eau, 47 LA SEMAJNE JURIDIQUE,
Jurus-CLASSEUR PERIODIQUE No. 2547 (1973).
230. Hawaii was the first state to establish an ombudsman office. See EsrADLISHING
OMBUDSMAN OFFICES: RECENT EXPERIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES viii et passim (S.
Anderson &: J. Moore ed. 1972) (Berkeley, Cal., Institute of Governmental Studies)
(transcript of the Ombudsman Workshop held in Honolulu, Hawaii, May 5-7, 1971).
Note also the proposed Consumer Protection Agency, mentioned in note 215 supra.
231. Provisions for the institution of an ombudsman are included in the constitutions of the regions of Tuscany, Liguria, and Latium. See, e.g., Bartolini, Difensore
dvico, MONDO ECONOMICO, June 8, 1974, at 20-22.
232, Included are the states of Maharashtra and Rajasthan. See L. Singhvi, supra
note 152, at 15-16.
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has been introduced.233 Recently, proposals have been made by authoritative sources to introduce a European ombudsman to promote
the protection of human rights at the European level.234
Although there are numerous differences among the various types,
a few basic features characterize the ombudsman everywhere. First, he
is an independent and nonpartisan functionary of the state (or governmental subdivision23°) that he is supposed to oversee; second, his
task is to examine complaints brought by citizens or (as in England
and France) by members of Parliament about maladministration or
other injustices; and third, he has broad powers to investigate, to
criticize, to make cases of maladministration and injustices known to
the public and to the governing bodies of the state, and in certain
instances even to present complaints to the courts.236
Only in these last instances, of course, is the ombudsman directly
relevant to this discussion. In so far as he brings or intervenes in law
suits on behalf of public or community interests called to his at233. The "military ombudsman" was established in West Germany in 1957, see
Gesetz iiber den Wehrbeauftragten des Bundestages of June 26, 1957, [1957] Bundesgesetzblatt I 652, based on a constitutional amendment. Grundgesetz art. 45b (amended
1956). For a commentary, see T. MAuNz, G. DURIG &: R. HERZOG, GRUNDGESETZ KoMMENTAR art. 45b, at 2-16 (3d ed. 1971) (Miinchen, Beck).
234. See, e.g., Written communication submitted by the International Institute of
Human Rights (Rene Cassin Foundation) of Strasbourg, in CouNcIL OF EUROPE CoNSULTATIVE AssEMBLY, PARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS 82, 84 (1972)
(Strasbourg). See also statements of F. Ermacora, id. at 88; B. Pittermann, id. at 88-89;
R. Dupuy, id. at Ill.
The final resolution of the Parliamentary Conference on this point states:
The European Parliamentary Conference on Human Rights • • • considers • • •
[a]s regards the effective protection of human rights in the member States of the
Council of Europe: ••• that even the best traditional systems of legal protection
are often ineffective since they can t>nly be invoked a poster{ori anC,. oft~n after
considerable delay, and even then without being able to remedy the inertia of
the administration; that consequently, it is necessary to consider favourably the
establishment of an organ authorized to receive and examine individual complaints, with a right of access to the files of government departments, functioning
on the lines of the Ombudsman as known in the Scandinavian countries.
Id. at 112-13.
The same recommendation was made in 1974 in Paris at a meeting of the ombudsmen of various European countries. See Bartolini, Un ombudsman per l'Europa,
MoNDO ECONOMICO, May 11, 1974, at 27-28. At the United Nations level, considerable
attention has been given to instituting an ad hoc organ for the protection of human
rights. A resolution was adopted by the Econoinic and Social Council of the United
Nations at its meeting on June 6, 1969, but the General Assembly has not yet made
a decision. See R. CLARK, A UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
(1972) (The Hague, Nijhoff).
235. Recently, even large private institutions-for example, Stanford Universityhave introduced a "mediator" whose tasks are analogous to those of an ombudsman.
236. See, e.g., D. RoWAT, THE OMBUDSMAN PLAN: ESSAYS ON THE WORLDWIDE SPREAD
OF AN IDEA 147 (1973) (Toronto, McClelland); Legrand, supra note 228, at 853. See
also P. Bolding, supra note 64, at 6-7; Dominice, Report on the Theme: How Can
the Existing Protection of Human Rights Be Strengthened1, in COUNCIL OF EUROPE
CoNSULTATIVE AssEMBLY, supra note 234, at 64, 72.
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tention, his role is much akin to that of a public attorney general
initiating or intervening in civil or criminal cases.237 It must be recognized, however, that this is neither the principal nor the usual role of
the ombudsman. Rather, his primary function is served prior to
litigation and out of court; he is a mediator-an alternative to or a
substitute for litigation and, as such, a bridge between individuals
and groups, on the one hand, and the governing "power" on the
other. Indeed, one important aspect of this institution is that it can
provide a forum for the grievances of persons who are unable to
surmount the psychological, financial, legal, or other barriers to going
to court. Thus, the ombudsman's great potential is to eliminate, or at
least reduce, the public's diffuse feelings of isolation, alienation, and
impotence vis-a-vis the bureaucratic machinery of the modern state.
One very interesting development has been the expansion of the
ombudsman's role to consumer and environmental problems, and
even the creation of specialized ombudsman positions for such problems.238 A valuable example is offered once more by Sweden, where a
new ombudsman was created in 1970.239 Called the "consumer ombudsman" (konsumentombudsman), 240 the office is composed of
twenty-five members-the consumer ombudsman, a deputy ombudsman, and a technical staff of attorneys, economists, marketing experts,
and an information officer.241 The duty of this agency is to watch over
237. The fact that a "justitieombudsman" has been effectively operating in Sweden for more than 150 years may explain, in part, the lack of any need (with only
unimportant exceptions) to entrust the public prosecutors' offices with the additional
task of pursuing public interests other than the prosecution of crimes, See note 207
supra. Cf. P. Bolding, supra note 64, at 3, 5-6.
238. The creation of specialized ombudsman positions for environmental prob•
lems, acting either within or apart from governmental agencies dealing with environ•
mental matters, was recommended by an international conference held in Donn,
Germany, on August 22-24, 1973. See R. Buxbaum, Report of Conference on Com•
parative Legal and Institutional Aspects of Public Interest Activity in the Environ•
mental Sector 10 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript).
239. See P. Bolding, supra note 64, at 5-6. Another ombudsman, called the "niiringsfrihetsombudsman" ("freedom of commerce ombudsman''), was created in 1954 by
the Restrictive Trade Practices Act to enforce Swedish antitrust law, See Sheldon,
Consumer Protection and Standard Contracts: The Swedish Experiment in Adminis•
trative Control, 22 AM. J. CoMP. L. 17, 28 (1974). A third ombudsman, established in
1969 and called "pressombudsman," sees that the press observes a code of ethical
standards. See Graetz, Les chevaliers de la consommation, JOURNAL n'EUROPE, Nov, 6,
1973, at 26-27. These ombudsmen are all in addition to the original "justitieombuds•
man" in existence since 1809. See note 237 supra.
240. A similar institution has been operating in Nonvay since 1973, and the Danish
Parliament is presently considering the creation of a consumer ombudsman. See Darto•
lini, supra note 231, at 28; Graetz, supra note 239, at 26, An analogous -proposal was
made in 1972 in the Belgian Senate. Id. at 28, For the United States proposal, sec
note 215 supra. In Japan, there are "consumer grievances advisers" whose "activities
are very much like those of an Ombudsman, though there is no institutional guar•
antee of their independence.'' T. Kojima, supra note I, at 25.
241. See Sheldon, supra note 239, at 29.
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improper marketing and advertising; one of its powers is to bring
suits before the special, newly'created Market Court (marknadsdomstol).242 An additional function of the consumer ombudsman was
established by a statute of April 1971, concerning standard form
contracts. If terms in such contracts are considered unfair to consumers, the consumer ombudsman, either upon his own motion or
upon informal requests from outside sources, can apply to the Market
Court to forbid the use of such terms.243 I£ the· ombudsman refuses to
apply, the application can be made "by an association of tradesmen,
consumers or employees"244-an interesting acknowledgement that
not even a highly specialized "public attorney general" should
monopolize the representation of collective interests by excluding
private initiative in the commencement of court proceedings.245
II.

OTHER SOLUTIONS IN OUTLINE

Once the shortcomings of the traditional "public attorney general" have been recognized, the problem remains to find other solutions to supplement, integrate with, or substitute for it. Once more,
comparative analysis can prove fruitful.
Human imagination has designed innumerable methods of providing public and collective interests with access to justice. One important means is to entrust representation in court of such interests
to private individuals and organized groups or associations whose
242, P. Bolding, supra note 64, at 6. See also Carsten, Marktgerichtsho/ und Verbraucherombudsmann, 23 WmTSCHAFT UND WEITBEWERB 667 (1973); Korkisch, Verbraucherschutz in Schweden, 37 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFr FUR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES
PRIVATRECHT 755 (1973); Sheldon, supra note 239, at 23-29.
243. P. Bolding, supra note 64, at 6-7. For a detailed analysis see. Sheldon, supra
note 239, at 17-67, especially at 41; for a translation of the statute, see id. at 68. The
Market Court has the power to issue injunctions under penalty of fine "where such
measure is in the public interest." See id. at 40-41 (section 1 of the statute).
244. See Sheldon, supra note 239, at 41, 68 (section 3 of the statute). See also P.
Bolding, supra note 64, at 6-7. Sheldon explains that, while the kind of association
envisaged by section 3 is "not required to be in any way representative or to have
special qualifications, it must have legal capacity and represent its members in their
status as entrepreneurs, consumers or employees." Sheldon, supra, at 41. Individual
consumers, however, have no standing to take a case to the court. Id.
245. Another Swedish example of combination of governmental and private initiative bas already been mentioned. See note 210 supra.
Section 7 of the statute discussed in the text contemplates an even more complex
combination of efforts, since it leaves with the Public Prosecutor the task of "instituting proceedings before the ordinary courts in regard to the imposition of fines."
Sheldon, supra note 239, at 68. Thus, we have the following combination: Both (1)
the consumer ombudsman and (2) a private association can bring complaints before
the Market Court; (3) the Market Court can issue injunctions prohibiting, under
penalty of fine, further use. of certain contract terms; in case of noncompliance, (4)
the Ministere public institutes a proceeding for the imposition of the fine, but be
does so only upon notification by (5) the consumer ombudsman or (6) any other person
who had applied to the Market Court for the injunction.
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institutional goals encompass those interests. In the words of Professor
Vigoriti:
·
It seems pointless to maintain in the judicial system an institution
[the Ministere public] whose ambiguities make it unable to serve its
intended role, and one which has been deprived of any practical
relevance. One can think of other and better methods of protecting
the public interest in the right application of the law. For example,
judges could be given stronger investigatory powers; and, as in certain areas of labor law and of administrative law, standing to sue or
to intervene to protect the public interest could be given to individuals and associations whose institutional goals include such an interest. It is submitted that such measures would protect the public
interest more realistically and more effectively than is now the case
under the useless aegis of the p[ubblico] m[inistero].246

Professor Vigoriti, I believe, has gone too far in his total condemnation of the traditional institution.247 The fact remains, however, that additional tools need to be utilized. One such tool is a
liberal conferral upon private individuals of standing to sue in the
community's or group's interest; another is a liberal grant of standing
to the groups themselves or to associations concerned with the interest
of those groups. I will briefly describe some typical examples 0£ both
methods.
A.

The Individual "Private Attorney General"
I. Relator Actions in England and Other
Common-Law Countries

As we saw above,248 the attorney general's role in civil litigation
is, de facto, a modest one in common-law countries. This situation,
however, is not the result of limitations imposed by law. In theory,
the attorney general's role, although ill-defined by statutory and case
law,249 could potentially be very broad, including a duty "to promote
the interest of all sections of the community and to prevent the
wrongdoing of one, resulting in the injury to the general welfare." 200
As a consequence, the attorney general may have standing to demand
compliance with the law in most civil matters involving the general
246. Vigoriti, supra note 21, at 288.
247. A similar condemnation is made by the Japanese and the Mexican Reporters.
See S. Ofiate, supra note 3, at 11-13; C. Suzuki, supra note 3, at 15. See also T. Kojima,
sup7:a note 1, at 1-2 et passim.
248. See section IC supra.
249. s. DE SMITH, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcrxoN 404 (3d ed. 1973)
(London, Stevens &: Sons). Cf. I. Jacob, supra note 63, at 48-49.
, 250. G. Taylor, supra note 151, at 10, quoting Attorney-General v. Huber, 2 S.A.S.R.
142, 174 (F.C. 1971).
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public interest.251 Indeed, the attorney general is at the same time
"the official representative of the Crown in litigation and the representative of public interest."252 In this latter capacity, he is entitled
to bring suit "whenever the law has been broken, whether by a public or a private body or person."253
It may be because this broad role of the attorney general has
remained merely theoretical that England and some other commonlaw countries have relied on an institution with great potential for
representing the public interest in civil litigation. This institution
-quite vital, for instance, in Australia.254-is the relator action.
Through this action, an individual who himself lacks standing to
bring suit in the public interest can do so in the name and with the
fiat of the Attorney General:
In English law questions of title to sue in actions of public concern are obviated when proceedings are brought in the name of the
Attorney-General on the relation of a member of the public, who
need satisfy only the Attorney-General that he has a real grievance.255
This procedure has been much used to review the legality of local
authority activities; to secure relief in cases of infringement of a
public right, e.g. public nuisance; and to secure the proper administration of public and charitable trusts.25s
251. See id. See also id. at 11-12. Jacob indicates that a narrower view prevails
in England. I. Jacob, supra note 63, at 22-23. But see id. at 49-53, 67-69. Jacob expresses the opinion that "the right of intervention by the Attorney-General • • • in
civil proceedings either as a party or as amicus curiae should be greatly extended to
all cases in which there is or may be an element of public interest involved." Id. at 94.
252, G. Taylor, supra note 151, at 2. See also I. Jacob, supra note 63, at 20-21.
253. G. Taylor, supra note 151, at 19.
254. See id. at 7-8 and the interesting examples mentioned therein.
The institution does not exist in Scotland. See Scottish Law Commission, supra
note 142, at 48; J. Thomson, supra note 142, at 4 & n.17. It exists, but is very rarely
used, in Kenya. See J. Spry, supra note 151, at 1-2. As for India, Advocate General
Singhvi informs us that section 91 of the 1908 Indian Code of Civil Procedure-which
allows civil actions concerning public nuisances to be brought by either the Advocates
General (the attorneys general for the Indian states) or by relators acting with the
Advocate General's written consent-"has ••• tended to fall into desuetude because •••
the Advocates-General do not have any investigating staff of their own and generally
do not have either the time or the motivation to commence action under Section 91."
Furthermore, "[t]he relators often find the procedure slow, cumbersome and ineffectual.'' L. Singhvi, supra note 152, at 4. No more effective is sec~on 92 of the Indian
Code, which provides for suits to be brought by the Advocates General or relators in
matters involving charitable or religious trusts. See id. at 6-7.
255. However, if such grievance consists of the violation of the suitor's own rights,
he has standing to sue for his own personal interest, rather than in the public interest
and in the name of the Attorney General, and thus does not need the Attorney
General's fiat. See G. Taylor, supra note 151, at 7-8. See also S. DE SMITH, supra note
249, at 387 ("the relator need not show any personal interest in the subject-matter of
the suit, for the proceedings [are] the Attorney-General's'), 401 ("[i]t is immaterial
that the relator may have no personal interest in the proceedings beyond that of any
member of the public'), 401-03.
256. Scottish Law Commission, supra note 142, at 48.
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A private citizen generally does not have standing to sue to protect· the public from illegal activity. 257 The Attorney General, however, has such standing because he represents the Crown in its role
as parens patriae.258 This power of the Attorney General, originally
developed in equity, was for a long time restricted to public nuisance
cases.269 It is now exercised to restrain illegal conduct in a wide range
of situations of great concern,260 either by the Attorney General himself or, much more frequently, by private citizens in relator actions. 261
For example, suits for injunctions can be brought to restrain land
developers who have not obtained the requisite permission from the
local planning authority.262 More generally, conduct injurious to the
public welfare can be restrained, 263 and "[p]rohibitions and restrictions [can be obtained] directed towards public health and comfort
and the orderly arrangement of municipal areas ...." 264 The relief,
of course, must "benefit . . . the public or at least a section of the
public,"266 and not only particular individuals.
As we already mentioned, the private plaintiff must obtain the
fiat, or consent, of the Attorney General before he can institute a
relator action. The granting or withholding of consent is discretionary. 266 Although this discretionary power presents the danger that
the Attorney General, "being a politician," may deny his permission
for political or partisan reasons,267 it may avoid the corresponding
danger of having frivolous suits brought in the name of the Attorney
2~7. See S. DE SM111I, supra note 249, at 401, 405, 407-10.
258. Id. at 401-02.
259. In addition, his power covered cases concerning marriage, incompetents, chari•
ties, and public trusts, that is, the traditional areas of concern for the sovereign as
"parens patriae," See S. DE S1111TH, supra note 249, at 385-87, 402. Cf. I. Jacob, supra
note 63, at 22; G. Taylor, supra note 151, at 20. Once more, the similarity to the
civil-law world is apparent. See sections IA!, 2 supra.
260. See S. DE SMlllI, supra note 249, at 403.
261. See id. at 387, 400,01, 406. "[A]ctions begun by the Attorney-General in the
public interest . • • are rare except in cases where the Attorney-General allows an
action to be brought in his name by an individual who is personally interested."
Jolowicz, supra note 169, at 182. See also I. Jacob, supra note 63, at 50: "[I]n practice
the Attorney-General seldom acts ex officio and he more generally acts on the complaint, or as it is said, on the relation of a person or body interested."
262. Cf. S. DE S1111TH, supra note 249, at 404.
263. See id. at 404-05.
264. G. Taylor, supra note 151, at 12, quoting Cooney v. Ku-Ring-Gai Corp., 114
Comniw. L.R. 582, 605 (1963) (Menzies, J.). Other examples include a ratepayer suing
as relator against the building of a new _town hall without compliance with the
relevant statute, and a riparian landowner suing as rclator against diversion of water
from a river. See id. at 8.
265. Id. at 12. See S. DE SMITH, supra note 249, at 404.
266. Cf. S. DE SMITH, supra note 249, at 401; I. Jacob, supra note 63, at 50-51.
267. See G. Taylor, supra note 151, at 7, 20.
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General.268 Nor is this latter hazard merely a remote possibility. One
Australian judge went so far as to speak of his "apprehension" concerning "the invasion of the civil courts by bands of self-appointed
moral vigilantes using the name of the Attomey-General." 269 The
danger of political abuse in tum is avoided in those jurisdictions
where the granting of the fiat is almost automatic if a reasonable case
is presented.270
Even though relator actions are almost invariably prosecuted entirely by the private plaintiff, the Attorney General retains control
over the whole proceeding.271 The relator is, and remains, "merely a
representative member of the public," whereas the Attorney General
is "the legal representative of the public."272 In Dr. Taylor's words:
The Attorney-General's interest in the case does not end with the
issuing of his fiat. He maintains theoretical control of the action
throughout .... Thus, he can at any time decide to take over the
conduct of the case from the relator's lawyers .... This scarcely ever
happens.273 All further pleadings in the case are delivered to him and
his approval must be sought for amendments to the statement of
claim upon which he issued his fiat. Finally, his approval must be
obtained for any settlement of the action out of court.2 74
A most interesting aspect of relator actions is the combination of
private initiative and governmental control. It seems fair to conclude
that this institution is potentially a very important instrument m.
assuring judicial protection of public and group interests in the
common-law world. 275 Indeed, the hypothesis can be ventured that
268. See, e.g., id. at 7.
269. Attorney-General v. Huber, 2 S.A.S.R. 142, 165 (F.C. 1971) (Bray, C.J.), quoted
in id. at 11.
270. G. Taylor, supra note 151, at 7.
If there is an arguable point of substance, then that is enough. In Victoria it is
not the practice for the Attorney-General to concern himself with whether he wants
the plaintiff to win for political or other reasons. However, in other jurisdictions
this practice has not been adopted. There will obviously be political issues canvassed under the umbrella of a relator action, but, since this is often the only
way in which many actions can be brought before the courts it is undesirable that
the Attorney-General should concern himself with more than the existence of an
arguable point of substance.
Id.
271. See S. DE SMITH, supra note 249, at 51-52.
272. G. Taylor, supra note 151, at 8.
273. The same is true in England. See I. Jacob, supra note 63, at 401.
274. G. Taylor, supra note 151, at 8. See also S. DE SMITH, supra note 249, at 401.
275. Provided, of course, that the "suspicion about the Attorney-General's impartiality and that the process of obtaining a fiat is too cumbersome or expensive,"
raised by Taylor at the close of his excellent report, proves unfounded. G. Taylor,
supra note 151, at 20. As for expense, the suspicion seems well-grounded, at least in
England. S. DE SMJ.TH, supra note 249, at 401, informs us that "[o]riginally the main
function, of the relator was to pay the costs if the actions • • • were dismissed. This
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it is, in part, because of the lack (or nonuse) of relator actions in the
United States276 that there has been in that country a tremendous
growth of class and public-interest actions in recent times, whereas
this phenomenon is unknown elsewhere.277

2. Class and Public Interest Actions in the United States
and Other Common-Law Countries
Whereas relator actions still require the intervention, by fiat, of
the governmental attorney general, class and public-interest actions
allow a private suitor, in his capacity as a member of the public at
large or a smaller class, to sue as a "private attorney general"278 in
the interest of the public or the class. No governmental consent is
required, except in so far as the court may have discretion in determining whether the suit is maintainable as a class action.
Developments concerning class and public-interest actions, especially important in the United States,279 are too complex and too
is still one of his functions, for although the Crown has been generally liable since

1933 for costs in civil proceedings to which it is a party, the definition of civil
proceedings for this purpose excludes relator actions," See also I. Jacob, supra note 63,
at 52 & n.120.
276. Only a few references to the relator action may be found in the American
cases, and most American treatises do not even mention it. Corpus Juris Secundum,
for example, which usually contains a plethora of citations, refers to only two state
court decisions involving relator actions, the more recent being a California case,
Brown v. Memorial Natl. Home Foundation, 329 P.2d 118, 162 Cal. App. 2d 513
(1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 943 (1959). See 76 C.J.S. Registration of Land Titles 625
n.21 (Supp. 1974). It seems fair to say that even in those American jurisdictions where
the action is not entirely unknown, its use is extremely rare.
277. Taylor writes that "[t]hc Australian system is based upon the proposition that
an individual can sue only for wrongs done to him personally. It follows from this
that an individual cannot sue where the wrong done is not to him but to the public
at large." G. Taylor, supra note 151, at 18. The above proposition, however, can stand
"only because the Attorney-General will always have standing to vindicate the public
interest. Should it happen that the Attorney-General in a jurisdiction persistently
refuses to act [either directly or through relator suitors], it could be that a merely
nominal interest would be permitted to the plaintiff citizen." Id. at 14. See also note
285 infra and accompanying text.
278. For the source of this terminology, see note 165 supra and accompanying text.
279. Although representative or class actions arc of much greater frequency and
importance in the United States, they arc also well-known in England. See I. Jacob,
supra note 63, at 77-80. However, Master Jacob recognizes that class actions arc rarely
used in England, id. at 78-79, and takes a position in favor of a great expansion of
the present modest scope of class actions in that country. Id. at 94. The same is true
for a number of other countries, including Canada, see, e.g., Kazanjian, Class Actions
in Canada, 11 OscoonE HAu. L.J. 397 (1973); Australia, see G. Taylor, Defense of the
Public Interest in Civil Litigation 38-39 (unpublished memorandum prepared upon
commission by the Australian Attorney General in answer to a request concerning
new legislation); India, see L. Singhvi, supra note 152, at 14-15; Ghana, see N. Ollennu,
supra note 219, at I; and Kenya. See J. Spry, supra note 151, at 2. Class actions are
not used, however, outside the common-law systems or systems influenced by the
common law. M. CAPPELLE'ITI & J. P.ERILI.o, supra note 38, at 124-25 (Italy); N.
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much in flux to be summarized here.280 Suffice it to note that, even
TROCKER, PR0CESSO CIVILE E CoSTITtJZIONE, PROBLEM! DI DIRI'ITO TEDESCO E ITALIANO
437-38 (1974) (Milano, Giuffre) (Germany); T. Kojima, supra note 1, at 16 (Japan);
H. Kotz, supra note 1, at 21-22 (Germany); W. Kralik, Supplement to Austrian Report 1
(Austria); S. Ofiate, supra note 3, at 11-12 (Latin America); Kazanjian, supra, at 397
n.I. (Canada). Kojima informs us, however, that the introduction of the "American
device" in Japan "is strongly advocated by several scholars." T. Kojima, supra, at 16,
18-23. For a discussion of some reasons for this difference between the common law
and other legal systems, see note 380 infra and accompanying text.
280. There are at least two elements shared in common by class and public-interest
actions: "Both present to the Court issues which are larger than the individual interest of the litigant who appears in court; and both seek to assure a just resolution
of the controversy by genuine adverseness and adequate protection of the interests
represented." Hamburger, supra note I, at 387. On the other hand, there are also
basic differences between the two. Inter alia: (1) "Public interest actions are concerned
with the implementation and enforcement of rights vested in the general public or
a segment of it"; usually, although not always, "they challenge an alleged unconstitutional or illegal exercise of power by the political branches of the government.'' Id.
On the other hand, "[m]any class actions owe their 'public' character not to the subject matter of the litigation, which may be strictly private, but to the mass effect of
the judgment and the impracticability of maintaining separate actions.'' Id. Moreover,
(2) "[c)lass actions proceed on the theory, or ••• fiction, that all persons affected by
the litigation are before the court, either in person or by representation," even if
"the class representatives are self-chosen or, in defendants' cl~es, chosen by plaintiff.''
Thus, it is required in class actions that the parties present in court adequately represent the class, that their claims "typify those of all members of the class," and that
there are no "practicable alternatives for mass litigation." Hence, a decision for or
against the class representatives binds all members of the class in so far as the class
has been adequately notified and represented. On the other hand, the public-interest ·
plaintiff "does not purport to represent any particular individual," but "acts as a
spokesman for the public at large or a segment of it.'' And no problems of notice
or res judicata arise, for, "[i]f plaintiff succeeds, the benefit of the judgment accrues
automatically to the general public through injunctive, declaratory or other relief,
restraining or invalidating the governmental action"; whereas "if the government prevails, • • • stare decisis rather than res judicata should discourage a renewed attack
by another public interest plaintiff." Id. at 387-88. To oversimplify: The thrust behind the growth of class actions is a liberal conception of representation, whereas the
thrust behind the growth of public-interest actions is an unprecedented loosening of
the requirement of locus standi (which combines, grosso modo, the civilian notions
of legitimatio ad causam or qualitt! and causa petendi or interlt). Cf. N. Havranek,
supra note 1, at 6-7. The policy underlying the first phenomenon is to give otherwise
unprotected group interests access to justice, whereas underlying the second is the
policy of favoring "effective citizen participation in guarding the public against illegal
exercise of governmental power.'' Homburger, supra, at 389. (For a telling example of
public-interest actions sanctioned by legislation, see note 226 supra.) Of exceptional
interest is a recent congressional committee study "intended to fulfill the need for
reliable quantitative data on class actions so that the Congress will be able to make
an informed decision on the merits of the many arguments surrounding them.'' SENATE COI\IM. ON COMMERCE, 93n CoNG., 2D SESs. Cr.Ass ACTION STUDY, 3 (Comm. Print
1974) [hereinafter Cr.Ass ACTION STUDY].
In addition to class and public-interest suits, Professor Homburger also discusses
shareholders' derivative actions as a third type of "private litigation in the public
interest." Homburger, supra, at 379-85. Stormily contested only 30 or 40 years agono less than class and public-interest actions have been in the last 10 years or soshareholders' derivative actions are today "firmly entrenched in the American system.''
Id, at 381, 405. Even in England, where class actions are rare, "the minority shareholders' action (sometimes called the derivative shareholders' action)" is "quite common or frequent.'' I. Jacob, supra note 63, at 79. These actions are based on the
equitable idea that every shareholder is allowed "to establish himself as representative
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though these important, if controversial, actions have historical antecedents in English law,281 they represent a marked deviation from
principles longstanding in the law of procedure of most nationswithin and ·without the common-law world.
These principles foreclose access to the courts to persons, natural
and legal, who do not hold a personal interest in the case or who
do not sue for the protection of their own rights.282 "The general
of the corporation" in the enforcement of "substantive rights of [the] corporation
against its own management and others," if "the regular corporate functionaries do
not act, usually because they themselves are the wrongdoers or because the majority
in control of the corporate affairs does not want them to act." Homburger, supra, at
379. Not infrequently, derivative actions proceed in the form of class actions, but,
unlike class actions, "there is no requirement in a derivative suit that the shareholders be too numerous to be joined." le/,. at 380. The "public interest aspects" of
derivative actions are apparent. In Homburger's pregnant description,
apart from much needed protection of the rights of large groups of small in•
vestors, the interests of consumers, corporate employees and creditors and the
economic well-being of the nation demand sound corporate management. The
trend toward corporate control of the national economy, the progressive sepa•
ration of corporate ownership from corporate control and the enlargement of
powers wielded by management accentuate the public importance of a remedy
designed to hold corporate fiduciaries accountable for their conduct.
Id. at 380-81.
It may be interesting to contrast this American devlopment with the backward
situation in a country such as Italy. The 1942 Cadice civile requires a majority vote
at a shareholders' meeting before a civil liability action can be brought against the
corporation's administrators (article 2393); and only in case of "serious irregularities"
on the part of the administrators may either shareholders representing no less than
one tenth of the corporation's capital, or the Ministere public, see text at note 95
supra, file a complaint with the court. This complaint may or may not bring about
the commencement of a civil proceeding against the administrators (article 2409), See
M. CAPPELLETn & J. PERILLO, supra note 38, at 125. The situation in Germany is no
better. See Aktiengesetz § 147 (1965); B. GROm'ELD, AKTIENGESELLSCHAFr, UNTERNErI•
MENSKONZENTRATION UND KLEINAKTIONAR 208, 220-23, 233-310 (1968) (Tilbingen, Mohr)
(including a detailed comparison with American derivative suits); H. Kotz, supra note
1, at 24-25.
281. Class actions were known to English Chancery practice as far back as the
17th century. Professor Chafee called them an "off-shoot" of the broad and flexible
equity rule which required the joinder of all persons materially interested in the
subject of the litigation. Representation of a class by one or more of its members
implemented that rule when actual joinder was impracticable and also unnecessary because of the similarity of the claims or defenses involved.
Homburger, supra note 1, at 347. See also I. Jacob, supra note 63, at 77; Kazanjian,
supra note 279, at 399-413. As for the history of public-interest actions, see Homburger, supra, at 389-90, and references therein.
282. Not a few civilian codes expressly forbid the maintenance of a suit for the
protection of third persons' rights, unless othenvise allowed by statute (a very rare
case). See, e.g., C. PRo. Crv. art. 81 (Italy). In Germany, however, with certain limitations, judicial interpretapon has ~owed the so-called gewillkilrte Prozesstandschaft,
that is, the power of the holder of a substantive right to assign to a third person
_the right to bring a civil suit on the former's behalf. This makes it possible, for
Jnstance, for all of the members of an association (whether incorporated or not) to
assign to the association the right to sue on behalf of their interests. See a comparative
_discussion in N. TROCKER, supra note 279, at 200-04, 708-09. See also H. Kotz, supra
note I, at 26 & n.50. A similar possibility, while still denied by the Italian courts,
see N. TROCKER, supra, at 201-02, exists in Japan. See T. Kojima, supra note I, at II,
21. Such a possibility is foreclosed not only in Italy, but also, for example, in France.
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principle of justiciability in court actions is that the parties must
have an interest in the proceedings. Moot questions _and the intervention of busybodies are to be discouraged. This applies equally
where the interests of the public at large are infringed .... [Only]
... the Attorney-General will always have standing to vindicate the
public interest."283 Under these longstanding principles, a person
can sue only for wrongs done to him personally. If a person is injured by conduct that also affects the public, he lacks standing to sue
unless he can show "some special right ... over and above rights enjoyed by the public in general or by all members of a particular class
to which he (the plaintiff) belongs."284 As Dr. Taylor has noted,
"[t]he traditional approach that the Attorney-General' can act for
the public hampers any advance away from [these] long-standing
rules.''2Bo
The struggle between the maintenance of these traditional rules
and the growth of class and public-interest actions reflects perhaps
the most heated ideological struggle of our century-between solitary
individualism and laissez-faire, on the one hand, and a social conception of the law, the economy, and the state's role, on the other. IdeoThere are, however, exceptions to this rule; especially important is article 3lt of the
Code du travail, which allows a labor union to act in court as a substitute for one
or more of its members in exercising their individual rights of action against violations of a collective labor agreement. C. TRAVAIL, liv. I, art. 3It. A similar situation
prevails in Belgium. See J. VAN COMPERNOLLE, LE DROIT D'ACTION EN JUSTICE DES
GROUPEMENTS 114-15 (1972) (Bruxelles, Larcier); A. De Vita, supra note 1, at 1-3, 17
n.18. It is interesting to note that the above-mentioned development is limited in
Germany to proceedings before the civil courts; strange as it might appear, the administrative courts have usually persevered in their adherence to more traditional conceptions in this field. See, e.g., Bundesverwaltungsgericht, Decision of Dec. 3, ,1959, in
14 MONATSCHRIFr FiiR DEUTSCHES REcHT 338 (1960) (standing denied to association of
electrical engineers that brought suit on behalf of members against police order
prejudicial to exercise of their profession). See also N. Trocker, supra note 1, at B-10,
with further references; note 316 infra.
283. G. Taylor, supra note 151, at 14. The author illustrates this point with an
actual court decision that held that the mere fact that the plaintiff was a consumer
did not give him standing to attack an agreement on sugar between the State of
Queensland and the Commonwealth government. Thus, even though the agreement
in fact substantially increased the cost of sugar to the plaintiff "and other consumers
in Australia,'' it affected "the public generally and the plaintiff has no interest in the
subject matter beyond that of any other member of the public: he has no private or
special interest in it." The court concluded that "[g]reat evils would arise if every
member of the Commonwealth could attack the validity of the acts of the Commonwealth whenever he thought fit; and it is clear in law that the right of an individual
to bring such an action does not exist unless he establishes that he is 'more particularly affected than other people.'" Id. at 15-16, quoting Anderson v. Commonwealth,
47 Commw. L.R. 50, 51-52 (1932) (emphasis added).
284. Id. at 18.
285. Id. Dr. Taylor admits, however, that in Australia liberal granting of the
Attorney General's fiat in relator actions-to "every individual who has a point of
substance to argue"-makes such an "advance" less urgent. Id. at 18-19.
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logical struggles, of course, tend to become loaded with value judgments. Class and public-interest suitors-the "ideological plaintiffs"
-are labeled by some as sheer "busybodies" or even "bands of selfappointed vigilantes," 286 whereas others view them as the true champions of the common cause.287
Apart from personal preferences, what matters here is the lesson
to be derived from comparative analysis. The conclusion seems inescapable that, in our mass production, mass consumption, and mass
urbanization society, the days of civil litigation as a merely two-man
battle are numbered. In Justice Douglas' strong words:
I agree .•. that a class action serves not only the convenience of the
parties but also prompt, efficient judicial administration. I think in
our society that is growing in complexity there are bound to be innumerable people in common disasters, calamities, or ventures who
would go begging for justice ·without the class action but who could
·with all regard to due process be protected by it. Some of these are
consumers whose claims may seem de minimis but who alone have
no practical recourse for either remuneration or injunctive relief.
Some may be environmentalists who have no photographic development plant about to be ruined because of air pollution by radiation
but who suffer perceptibly by smoke, noxious gases, or radiation.
Or the unnamed individual may be only a ratepayer being excessively
charged by a utility or a homeo·wner whose assessment is slowly rising
beyond his ability to pay.
The class action is one of the few legal remedies the small
claimant has against those who command the status quo. I would
strengthen his hand with the view of creating a system of law that
dispenses justice to the lowly as well as to those liberally endowed
with power and wealth.2 88
Clearly, then, the ideological plaintiff reflects a vital need of our
age of mass interests and group action. 289 While his emergence may
possibly be delayed and hindered, he cannot long be kept from the
forefront of civil litigation.

B. The Organizational "Private Attorney General"
If private "ideological plaintiffs" cannot associate and fight as an
organized group, even the liberal grant of standing to such individuals may prove to be an insufficient solution to the problem of hav286. See text at note 269 supra.
287. Homburger, supra note 1, at 360-61.
288. Eisen v. Carlisle &: Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 185-86 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring and dissenting).
289. See, e.g., T. Kojima, supra note I, at 9.
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ing meta-individual interests adequately represented. Union creates
strength. For example, only when individual workers starting in the
second half of the last century could associate into effective, powerful
unions was a relatively even balance reached in the class struggle for
labor rights. Similarly, only when individual consumers or small
savers associate will they have effective protection against production,
marketing, and banking abuses. The same is true for other basic
needs of modem societies; everyone knows, for instance, of the impact of civil rights associations in the United States, especially during
the glorious years of the Warren Court.
Kalven and Rosenfield described this development with deep in~
sight a long time ago:
'
The employee who is entitled to time and a half for overtime, the
stockholder who has been misled by a false statement in a prospectus,
the rate-payer who has been charged an excessive rate, the depositor
in a closed bank, the taxpayer who resists an illegal assessment, or the
small business man who has been the victim of a monopoly . . . ,
finds himself inadvertently holding a small stake in a large controversy. The type of injury which tends to affect simultaneously the
interest of many people is also apt to involve immensely complex
facts and intricate law, and redress for it is likely to involve expense
totally disproportionate to any of the individual claims ....
Modem society seems increasingly to expose men to such group
injuries for which individually they are in a poor position to seek
legal redress, either because they do not know enough or because such
redress is disproportionately expensive. If each is left to assert his
rights alone if and when he can, there will at best be a random and
fragmentary enforcement .... This result is not only unfortunate in
the particular case, but it will operate seriously to impair the deterrent effect of the sanctions which underlie much contemporary law.
The problem of fashioning an effective and inclusive group remedy
is thus a major one.200
I have used the term "organizational private attorney general"
to denote a private (nongovernmental) organization that represents
public or collective interests. Such organizations are but another aspect of the "private attorney general" discussed above in its individual form. Indeed, the class plaintiff-perhaps the most typical
example of the private attorney general-frequently has been a pri~
vate association or group, not a single individual or an aggregate of
290. Kalven &: Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class' Suit, 8 U. Cm.
L. REv. 684, 686 (1941). See also H. Kotz, supra note 1, at 2-6.
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nonorganized individuals; and the same is true for both the relator201
and the public-interest plaintiff.292 The importance of the associative
element in this area is so great as to deserve separate treatment.
1. In the Western World

Krings, having admitted that the Ministere public is not a suitable
representative of collective interests in civil litigation,203 suggests that
"we should leave these matters to the appraisal and the initiative of
the groups that have formed, and are forming, themselves for this
purpose."294 Indeed, in many nations representation of collective
interests by social organizations has been a growing phenomenon for
a number of years.
At least in Continental Europe, the traditional approach, which
stems from the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, was one
of blunt exclusion; this approach still prevails in many court decisions and the more traditionally oriented doctrine. Professor Habscheid describes (and approves) the approach as follows:
[T]he Ministere public is ... the only guardian of public interests.
Since civil litigation is considered the private affair of the parties,
291. See some of the typical examples of relater actions given by G. Taylor, supra
note 151, at 8.
292. See, e.g., the cases mentioned by Homburger, supra note I, at 393 &: nn.230-32,
293. "It is necessary that the Ministere public • • • give impartial opinions and
that he be able to keep a distance from so-called collective interests, which in fact
might represent only one part of the 'collectivity.'" Krings, supra note 4, at 166,
294. Id. The author continues by saying that, if a suit is brought by such organizations, it might be possible for the Ministere public "to take a position free from every
partisan interest.'' But the "initiative" should not be his. Id.
Contrary to Professor Krings' proposal (quoted in the text) is that of the Uruguayan Reporter. E. Vescovi, supra note 20, at 4-5. Professor Vescovi's thesis is that
all public and collective interests should be represented in court by the Ministcrio
publico or similar governmental institutions, rather than by social groups, because
the interests of such groups do not necessarily coincide, and may even conflict, with
the general societal interest. He therefore proposes that the intervention and initiating
powers of the Ministere public be increased and the Parquet's organization corre•
spondingly strengthened. Also, he approvingly describes the solution of socialist na•
tions, which confers broad powers upon the Prokuratura (while also leaving ample
openings to social organizations, see section IIB2 infra). There is, of course, a core
of truth in Professor Vescovi's position, since the danger that the general interests
might be misrepresented by sectorial groups is very real. Opening the doors of judi•
cial (or even legislative and administrative) proceedings to so-called public-interest
groups is risky if no adequate controls are available to check abuses detrimental to
either the individual or the public interests, or both. On the other hand, it seems
that there are two weaknesses in Professor Vescovi's thesis. First, increasing the
Ministere public's powers is itself a very risky development, because it carries the
dangers inherent in an unwieldy, potentially oppressive, bureaucratic machinery.
Second, the real problem is choosing between dynamic pluralism and an institution,
like the Ministere public, that may not be sensitive enough to problems that, although
affecting substantial social groups, are not "public" in the absolute sense of belonging
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other official or quasi-official institutions are not allowed. This is
true also for any kind of social group. We trust completely the judge
who, in enforcing the laws, will guarantee that the public interest
recognized by the legal order is respected. Other interests of the
state or of society can never be protected by courts.295
This rigidly individualistic position was perfectly acceptable one
and a half centuries ago. In fact, the French Revolution represented
the victory of both the private citizen and the unitary state against
all those "intermediate societies" that, under the ancien regime, constituted the very structure of feudalism. As forcefully described by
Max Rheinstein:
Pre-industrial societies have been composed of groups rather than
individuals. The state was an aggregate not so much of individuals
as of clans- or "houses" . . . . When in Europe the modem state
developed out of the once universal system of feudalism, the monarchs were rulers over groupments of seigneuries, towns, guilds, and
above all, families.
With eighteenth century Enlightenment the individualizing
view of society began to be preponderant. In the French Revolution
the new ideology became official. The nation was to be une et indivisible. The state was now clearly conceived to be composed of
individual citizens. The intermediate groups of manor, guild, estate,
province were swept away; the municipalities were made subdivisions
of the state government. [Only] one group, intermediate between
the state and its individual citizens was left intact: the family. 296
This solitary dualism-the individual citizen and the state-was
soon to reveal its own dangers, however. Intermediate societies, even
if susceptible to degeneration (as indeed occurred under the ancien
regime), might prove to be powerful instruments for checking and
balancing excesses of both oppressive statism and atomistic individualism. Faced by a dictatorial government, the lone individual is
powerless; correspondingly, faced by myriads of unorganized individuals, a government can hardly maintain a democratic rule of law,
let alone implement economic and social-welfare programs. Many a
country in Continental Europe and other areas of the civil-law world
to the Respublica, that is, the state. In so far as these social groups (aptly called
"intermediate societies" or "corps intermediaires") are midway between the individual
and the state, they may bring about an extremely useful social dynamism, ensuring
access to justice for valuable interests that neither the individual alone nor a governmental attorney would be capable of safeguarding.
295. Habscheid, supra note 20, at 176.
296. Rheinstein, The Family and the Law, in 4 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAw 3, 13 (A. Chloros ed. 1974) (Tiibingen/The Hague, Mohr/Mouton).
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has learned these two sad lessons. Indeed, sudden and painful shifts
from dictatorial to powerless regimes (and vice versa) have characterized for numerous decades the political history of many heirs of the
great bourgeois Revolution. The lack of strong, organized, democratic "intermediate societies" has undoubtedly been a factor in those
tragic events. Thus, a gradual reemergence of new corps intermediaires was, and still is, both inevitable and desirable.
This phenomenon, hardly discernible until the second half of the
last century, has reached major dimensions in post-World War II
Continental Europe. The trade unions were, of course, among the
first powerful "intermediate societies" to emerge in the new industrial state. Once again, the isolated individual strived to unite-to
"break his chains"-and thus to build up his power. The nineteenthcentury "liberal" and "laissez-faire" state reacted in varied manners
to this "return to the past." The labor movement was, at times,
ignored, condemned,297 or absorbed.298 Only more recently has the
"social state" or "sozialer Rechtsstaat" recognized both the existence
and the autonomy of that movement. 299 Thus, a pluralistic ideal was
affirmed over both the pure dualism (state/individual) of the liberal
state and the monistic statism of the liberal state's degenerationfascism.
A similar discourse could be repeated for political parties and
other societal organizations. Very recently, however, other "intermediate societies" have begun to emerge. New "classes" of "weak"
individuals-such as racial and religious minorities, the poor, consumers, environmentalists-have begun to unite in order to protect
themselves against the actual or potential oppressors of our time:
_not only the state and its departments, but also corporate power and
the blind tyranny of majorities.
To follow the landmark steps of this development as they are
reflected in the law of civil procedure of the various countries would
be a most fascinating task. I will refer only to a few developments
in France, Germany, and Italy, recognizing that a basic trend is fol297. In France, for instance, it was not until 1884 that the legality of trade unions
was clearly established. Statute of March 21-22, 1884, [1884] D.P. IV 129. See H. SoLUs
&: R. PERROT, supra note 204, at 223.
298. Condemnation and absorption went hand in hand under the Fascist regime,
which forbade autonomous labor unions and "governmentalized" official labor unions
-thus integrating these into the regime's monistic ideology. See, e.g., P. REscxcNo,
PERSONA E COMUNITA. 23 &: n.26 (1966) (Bologna, Mulino).
299. See, e.g., N. TRoCKER, supra note 279, at 247.
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lowed by many of the Continental countries even though numerous
differences exist among them.300
The first step was to attribute a "legal personality" to partnerships, professional associations, and like entities. While their personality was, of course, a legal fiction, the fiction nonetheless preserved the
principle that only individual "persons"-natural or legal-can participate in the legal and judicial process.
Two major problems, however, arose: (1) when nonrecognized,
unincorporated, de facto partnerships, associations, and other groups,
wanted to participate, and (2) when organizations, incorporated or
not, sought access to the courts not merely to protect themselves
against "personal and direct" prejudice affecting "their own rights
and legitimate interests,"301 but rather to protect either the individual rights of their members302 or the "collective interests" of a class
or group that the organization purported to represent.303
Germany provides an interesting demonstration of the gradual
evolution in Europe of a response to the first problem.304 Full denial
of "procedural capacity" to an unincorporated association, albeit perfectly consistent with the rigorous logic of "legal nonexistence" of
de facto entities, proved to be an easy way for such an entity to escape
liability-clearly an undesirable result. Hence, the law's first step was
300. See the analyses by H. Sows &: R. PERROT, supra note 204, at 218-43; J. VAN
COMPERNOLLE, supra note 282, passim; M. WOLF, DIE Kr.AGEBEFUGNIS DER VERBANDEAUSNAHME ODER ALLGEMEINES PRINZIP? (1971) (Tiibingen, Mohr): Perrot, L'action en
justice des syndicats professionnels, des assodations et des ordres professionnels, IO
ANNALES UNIVERSITATIS SCIENTIARUM BtmAPESTINENSIS DE ROLANDO EoTVOS NoMINATAE
99-106 (1969). See also H. FABER, DIE VERBANDSKLAGE IM VERWALTUNGSPROZESS (1972)
(Baden-Baden, Nomos); E. REHBINDER, H. BURGBACHER &: R. KNIEPER, supra note 71.
For Italy, see especially u. RoMAGNOU, LE ASSOCIAZIONI SINDACALI NEL PROCESSO (1969)
(Milano, Giuffre).
301. For instance, an association (perhaps a political party) might claim damages
for the destruction or pillage of its premises by political adversaries. See H. Sows &:
R. PERROT, supra note 204, at 219; Perrot, supra note 300, at 100.
302. See note 282 supra.
303. An example would be an association of doctors, claiming to represent the
general interests of the medical profession, that brings suit against persons abusively
exercising that profession. See H. Sows &: R. PERROT, supra note 204, at 220; Perrot,
supra note 300, at 100.
304. As for France, where the situation reveals not a few similarities to that in
Germany, see, for example, A. De Vita, supra note 1, at 24-25, 30-33, and references
therein. In Italy, an important development occurred with the Codice dvile of 1942.
Articles 36, 41, 1131, 2266, and 2297-98 of that Code as well as article 75, paragraph 4,
of the 1942 Code of Civil Procedure, have granted full procedural capacity to associations, committees, condominiums, and partnerships, even though devoid of legal
personality. See M. CAPPELLETII &: J. PERILLO, supra note 38, at 121-22. The situation
in Japan is similar to that in Italy. Article 46 of the Japanese Code of Civil' Procedure
grants capacity to sue and be sued to unincorporated associations. See T. Kojima,
supra note 1, at 22.
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to affirm the association's liability, allowing the holders of rights
against the association to sue it.805 This situation was (and still is)
called "halbe Prozessfiihigkeit" ("half procedural capacity"), because
the association can be a defendant, but not a plaintiff. To be sure,
the logic underlying this ambiguous status is not very strong, and even
less satisfying have been some of its practical results. Indeed, one
interesting chapter in the history of modern German law is the gradual attenuation-even based, most recently, on constitutional grounds
-of the doctrine of the halbe Prozessfiihigkeit.806
As for the second problem, I shall mention only three representative developments in France and one in Italy.
In 1913, the French Gour de cassation, in a landmark decision of
its Chambres reunies,301 put an end to a long controversy concerning
the capacity of the syndicat professionnel308 to act in court as the
representative of the "collective interest of the association." This
capacity was allowed by the Court, a result later confirmed by statute.309 A large breach was thus opened in the longstanding principle
that one can sue only to protect "his own" rights and legitimate inter~
305. ZPO § 50 II. ,
306. One aspect of this development is briefly e.'{l!mined in note 282 supra. Another

is a judicial evolution in recent years that Professor Habscheid defines as "a judicial
construction contra legem." W. Habscheid, Supplement to German Report 2·3 (n.d.).
The Federal Court of Germany has recognized that labor unions and political parties
have full procedural capacity (that is, to sue, as well as to be sued). Thus, the Court
has treated them as if they were legal persons even though they arc unincorporated,
and therefore lack "legal personality." It should be noted, however, that this judicial
evolution did not deviate from the "Hohfeldian" doctrine, see notes 315-16 infra,
that suit can be brought only for the protection of the plaintiff's own and personal
rights. W. Habscheid, supra, at 3.
307. Gour de Cassation, Decision of April 5, 1913, [1914] D.P.I. 65 (ch. r~un.).
See H. SoLUs & R. PERROT, supra note 204, at 225; A. De Vita, supra note 1, at 16;
Perrot, supra note 300, at 101.
308. Trade union$ and employers' organizations are included in this term. Moreover, much of what is said in the text concerning "syndicats professionnels" also applies
to "ordres profession'nels," that is, the associations of all of the members of certain
professions or arts (for instance, the bar association). The reasoning is that because
membership in the "ordres professionnels" (which have legal personality) is obliga•
tory, they are deemed sufficiently representative of the collective interest of the pro•
fession-indced, "they are one and the same thing as the profession"-to merit
standing to protect that interest even in the absence of specific legislation. For ex•
ample, the bar association may bring suit for damages against defamation of tl1e
lawyers' profession. H. SoLUs & R. PERROT, supra note 204, at 239-41; Perrot, supra
note 300, at 105.
309. C. TRAVAIL, liv. III, art. II. ("[Unions] can, before every court, exercise all the
rights belonging to a partie civile concerning situations that involve a violation,
whether direct or indirect, of the collective interest of the profession they represent").
See H. SoLUs & R. PERROT, supra note 204, at 226; A. De Vita, supra note I, at 16-23
(detailed analysis).
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ests against "direct and personal" prejudice. Today, for example,
actions are frequently brought by labor unions to enforce labor legislation providing for such matters as weekly rest, paid vacation, and
minimum salary.310
In a series of decisions that can be traced to arrets of July 23,
1918, and November 25, 1929,811 the Gour de cassation has affirmed
the standing of associations de defense, that is, associations formed
for the very purpose of more effectively defending a common interest
of their members. One way to fulfill that purpose is to exercise collectively a right of action belonging to each member individually.312
The French ~'loi Royer" of 1973 opened new possibilities for
consumer associations to sue in cases of "direct or indirect prejudice_
to the collective interest of consumers."313 The same loi also created
a series of checks to prevent abuse of this power. In particular, general requirements are to be established by executive decree to assure
that consumer associations adequately represent, on the national or
local level, the groups in whose behalf they purport to act. Interestingly, the Ministere public must give his advice on whether those
requirements are met in the particular case-a new, ingenious example of simultaneously adopting both the private (organizational)
and the official (governmental) "attorney general" solutions to come
to grips with a vital problem of our time. 314
Abandoning, in part, a strictly "Hohfeldian"315 doctrine affirmed
by a long line of precedents,316 the Italian Consiglio di Stato (the su310. See H. SoLUs &: R. PERROT, supra note 204, at 226-27 and cases cited therein;
Perrot, supra note 300, at IOI.
3ll. See H. SoLUs &: R. PERROT, supra note 204, at 236 &: n.l; A. De Vita, supra
note I, at 35; Perrot, supra note 300, at 104.
312. For example, the inhabitants of a village may form a league to oppose the
installation of a factory that would pollute the air in their vicinity; or a group of
electricity users may associate to fight certain abuses.
313. Statute No. 73-ll93 of Dec. 27, 1973, art. 46, [1973] J.O. 14139, [1974] D.S.L. 30,
35, [1974] B.L.D. 30 ("loi Royer"). See generally P. Thery, supra note I, at 23-24.
Another noteworthy step in the same line of development is the loi of July 1,
1972. By this loi, every association "that has been duly registered at least five years
before the time of the facts," and whose statutory objective is to fight racism, has
standing to bring an action civile, see note 204 supra, in criminal proceedings concerning racial defamation. See N. Havranek, supra note 1, at 7 &: n.14; P. Thery,
supra, at 22-23.
314. Other examples also have been encountered in this article. See, e.g., note 245
supra and accompanying text.
315. See Jaffe, supra note 74, at 1033, where the Hohfeldian plaintiff is defined as
one who "is seeking a determination that he has a right, a privilege, an immunity or
a power"; in other words, one who seeks judicial protection merely for his own
personal rights and legal interests. ·
316. With some attenuation, see, e.g., note 282 supra, the Hohfeldian doctrine
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preme administrative court) affirmed in 1973 the standing of "Italia
Nostra," a private, nationwide association of about 20,000 members,
to challenge the lawfulness of a local government's resolution authorizing the construction of a road through a park.817 The stated
purpose of the association is the preservation of Italy's artistic and
environmental heritage-clearly a general public interest, and not
a "personal" interest "owned" by the association. The clamorous
annulment by the Consiglio di Stato of the local government's resolution upon the challenge brought by "Italia Nostra" may well
represent a badly needed turning point from a long period of unchecked spoliations of the Italian environment and artistic heritage.sis
These are but examples of a general and growing trend in much
of Western Europe-the supplementation, or integration, of governmental intervention with private initiative in safeguarding emerging
collective interests, and the channeling of such initiative into associative forms. Indeed, it seems a fair hypothesis that the expansion in
civil-law systems of the procedural capacity of associations may prove,
in part, to be an effective substitute for the lack of such devices as
relator and class actions in those systems.319
Of course, many adaptations are required in Western Europe, and
more generally in civil-law countries,320 to strengthen this trend. A
new conception of droit d'action is only one facet of the needed
change. As Roger Perrot, a noted French authority, puts it: "In the
nineteenth century _the th~ory of the civil action was developed in a
still prevails in the German courts, especially in the administrative courts. See
Oberverwaltungsgericht Lilneburg, Decision of Oct. 23, 1969, 23 NEUE JURI,STJSCHE
WocHENSCHRIFT 773 (1970); Verwaltungsgerichtshof Mannheim, Decision of Feb. 23,
1972, 25 NEUE JURisrtSCHE WocHENSCHRIFr 1101 (1972). Both decisions denied standing
to incorporated environmental associations that challenged administrative resolutions
concerning urban planning. The courts held that the associations were not "person•
ally damaged" by those resolutions, since none of "their own rights" were violated.
See the discussion in N. Trocker, supra note 1, at B--1 to -3 and references therein,
See also H. Kotz, supra note 1, at 35-36. An important departure, but not yet at the
supreme (federal) court level, is the "sensational" decision by the Bayerischer Verwaltungsgerichtshof of February 2, 1973. [1973] BAYERJSCHE VERWALTONGSBLATI'ER 211.
The Bavarian administrative court granted standing to an incorporated environmental
association that requested a court order staying the construction of a hotel; this decision parallels the "Italia Nostra" case discussed in the text. See N. Trocker, supra,
at B-4.

317. Consiglio di Stato, Decision No. 253 of March 9, 1973, [1974] Foro. Ital. III 3!1,
49 Foro. Amm. 261 (§II) (1973).
318. See A. Nicholson, supra note 1, at 1-9, 20-24,
319. See Cohn, Parties, in 16 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW
§ ~27 (M. Cappelletti ed.) (publication forthcoming).
320. This observation seems to apply also to Japan. Cf. T. Kojima, supra note 1,
at 9-16 et passim.
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liberal and individualist perspective. It was normal, therefore, that
the growth of groups of every kind, which is the mark of our modem
economy, has involved many problems of adaptation."321
Other difficulties are less theoretical. Some are ingrained in the
structure and mentality of a career judiciary, which by its nature
views with fear, distrust, and even disdain the "politicization" of
civil proceedings brought about by their evolution into arenas for
collective contests, rather than merely for private disputes. Other
difficulties are caused by the very complexity of pluralism. How much
easier it was in the good old days when civil proceedings were private
affairs, and the judge was a passive umpire; in the rare instance when
the public interest was involved in a civil dispute, its representation
was entrusted to the sole care of a simple, trustworthy, official bodythe Ministere public. Participation by spontaneous groups and associations, of course, raises problems that are not as simple. For instance, once one group incorporates into its charter the goal of protecting a certain interest, and gains standing in court to do so, should
other groups be denied standing to represent that same interest? The
logic of pluralism obviously would suggest a negative answer; otherwise a judicial monopoly in effect would be granted to the first group,
thereby excluding groups that possibly might be more capable of
representing the interest. Yet, pluralism may result in the anomalous
situation in which two or more subjects "own," and sue for, the same
interest.322 Moreover, how organized,323 how large,324 how "serious,''325
321. Perrot, supra note 300, at 106.
322, See H. Kotz, supra note 1, at n.73 (German discussions indicate prob~em
"not insolvable'1; A. Nicholson, supra note I, at 24-26.
323. The problem of the "internal democracy" of intermediate societies-the core
of which is to achieve a satisfactory balance betlveen autonomy and a degree of
official control (judicial, executive, legislative, and even constitutional and international)-is one of the most challenging, yet least analyzed, issues in modern legal
scholarship. Cf. Bettermann, Zur Verbandsklage, 85 ZEITSCHRIFT FiiR ZlvILPROZESS 133,
137-38 (19'72). Also of crucial importance is public (societal) confidence and control.
As Professor Kojima ably puts it, "[the strength of organizations] depends upon •••
support from a broad segment of ••• citizens •••• [Organizations] have to be 'clean,'
so that from the beginning ethical standards must be established. This is of utmost
importance, because public confidence is their major asset.'' T. Kojima, supra note 1,
at 13-14.
324. A recent decision of the Italian Constitutional Court is noteworthy in this
context, Corte costituzionale, Decision No. 54 of March 6, 1974, [1974] Foro. Ital. I.
963, 19 Giur. Cost. 199 (19'74). One of the questions raised concerned the constitutionality of article 28 of the important law of May 20, 19'70 (No. 300) ("Statuto dei diritti
dei lavoratori'1· This article grants standing to "the local branches of national labor
unions" to bring suit against management for unfair labor practices intended to impede or limit the free exercise of labor unions' activities, including strikes. The issue
was whether the grant of standing only to unions of a national size was a yiolation
of the liberty of association and equal treatment clauses of· the Constitution. The
Court upheld the challenged statute, holding that it is not unreasonable for the
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and how "representative" should a group be before it is granted
standing to protect a collective interest? Should legislation determine
all of the requirements, thereby avoiding possible arbitrariness and
unequal treatment of the various groups? Or should the determination be more flexible, based upon the concrete and unforeseeable circumstances of each case? If the latter solution is chosen, should the
determination be made by the judge,326 the administration, or perhaps by someone midway between the two, such as the Ministere
public? Also, what about the relief available? Suppose that a group,
perhaps an association de defense, recovers a certain amount of damages from a polluting factory. Should the amount be divided among
the members of the association? Or among all the unnamed members
of the collectivity directly or indirectly represented by the association? Or should more flexible and more practicable solutions be
devised-and by whom? There also remains the problem of how to
satisfy procedural guarantees if standing, and the effects of decisions,
are expanded beyond their traditional confines. Should every member
of a certain community be given notice of litigation involving the
interests of that community? If not, can the res judicata effect of a
judgment nevertheless extend to every member of the community?327
The gravity of these and other problems is undeniable. They cannot be solved by a single new and simple formula; only experience
can provide the bases for new solutions-and comparative analysis
may act as a catalyst in this process. Suffice it to say that, as difficult
as these new problems may be, the trend toward group representation
legislature to grant standing only "to responsible organizations which arc effective
representatives in the field of labor," and which are able to base their concrete
choices on broad considerations rather than on narrow evaluations. [1974] Foro. Ital.
I. at 969-'10.
325. The problem of identifying the "serious" plaintiff is particularly acute once
we abandon the traditional rule that standing belongs only to persons directly affected
in their own rights. "The court, not being a representative institution, not having
initiating powers and not having a staff for the gathering of information, must rely
on the parties and their advocates to frame the problem and to present the opposing
considerations relevant to its solution." Jaffe, supra note '14, at 1037. Professor Jaffe,
however, rightly rejects the argument that this correct premise justifies the maintenance of the traditional limitations on standing. The "ideological" plaintiff, even if
he is not suing for the protection of his own rights, may be and usually is no less
"serious" and "effective" an advocate of the cause for which he sues than the "traditional plaintiff." Id. at 1037-38. See also H. Kotz, supra note 1, at 35 &: n.'12.
326. See, e.g., the suggestion of E. R.EHBINDER, H. BURGBACHER &: R. KNIEPER, supra
note 71, at 153-57. A preliminary, summary examination of the merits-similar to
that used in Germany for the "constitutional recourse" ("Yerfassungsbeschwerde") or
for the granting of legal aid-should allow the court to dismiss in limine claiins that
are manifestly unfounded. See also H. Kotz, supra note 1, at 37 &: n.'17.
327. See A. Nicholson, supra note 1, at 25-26.
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will grow unabated if it is true that (I) governmental intervention
proves insufficient, and (2) only by associating can the individual gain
the economic and social828 strength, acquire the technical expertise;
and nourish the motivation329 necessary to undertake the new task.
The nv-entieth century is not a time for solitary Don Quixotes, but
for armies of more organized, if less romantic, cavaliers.
To conclude with a glance at the common-law world, it should
be noted that England and her legal heirs had a historical development quite different from that discussed at the beginning of this section. Certain excesses of the French bourgeois revolution did not
reach the common-law countries. In fact, intermediate groups, tainted
on the Continent as vestiges of "feudalism" and ilie "ancien regime,"
continued to play a significant role in the common-law systems.330
State/individual dualism as reflected on the Continent by the profound cleavage benveen the "public" and the "private"-the first
referring only to the state and the second only to isolated individuals
-remained largely foreign to those systems.331 This difference even
has linguistic overtones. The word "public" has ·a different legal
connotation in English than the corresponding words generally. have
in French, German, Spanish, or Italian, a connotation ·that includes
the interests of intermediate groups as well as the general public
interest represented by the state.332
These historical differences have influenced the development of
civil procedure in the common-law countries.333 r have already men328. Litigation brought either by associations or by a large number of plail}tilfs
"dramatizes the case," increases "publicity and pressure of public opinion," and mak~
judges "more responsive"; also, "it makes retaliations by the adversary more difficult."
T. Kojima, supra note I, at 9-10.
329. It is not only a matter of idealistic motivation. For instance, the financial
prejudice caused to an individual consumer by violations of marketing regulations is
often insufficient to encourage him to bring suit; this is not so if multiple claims can
be raised jointly. Furthermore, this problem must also be seen from a macroeconomic
point of view. The societal benefits derived from small consumer actions individually
brought. and separately decided are outweighed by the societal costs involved in the
time and effort expended by the judges, parties, experts, and witnesses.
330. Cf. A. Paul, supra note I, at 5-8 and references therein. Consider also the
profound insights o_f Pekelis, Legal Techniques and Political Ideologies, .in LAW AND
SOCIAL AcrION 42, 66, 74 (1970) (New York, Da Capo Press).
331. See, e.g., J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAw TRAI>moN 98-108 (1969) (Stanford,
California, Stanford University Press).
·
332. See WEllSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DlcrIONARY OF THE ENGUSH LANGUAGE
1836 (3d ed. 1971) ("public" defined to include "a group of people distinguished by
common interests or characteristics").
333. It should be noted that certain procedural difficulties encountered on the
Continent in attributing procedural capacity to nonrecognized (hence, under jus
strictum, nonlegal) entities were easily and satisfactorily solved in the common-law
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tioned, for instance, the fact that in these countries, many relator,
class, and public-interest actions have been brought not by isolated
individuals, but by organized (even if formally unincorporated)
groups.384 These private groups have established themselves as the
"chevaliers''335 of whole classes of unnamed persons institutionally in
need of organized, collective defense886 (and not, like their medieval
predecessors, as the "chevaliers'' of individuals oppressed by abusive
power and injustice-poor or sick persons, women, absentees, or
infants).

2. In Socialist Countries
Protection of citizens' rights and respect for legality were not, of
course, primary concerns of the Soviet legal system during the Stalinist era.837 Khrushchev's attempts to change that situation are wellknown. In his famous speech at the Twentieth Congress of the
Communist Party in 1956, he indicated that high priority was to be
given to those concerns.388 In the following years, he repeatedly indicated that the change should be accomplished, in part, by a transfer
of functions from state agencies to social organizations.880 Stronger
evidence could hardly be required of the insufficiency, even in socialist nations, of the monistic, statist approach represented by the Prokuratura and the other governmental agencies encountered above. 840
A move against excessive bureaucratic centralization was thus unchained. Its reflections in the field of civil procedure are very clear,
countries by flexible equity devices. Such entities could and did appoint trustees; the
trustee, in turn, could sue and be sued with respect to the unincorporated body's
assets held by him. See Cohn, supra note 319, § 33.
334. See text at notes 291-92 supra.
335. See the title of Dr. Graetz's study, supra note 239.
336. In the United States, for instance, the long list of such twentieth-century
cavaliers includes, to mention only the most well-known: the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People and the Urban League (which pioneered
in the use of litigation to further group interests in the field of racial equality and
civil rights); the National Welfare Rights Organization (in the field of poverty); the
Sierra Club, the Wilderness Society, and the National Wildlife Federation (in the
environmental area); and the Consumers Union, Nader's Public Citizen, and the Con•
sumer Federation of America (in the consumer field). See C. Halpern, supra note 1,
at 4-5, 9-10.
337. See, e.g., s. KUCHEROV, THE ORGANS OF SOVIET ADMINISTRATION OF JumCE:
ToEm HISTORY AND Ol'ERATION '100 (1970) (Leiden, Brill). For a general discussion of
the topic of this section, see N. Havranek, supra note 1, at 11-18.
338. CJ. J. HAzARD, I. SHAI'mo 8: P. MAGGS, THE SoVIET LEGAL SYSl'EM 8 (1969)
(Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., Oceana).
339. See, e.g., I. l.Al'ENNA, STATE AND LAW, SOVIET AND YUGOSLAV THEORY 61-63
(1964) (New Haven, Yale University Press).
340. See sections IB, E supra.
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That hesitation, obstacles, and great caution stood in the way of the
implementation of that move is equally clear, although we lack precise empirical and statistical data concerning these developments.341
That move, nevertheless continues. Its motto was and is the "participation"342 of individuals and social organizations-or, in more
ideological terms, "the necessity of drawing the public. into the fight
to strengthen Socialist legality and order."343 In. civil litigation, that
motto's implications are, aniong others:
(I) The reintroduction of a degree of adversariness. Thus, judicial activism and the role of the Prokuratura should supplement, but
not wholly displace, party initiative. As was repeated again and again
at the latest Congress of the civil proceduralists of the Soviet Union
and the Eastern European nations,344 the parties should not be. in
a status of "procedural incompetency."
.
(2) ·Allowing third (private) ·parties and unofficial organizations
either to commence proceedings on behalf of others or,· at least, to
participate in amicus curiae capacities.
Sweeping legislative reform has taken place in the Soviet Union
and the People's Democracies, especially since 1962. Most of the new
codes include interesting innovations concerning these two points. I
shall touch upon the second point, which more directly concerns us
here.
·
Section 30 of the 1962 Principles of Civil Procedure of the Soviet
Union and the Union Republics provides that:
In the cases provided by law claims may be brought by State administrative bodies, trade unions, State institutions, enterprises, collective farms, and other co-operative and public organizations or
private citizens in defence of the rights and legally protected interests
of other persons;
State administrative bodies in the cases provided by law may be
341. See notes 347, 353 infra,
342. An entire issue of Droit Polonais Contemporain, published by the Polish
Academy of Sciences, is dedicated to "participation." See 17/18 DROIT PoLONAIS
CoNTEMl'ORAIN (1972). The volume contains articles on the various facets of the
people's participation in the administration of justice, including an article by J.
Jodlowski, La participation des representants de la societe a l'administration de la
justice en Pologne, id. at 5, and another by T. Misiuk, La participation a la procedure
civile des organisations sociales et de leurs representants dans les afjaires de particuliers.
Id. at 57.
343. "l'rovisions of the Programme of the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet
Union], and decisions of Congresses of the CPSU concerning the necessity of drawing
the public into the fight to strengthen socialist legality and order, are the realization
of Lenin's ideas.'' V. Puchinskii, Memorandum of' May 4, 1974, supra note 1.
344. The Congress was held in East Berlin in November 1971. I ·attended with a
few Western proceduralists; unfortunately, the proceedings were not published.
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joined as parties by the court or intervene in prdceedings on their
own initiative to state conclusions on the case in furtherance of the
· obligations laid upon them and in defence of the rights of citizens
and the interests of the State.
The State administrative bodies mentioned in this section, institutions and enterprises, in the persons of their representatives, and
the private citizens referred to in the present article may familiarise
themselves with the materials of the case, make objections, give explanations, present evidence, take part in the investigation of evidence, make applications, and take other procedural steps provided
by la,v.a4o .
Sec;tion 36, paragraph I, of the same Principles states:
Representatives of public organisations and collectives of workers
who are not parties to a case may be permitted by a ruling of the
court to appear at a trial in order to expound to the court the
opinions of the authorities within those organisations or collectives
regarding the case being tried.s4o
Other socialist countries have substantially similar provisions. For
instance, articles 32 to 35 of the 1963 Czechoslovakian Code of Civil
Procedure authorize "national committees" both to commence and
to intervene in civil cases, and permit "all social organizations" to
intervene in cases that are connected with their institutional function. 347 As indicated by Professor Steiner, this function includes the
protection of minors and the fair assignment of housing, in the case
of the national committees (which, in fact, have a local character),
and a variety of matters such as physical and mental education, in the
case of. the social organizations. Thus, as Professor Steiner observes,
all these entities have a role in civil litigation that "is analogous to
that of the Prokuratura," except for the rather thin difference that
345. 7 LAw IN EASI'ERN EUROPE, supra note 115, at 306. Note the almost literal
repetition of the provisions governing the powers of the Prokuratura in civil litigation.
See text at notes 114-15 supra. Section 30 of the Principles is repeated in section 42 of
the R.S.F.S.R. Code of Civil Procedure of 1964, with only the addition (at the end of
the first paragraph) of the following sentence: ''The abandonment by such organs or
citizens of an action brought by them does not deprive the person in protection of
whose interest the action was brought, of the right to demand an examination of the
case on its merits." 11 LAw IN EASTERN EUROPE (1966), supra, at 168-69. Note again the
analogy to the Prokuratura. See note 115 supra.
346. 7 LAW IN EASI'ERN EUROPE, supra note 115, at 308.
· 347. V. Steiner, supra note 115, at 1, 15-16. In the supplement to liis report, Pro•
fessor Steiner informs us that no statistical data presently exist concerning the frequency of the participation of national committees and social organizations in civil
litigation. V. Steiner, Supplement to Czechoslovakian Report, March 4, 1974.
In addition, article 26 ·of the Czechoslovakian Code allows labor unions and cooperatives to represent in court any one of their members. A similar provision can
be found in section 44 of the R.S.F.S.R. Code of Civil Procedure, 11 LAW IN EASI'ERN
EUROPE (1966),'supra note 115, at 169-70.
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the Prokuratura's function is to protect "social interests of a general
character, i.e., concerning the whole society," whereas the national
committees and the social organizations <:1-re concerned with the interests of a given territory and a given group, respectively. 348 ·
A few comments are appropriate at_ this point. First, it is not
always clear in socialist countries whether a "social organization"
may be a spontaneous association or whether it is invariably an official (governmental) body, in which case it is yet another kind of
specialized, but still governmental, "attorney general."849 The code
provisions quoted above link such entities as "State administrative
bodies" and "enterprises," and "labor unions" and "collectives of
workers," all of which appear to be quite "public" in nature in those
countries. It seems fair to question, for instance, whether on the
basis of section 36 of the Soviet Principles a group of workers, spontaneously and unofficially organized, might send their representative
to present the group's opinion to the court. An affirmative answer
is probable, however, at least in the Soviet Union and limited t0 an
appearance of an amicus curiae nature,850 in view of the basic infor~
mality of civil procedure in that country. As put by an American
observer,351
persons present [at civil trials] are regularly given permission to
speak in conduct-related cases. Observers have commented on the
informality of Soviet trials . . . . Trials on local circuit are ex- ·
pected regularly to involve active participation of some if not most
of those present as spectators. Such participation is not limited to
348. V. Steiner, supra note 115, at 1, 15-16. For analogues in other socialist countries,
see J. Jodlowski, Supplement to Polish Report, Jan. 20, 1974; N. Havranek, supra note
I, at 11-24, 32-35; Z. Stalev, Supplement to Bulgarian Report, Jan. 25, 1974; Nevai,
supra note 101, at 116-17. Particularly interesting are articles 61 to 63 of the 1964
Code of Civil Procedure of Poland (governing the participation in civil litigation of
the "social organizations of the working people"), and the commentaries by J. Jodlowski, La nouvelle codification de la procedure civile en Pologne, 11/12 DRorr PoLONAIS
CoNTEMl'oRAIN 5, 21-22 (1969), and by Misiuk, supra note 342, at 57-66.
349. See section IE supra.
350. A positive answer, limited to the provision contained in section 36 of the
Principles, is given by Professor Puchinskii in his Memorandum of May 4, 1974, supra
note 1, at 4: ''These groups of persons need not be legally incorporated bodies . • • •
Any stable group of workers organized in the place of their employment or residence
may send their representative to the court ••• in any civil case if they thiuk this
participation expedient. Of course, the opinion [of the group] is not binding on the
court •.•• If the court finds the opinion ••• unsatisfactory, it must give its reasons."
On the other hand, in his Memorandum of June 7, 1974, supra note 1, at 1-2, Professor
Puchinskii informs us that only "public organizations," which are "legally incorporated
bodies" and whose formation has received governmental approval, can sue or be sued.
351. O'Connor, Soviet Procedures in Civil Decisions: A Changing Balance Between
Public and Civic Systems of Public Order, in LAW IN THE SoVIEr SOCIETY 51, 80-81 (W.
LaFave ed. 1965) (Urbana, University of Illinois Press).
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comment on questions of fact on which the spectator has personal
knowledge, nor to comment on the character of the defendant ....
[C]omments on judicial practice reveal that in some instances persons
present have been heard as representatives of the local group.8 1i2
Second, it should be noted that in the Soviet Union, as indicated
by section 30 of the Principles, commencement of civil cases by social
organizations is allowed only in the instances specified by statute; 8 1i3
without legislative authority, only amicus appearances may be
allowed by the court.854 In Poland, the Code of Civil Procedure itself
determines the areas in which "social organizations" are allowed to
commence or to intervene in civil cases "on behalf of the citizens."
Such participation is limited for the most part to labor disputes and
maintenance claims; furthermore, only those "social organizations"
included in a list drawn up by the Minister of Justice are allowed so
to participate.355 The official, or quasi-official, character of such organizations is apparent. This character is confirmed by article 62 of the
Polish Code, which makes applicable to those organizations the provisions governing the Prokuratura's power to commence or intervene
in civil cases.356 Clearly, strong obstacles stand in the way of that
352. The author continues by saying, however, that such informal representation
of a group is discouraged, since "only officially recognized representatives of a group arc
considered to have the capacity to present its opinions." Id. Note, however, that
O'Connor's point is that there must be a duly recognized representative of a group
(whether or not the group itself is recognized), whereas our question is whether a
group that is not officially recognized may appear in court. This distinction seems to
be implicit, for instance, in article 63 of the Polish Code, which provides that a
social organization may be allowed to intervene "in order to present to the court its
opinion related to the case, which opinion must be expressed in a resolution or
declaration of its governing organs properly authorized to that effect." POLISH CODE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 63.
353. As in Czechoslovakia, see note 347 supra, it appears that statistical data con•
cerning the frequency of civil cases brought by social organizations in the Soviet Union
are largely nonexistent. Professor Puchinskii indicates that "there are not a lot of
such actions." V. Puchinskii, Memorandum of June 7, 1974, supra note I, at 4. This
paucity is due partly to the fact that litigation is very informal and inexpensive, and
therefore individuals have easy access to court and rarely need to have social organizations substitute for them, and partly to the sweeping powers of the Prolmratura,
which can always sue, so that "hardly anything is left for the social organizations." Id.
354. 7 LAw IN EASI'ERN EUROPE, supra note 115, at 308 (section 36 of the Principles).
See text at note 346 supra. Section 36 appearances are not so rare as commencement of
actions by social organizations, occurring in perhaps as many as two per cent of all
civil cases. V. Puchinskii, Memorandum of June 7, 1974, supra note I, at 5-6.
355. POLISH CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 61, 1J I; interview with Professor ·w.
Berutowicz, Polish Minister of Justice, in Warsaw, April 2, 1974. Professor Jodlowski
indicates that the following social organizations arc included in the list: labor unions,
invalids' associations, and the women's league. J. Jodlowski, supra note 348, at I, For
further details, see Misiuk, supra note 342, at 58.
. 356. For the similar situation in the Soviet Union, see, for example, Shakarian,
supra note I, at 126-27, 132.
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kind of attenuation of the monopoly of state organs that was contemplated by the Soviet leadership during the Khrushchev years.
Third, even under the most liberal interpretation of the above
provisions, it seems doubtful that individuals and social organizations
would have the authority to represent in court not merely the "rights
and legitimate interests" of third persons (as well as their own), but
also such diffuse, collective interests as, for instance, those concerning
the environment.357 I do not mean to suggest that important legislation has not been enacted, and is not being seriously enforced, in the
field of nature conservation in the Soviet Union358 and in other coun~
tries of Eastern Europe.359 However, one of the most basic principles
of the Soviet theory of government is "democratic centralism."360
This principle seems to be opposed both to the opportunity for an
informal group of citizens to bring an anti-pollution suit against, say,
the construction of a factory planned by central organs of State
government,861 and to the possibility that a court would interfere
357. See Z. Stalev, supra note 348, at 1: "[A]s a rule, actions raised by the Prokuratura or by social organizations . • • regard individual cases and not a group of persons. The public interest involved in the individual case [merely] consists in the
social importance of rights or violations ••• [that are] the subject matter of the
individual case or in the possible preventive effect of the action for the future in
similar situations." See also J. Jodlowski, supra note 348, at 1: "The suits brought by
~ocial organizations • • • aim directly at the protection of individual rights and interests of private persons, and not the protection of collective and group interests." Only
the amicus appearances made pursuant to article 63 of the Polish Code (which is
similar to section 36, paragraph 1, of the Soviet Principles, quoted in the text accompanying note 346 supra) can be based upon a concern for "collective interest" or
"group interest," rather than, or in addition to, a concern for the parties' rights. Id.
358. Professor Puchinskii, Memorandum of May 4, 1974, supra note I, at 2,
mentions various recent statutes in the Soviet Union concerning the protection of the
environment, and informs us that "[t]hese statutes • • • have established criminal,
administrative, and civil liability for violations." He also indicates that the "[c]ourts'
activity is of great importance for the protection of soil, forestry, river basins, air, and
the animal and vegetable kingdoms. The Supreme Court of the USSR constantly calls
to the attention of juridical organs the need to observe strictly legislation relating to
the protection of nature." Id. Compare the interesting discussion in N. Havranek,
supra note 1, at 19-24 and references therein.
359. See Sand, The Socialist Response: Environmental Protection Law in the
German Democratic Republic, 3 ECOLOGY L.Q. 451, 463-69, 488 (1973). See also
J. Jodlowski, supra note 348, at 3 (administrative and criminal sanctions against
illegal pollution are frequently applied in Poland).
360. The principle of "democratic centralism" emphasizes centralized administrative policy-making; as a consequence, reconciliation of various group interests
takes place at the center rather than in the court system.
361. Professor Jodlowski, supra note 348, at 2-3, doubts that under Polish law a
social organization could bring a civil suit for pollution, except for the direct and
actual damage done to the property of the organization (e.g., an organization of
fish-breeders damaged by a river's pollution illegally caused by a factory). Even if
the social organization is on the Minister's list, this is not one of the areas in which
public-interest litigation by social organizations is allowed by article 61, paragraph
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with or disrupt such planning.362 As paradoxical as it may appear,
the Soviet principle that all powers are embodied in one central,
supreme organ-the Supreme Soviet and its Presidium (and, of
course, the omnipresent Communist Party)-has repercussions similar to those of the Western principle of separation of powers (and
its companion ideology of individualistic liberalism). A dogmatic
application of the separation principle has nurtured in the Westand especially in the civil-law half of the West-the ideal of a judge
who merely and "neutrally" applies the law (essentially legislation),
We have seen that such a judge's sympathies were, and are, with the
"Hohfeldian" plaintiff, who brings to court discrete and individualized rights, and not with the "ideological" plaintiff, who would bring
to court aggregate, collective, "politicized" interests and concerns.
Similarly, a dogmatic implementation of the Soviet centralization
principle (pursuant to which priorities are centrally decided, often
as much as five years in advance), appears to leave no room for a
socialist judge to participate actively in a pluralistic policy-choosing
and law-making process. Under both ideologies, large-scale socioeconomic priorities are not to be established by the courts.
Notwithstanding this conclusion, innovation in the socialist countries since the early 1960's has been substantial and promising. The
1, of the Code. See note 355 supra and accompanying text. Also, as in the West, the
governing principle is that-apart from the broad powers of the Prolmratura and
from the other exceptions established by law-no one, individual or organization, has
standing to sue except for the protection of "his own personal rights." See also
N. Havranek, supra note 1, at 19-21, who refers, inter alia, to Soviet legislation that
entirely withdraws certain types of disputes in the environmental sector from the
competence of the courts; the resolution of such disputes is entrusted to administrative agencies or Ministries. See, e.g., WATER CODE OF nm R.F.S.F.R. of June 30, 1972,
art. 83, in 9 SovIET STATUTES & DECISIONS 129, 157 (1972-1973).
362. See V. Steiner, supra note 347, at 3: "In the Socialist nations, where no conflict exists between the interests of society at large and those of groups or classes
of citizens, the need for judicial protection of group or class interests, such as the
interests of consumers, is unknown. Specific needs-local, regional, or sectorial, i.e., of
certain categories of citizens or workers-are considered and satisfied directly within
the structure of the organs of State or other social organs, not by the courts" (emphasis
added). See also Z. Stalev, supra note 348, at 2: "Under socialist conditions the need
for class actions does not exist .••• In case of violations affecting many people •••
the immediate state or party action for compensation of all injuries by special funds,
or for payment by the responsible enterprises (state or cooperative), makes aimless
judicial actions • . . ."
Clearly, then, the role of judicial action vis-a-vis other state action is quite de•
emphasized. As observed by Sand, supra note 359, at 487, "the development of en•
vironmental law in East Germany has occurred mostly through statutory and
quasi-statutory enactments, rather than by judicial decisions." The same is true for the
other countries in Eastern Europe. Sand speaks of the "relative freedom" of the
socialist governments "from obstructive litigation." Id. at 488. Compare also the
complaint by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the R.S.F.S.R., quoted in note lll9
supra.
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new codes offer new potentials; the beginning of a trend toward what
has been called in the West the "private attorney general"-individual and organizational-is -discernible even in the East.363
C.

The Growth of the lndividuµl and Organizational
"Private Attorney General" in the
Contemporary World

One fascinating aspect of the "private attorney general" approach
is that, contrary to what one might at first believe, it reflects an idea
recurring. again and again in the history of mankind. The legal protection of the infant, the widmv, the old, the poor, and, more generally, the "weak," though monopolized in certain epochs by state
institutions such as the Ministere public-in his capacity as the attorney of the sovereign or parens patriae-more often than not has been
left to the initiative of private individuals and spontaneous organizations. Living in what we call, perhaps too ambitiously, the modern
welfare state, we tend to look down upon those ages and soci(!ties in
which "charity" and "chivalry," not governmentally organized "social
security," were the basic answers to the problem of assuring protection to the oppressed-"os femes, os pauvres et os orfelins, ou os
faibles genz ou a eels qui ne savent demander los droiture."364 Yet we
should not too quickly forget the enormous potential of-such moral
and intellectual forces. Nor should we too quickly forget that governmental solutions are themselves administered by individuals who,
if they lack moral and intellectual motivation, become the kind of
bureaucrats whom we have learned to distrust. The answer-admittedly difficult to implement-is to combine solutions, encouraging
individual and organizational championship for the public interest365
in addition to governmental intervention and control.366
363. See text at notes 140-41 supra.
364. "To women, to the poor, and to orphans, or to _weak people or those _who
know not to demand their rights." The phrase can be found in the Livre de justice
et de plet of 1209. See Cappelletti &: Gordley, Legal Aid: Modern Themes and Variations, 24 STAN. L. REY. 347, 353 (1972).
365. There are many ways to encourage such championship, including tax exemption of public-interest law firms, see note 367 ir,fra; the shifting of litigation costs in
favor of public-interest parties, see, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 387, 395
(M.D. Ala. 1972), afjd. sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); or
the assumption, under certain circumstances, o_f these costs by the state (as was suggested by the German Arbeitskreis Umweltrecht in a proposed federal statute regulating participation of environmental associations in the administrative and judicial
processes, see N. Trocker, supra note I, at B-6); the liberalization of standing requirements, and, more generally, the adoption of liberal legislation on citizen and group
actions (Popularklagen and Verbandsklagen) as well as on class and public-interest
actions. Always most important, of course, is the courts' attitude. See C. Halpern, supra
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Many more examples of individual and organizational "private
attorneys general" could be added to those described above. Indeed,
it seems clear that we are living in a time in which new public needs
of unprecedented dimensions demand a renewed rise and growth of
public-interest champions.367
Choosing almost at random from the innumerable examples
available in all parts of the world, and leaving aside the many possibilities of private amicus curiae appearances,368 the following actions

~

note 1, at 8, 10, 13-14; H. Kotz, supra note 1, at 6-22, 34. See also R. BuxnAu111, DIE
PRIVATE Kl.AGE ALS MrrrEL ZUR DURCHSETZUNG WIRTSCHAFI'Sl'OLinSCHER RECHTSNORMEN
16-26 (1970) (Karlsruhe, Muller).
366. See, e.g., E. R.EHBINDER, GERMAN LAW ON STANDING To SUE 18 (1972) (!\forges,
Switzerland, International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources)
(Environmental Law Paper No. 3).
Developing societies provide an interesting lesson. As related by Justice Ollennu,
according to customary law in Ghana only the head of a Tribe, Clan, or Family
could sue or be sued as the representative of the group he leads; however, through
"judicial reform" the law has been changed to allow "any elder" of the group to
litigate for the group's interest in case the incumbent head of the group fails to protect its interest due to absence, negligence, conflict of interest, or "no inclination,"
N. Ollennu, supra note 219, at 2-4.
367. This is best reflected, perhaps, by the recent proliferation in the United
States of nonprofit and tax exempt "public-interest law firms." See generally F. MARKS,
K. LESWING & B. FoRTINSKY, THE LAWYER, THE Punuc, AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI•
BILITY 148-85 (1972) (Chicago, American Bar Foundation). See also C. Halpern, supra
note 1, at 5, 8-9; Halpern & Cunningham, Reflections on the New Public Interest Law:
Theory and Practice at the Center for Law and Social Policy, 59 GEO. L.J. 1095 (1971),
368. The participation of amici curiae deserves a separate chapter in a complete
study on representation of public and group interests in civil litigation, We have seen
in section I, supra, that in many cases the Ministere public and his analogues, or
other governmental agencies, participate merely as advisors or parties jointes, rather
than as full-fledged parties or parties principales, in civil litigation. Similar partici•
pation is increasingly possible for private individuals and organizations not only in
common-law systems (particularly in the United States, and especially at the appellate
court level), but also, although to a much lesser degree, in the civil-law and socialist
countries. Consider the comparative discussions in N. Havranek, supra note 1, at 28·
35 and references therein; Criscuoli, Amicus Curiae, 27 RIVISTA TRIMESTRALE DI DIRITl'O E
PROCEDURA CIVILE 187 (1973). As for English law, consider I. Jacob, supra note 63, at 71•
74. For two examples of this trend, see article 425 of the Italian Law of Aug. 11,
1973, No. 533, [1973] Gaz. Uff. No. 237 at 6282, 6284-85 (amicus appearance of labor
unions in individual labor disputes); and section 36, paragraph I, of the 1962 Prin•
ciples of Civil Procedure of the Soviet Union and Union Republics, quoted in text at
note 346 supra.
The trend is discernible even at the international level. Recently, the Court of
Justice of the European Economic Community (E.E.C.) allowed an amicus appearance
of the Unione Nazionale Consumatori, an Italian private association of consumers, in a
case brought by eleven sugar producers (six of whom are Italian) against a resolution
of the E.E.C. Commission imposing sanctions against them. The Unione, which
favored the maintenance of those sanctions, was allowed to appear in view of the
facts that (1) the Unione was sufficiently representative of the interests of Italian
consumers, and (2) consumers are certainly interested in the correct application of
unfair competition and antitrust provisions enacted by the Community. Socictc
Anonyme Generale Sucriere v. E.E.C. Commission, 9 Raccolta 1465 (European Court of
Justice 1973). See V. Grementieri, supra note I, at 8-9.
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can be brought by any person (natural or legal) who is a member of
a national, local, or other community, even if he is not directly and
personally aggrieved: in Bavaria369 and Ghana,370 against legislation
that is violative of certain constitutional freedoms; in the United
States, against violations of federal clean air legislation; 371 in Sweden,
against activities detrimental to the natural environment; 872 ill' Italy,
against certain violations of urban development regulations; 373 in the
Federal Republic of Germany, against certain violations in the -field
of unfair competition and consumer protection; 374 and in Italy,375
India,876 and Tanzania,377 against irregularities in political elections.
369. A Popularklage (actio popularis or citizen action) can be brought before the
Bavarian Constitutional Court by anyone, whether a natural or a legal person, against
Land legislation violative of the Bill of Rights contained in the Bavarian Constitu•
tion of 1946. This citizen action was created by section 54 of the Bavarian law of
July 22, 1947, No. 72, on the Bavarian Constitutional Court. See generally M. CAPPEL·
LETII, LA GIURISDIZIONE cosrITUZIONALE DELLE LIBERTA 69-72 (1955) (Milano, Giuffre);
C, LEUSSER, E. GERNER, K. SCHWEIGER &: H. ZACHER, Dm VERFASSUNG DES FREISTMTES
BAYERN 42 (2d ed. 1970) (Miinchen, Beck). The effect of decisions of the Constitutional
Court declaring the unconstitutionality of Land legislation is retroactive and binding
on everyone. M. CAPPELLEITI, supra, at '71, and references in n.234.
370. See N. Ollennu, supra note 219, at 4, referring to articles 2(1), (2) of the (now
suspended) 1969 Constitution of Ghana. These provisions would allow any citizen, even
if not personally aggrieved, to bring suit in the public interest against enactments
violative of the Constitution before the Supreme Court acting in its original juri~diction.
3'71. See note 226 supra; H. Kotz, supra note 1, at 33 &: n.62. Recently, Florida,
Michigan, and Minnesota have also enacted legislation permitting private citizens to
bring polluters to court. See Florida Environmental Protection Act of 1971, FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 403.412 (Supp. 1973-1974); Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970,
MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 691.1201-.1207 (Supp. 1974-1975); Minnesota Environmental
Rights Act, MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 116B (Supp. 1974).
372. The presence of at least an "indirect detriment," however, is required for an
individual to have standing. Letter from Professor P.O. Bolding to the author, July
29, 1974. See note 210 supra.
373. Law of Aug. 6, 1967, No. 765, art. 10, [1967] Gaz. Uff. No. 765 at 4846, 4848-49
(allowing "everyone" to bring suit against an illegal grant of a building license by
municipal authorities). Cf. A. Nicholson, supra note 1, at 14-15, who rightly criticizes
a contra legem restrictive interpretation by the Italian courts.
374. See N. TRocKER, supra note 279, at 204-15 and the legislative and bibliographical
references therein; H. Kotz, supra note 1, at 28. But see W. Habscheid, supra note
306, at 3-4.
·
·
375. Law of Dec. 23, 1966, No. 1147, [1966] Gaz. Uff. No. 329 at 6594 (allowing citizens to challenge in court the regularity of local elections; in these proceedings, the
Ministere public must be heard at the trial). For a detailed analysis, see Borghesi,
Diritto soggettivo e azione popolare nella legge 23 dicembre 1966, n. 1147, 26 RmsrA
TRIMESTRALE DI DIRITIO E PROCEDURA CIVILE 542 (1972). The author discusses the general
(ultra parties) effects of the decisions rendered in such proceedings. Id. at 598-618.
376. See L. Singhvi, supra note 152, at 13, dting Kanglu Baula Kotwal v. Chief
Executive Officer, [1955] All India Rptr. Nagpur 49 (full bench). On another but no
less interesting topic, a 1968 Indian case held that "residents of a locality, whose health
is affected by existence of foul smell emanating from a bone factory, are entitled to
approach the High Court and question the validity of an order which renewed the
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All of these examples, as well as analogous developments emerging
at the international level,378 are innovations introduced since World
War II; 379 they reflect a general trend in modern legislation. Even
though this trend, for a number of reasons, is stronger in commonlaw countries (and especially in the United States) than elsewhere in
the world, 380 and even though everywhere such public-interest suits
••• license for running the bone factory in that locality." L. Singhvi, supra, at 13,
dting Subba Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, [1968] All India Rptr. Andhra
Pradesh 98.
377. See G. Onyiuke, supra note 151, at 4-5. In addition to the citizens "who voted
or had a right- to vote," the challenge before the High Court of Tanzania can also be
brought by the Attorney General; both national and local elections can be so challenged. See id. at 5 (Elections Act of 1970).
- 378. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF EUROPE CONSULTATIVE AssEMBLY, supra note 234, at 27
(discussing the necessary protection of the "entirely new right" to a healthy and
clean environment, which is emerging as one of the most fundamental needs of indi•
viduals and societies), 66-67, 83 (discussing the possibility that even persons and associations not personally aggrieved may have recourse to the European Commission on
Human Rights to challenge governmental violations of the individual and social
rights guaranteed by the Convention). As Dean C. Dominice observes, "[t]hc [European] Commission appears to have envisaged that possibility in the preamble to its
decision in case No. 113/55 ('••• whereas it is permissible for ••• even a third
party to submit an application to the Commission insofar as the alleged violation is
prejudicial to him • • • or when the victim himself is unable to take action to claim
his rights.' Convention Year-Book, Vol. I, p. 162).'' Id. at 67.
For a general discussion of the topic mentioned in the text, see V. Grementicri,
supra note I, at 3-6 et passim. For interesting developments in the field of transfrontier pollution, see P. Sand, supra note I, at 18-25.
379. For the German example mentioned above, see text at note 374 supra, the
statement is only partially correct. The German statute on unfair competition (Geset,:
gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb) was enacted in 1909. In section 13, paragraph
1, it allows all merchants, even if not directly and personally aggrieved, as well as
merchants' associations, to bring suit against violations in the field of unfair compe•
tition. Only in 1965, however, was this power to sue extended to consumer associations. Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb § 13, 1J la. See Radding, Die Klagebefugnis der Mitbewerber und der Verbiinde nach § 1J Abs. 1 UWG im System des
Zivilprozessrechts, 25 JURISTENZEITUNG 305 (1970).
380. See, e.g., T. Kojima, supra note 1, at I, 3, 16, 18-20, 22, 32 et passim; H. Kotz,
supra note I, at 24 et passim. This point should be the subject of a special study. I
shall limit myself here to mentioning some of the principal reasons why class and
public-interest actions face greater obstacles in civil-law systems than in the United
States: a different legal education, and correspondingly, a different (and more passive)
bench and bar; the lack of large law firms and public-interest law firms capable of
undertaking the great commitment frequently required in these actions; a narrower
and less flexible range of both judicial remedies and sanctions (including contempt of
court); the lack, or insufficiency, of discovery devices, so important in many class
actions, especially those against large corporations; and, more generally, a different
conception of the respective roles of legislation and adjudication in the law-making
process. Also very important is the fact that economic and societal complexities arc
more accentuated in the United States than elsewhere in the world-including Great
Britain and other common-law nations-thus making more urgent the need for class
and public-interest actions in America. H. Kotz, supra, at 21-22, also attributes fundamental importance to the contingent fee system prevailing in the United States; he
thinks that, since such a system is clearly unacceptable in Europe, class actions will
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as citizen. actions or actiones populares still remain the exception, a
progressive loosening of the traditional locus standi requirements is
discernible in many countries within and without the common-law
family.381 Furthermore, nowhere has such loosening produced either
the oft-predicted flooding of the courts with too numerous or capricious cases382 or a paralysis of administrative or corporate action.383
Indeed, the liberalizing of standing requirements is but one
aspect of an even more general and powerful trend that is apparent
in the contemporary world-the "publicization" of civil litigation.
Civil litigation is becoming more and more the arena in which
public, collective, and group interests are intermingled with, and
often prevail over, the private interests of the individual parties. It
is inherent in the structure of a mass-economy society that cases involving only two individuals become comparatively less numerous
and, above all, less important, while cases involving groups, classes,
and the public at large rapidly increase in frequency and significance.
Hence, the traditional view of civil litigation as a merely private
affair is no longer acceptable.384
This powerful trend has at least three dimensions. First, public
never find favorable ground there. See also T. Kojima, supra, at 18. Professor Kotz's
conclusion, however, seems too absolute. Financial encouragements for the class suitor
and his lawyers can be devised without resorting to a fee system that, in fact, is hardly
suitable for exportation. Cf. note 365 supra.
381. This is true especially, but not only, in litigation against the political branches
of central or local government. See, e.g., the "Italia Nostra" Case, discussed in text at
notes 315-18 supra. See also the important development in some civil-law countries
discussed in note 282 supra, and the interesting references to Germany, the United
States, and France in H. Kotz, supra note 1, at 32-33 & nn. 61-68, 35. Also for Germany,
see E. REm!INDER, supra note 366, at 17-18. For significant developments in England,
see I. Jacob, supra note 63, at 54-56.
Professor Vescovi speaks of a general phenomenon of "colectivizacion de la legitimacion,'' that is, collectivization of standing; he laments, however, that this phenomenon is in an embryonic stage in Latin America, where traditional individualistic conceptions still largely prevail. E. Vescovi, supra note 20, at 3-4. See also S. Ofiate, supra
note 3, at 11-12.
382. For evidence concerning the United States and Germany, see H. Kotz, supra
note 1, at 36 & n.74. See also the statistical data contained in CLASS Acr10N STUDY,
supra note 280, at 4-6 et passim. Italian experience with the actio popularis in cases
of electoral irregularities, see note 375 supra and accompanying t~t, fully confirms the
statement in the text.
383. See H. Kotz, supra note 1, at 37-38.
384. For a recent comparative discussion, see N. }'ROCKER, supra note 279, at 439-40,
709-10 et passim. See also T. Kojima, supra note 1, passim. As for the United States,
only after 1880 did an individualistic conception of civil procedure as a two-individual
litigation prevail; but the shift was to be reversed, at' least in part, in our century. Cf.
J. FRANK, supra note 151, at 80-107 (ch. VI: "The ,'Fight' Theory versus the 'Truth'
Theory"; ch. VII: "The Procedural Reformers"); ~- POUND, 2 JURISPRUDENCE § 78, at
407-46 (1959) (St. Paul, West).
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(governmental) entities have become increasingly involved in civil
·litigation. The Ministere public and his analogues are but a minor
aspect of this first dimension; much more important has been the
slow and painful overcoming of obstacles and taboos concerning
litigation against the state and its departments. One of these taboos
-that "the Crown can do no wrong"-has only recently fallen in
England.3s5 Another, even stronger taboo-that a court decision
against the executive would represent a breach of the principle of
separation of powers-survived for almost one century before it was
definitively destroyed by administrative agencies that, like the French
Conseil d'Etat or the Italian Consiglio di Stato, little by little transformed themselves into true courts. 886 Yet another taboo-that
Parliament is sovereign and no court should be entitled to review
its enactments-still survives in such otherwise pioneering countries
as England and France, although the movement away from it has
become one of the gigantic forces of recent decades in the five continents. 3s7 The second dimension has been an increase in judicial
activism-a phenomenon analyzed above.ass The third is representation of group, collective, and public interests by individuals and
spontaneous organizations-private initiative and motivation employed in the service of the public benefit.
III.

CONCLUSION:

A

LEssoN OF PLURALISM

A premise of the preceding discussion is that in modern societies
new general, collective, "public" needs and interests have been forcefully emerging. Such needs and interests are an outgrowth of the
most basic characteristics of our twentieth century "civilization."380
Whether we like it or not, modern societies are characterized by
mass production, mass commerce and consumption, mass urbanization, and mass labor conflicts, all of which require regulation.
These new, pressing needs and interests must find access to the
courts.390 Indeed, it would be utterly unreasonable to afford the most
385. On the maxim that "the king can do no wrong" and its only too recent
demise, see H. WADE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 277-313 (3d ed. 1971) (Oxford, Clarendon
Press).
386. See, e.g., Cappelletti, Liberte individuelle et justice sodale dans le proc~s civil
italien, 23 REvuE INTER?<IATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE 533, 536-37 (1971).
387. This movement is analyzed comparatively in M. CAPPELLETrI, JUDICIAL REvmw
IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD (1971) (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill).
388. See section ID supra,
389. See section IA3 supra.
390. While as a rule access to ordinary courts is desirable, to some extent special
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sophisticated kind of legal protection-judicial protection-only to
the more traditional needs and interests, such as private property
rights, and to deny it to the new societal needs and interests that are
quickly becoming vital to the very survival of human civilization.
For a number of reasons, the "public attorney general"-the
Ministere public891 and his formal analogues, the socialist Prokuratura892 and the attorney general in the common-law world893-is not
suitable for undertaking the entire immense task of representing
these new public needs and interests in court. Comparative experience has shown that there are insurmountable obstacles-educational,
structural, and "career" obstacles,894 among others-to adapting that
traditional institution to the new task.
This conclusion should not be taken to mean that the "public
attorney general" cannot play a meaningful role even in these new
areas. This role, however, should be essentially limited to prosecuting criminal violations of regulations concerning such matters as
production, consumption, labor, and urbanization. Yet it is very
doubtful that the "public attorney general" should be granted a
monopoly even in the criminal area.895 It seems that the French
experience with the action brought by the partie civile contains
very promising elements that may be successfully employed elsewhere.896
In so far as civil litigation is concerned, the insufficiency of the
"public attorney general" solution is beyond doubt. This insufficiency
has been demonstrated even in those legal systems that give the
Ministere public (or his analogues) broad power to commence (or to
intervene as a full-fledged party in) any civil case involving a "social,"
"collective," or "general public" interest.897
One important method of supplementing, or substituting for,
the Ministere public (and his formal analogues) has been the institution of special branches within, or specialized governmental agencies
outside, the Ministere public's office. Such branches and agencies
have the task of representing in court specific general or group intercourts may very well be advisable for controversies in areas requiring highly specialized
competence.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

section IA supra.
section IB supra.
section IC supra.
section IA3 supra.
note 204 supra.
note 204 supra.
section IA4 supra.
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ests that require particular training and expertise.898 The Swedish
Consumer Ombudsman is a prime example;899 another example in
the same area may soon be provided by the United States Consumer
Protection Agency.400
Another important method has been to encourage individuals
and/or spontaneously organized groups to represent vital community
interests in court, conferring upon them the role of individual401 and
organizational "private attorneys general." 402 Of course, the assumption of such a role by individuals and groups poses a number of
problems of a constitutional and procedural nature.403 The major
problems are (I) standing; (2) notice and, more generally, guaranteeing an adequate opportunity to be heard to all those who will be
affected by the judicial decision; (3) the extent to which a judgment
may bind absent parties; and (4) empowering the judge to utilize
adequate remedial devices404 to make both possible and effective his
intervention in matters so different from traditional civil litigation.
As difficult as these problems are, an answer to them must be
found, because no adequate alternative exists for the protection of
the supremely vital interests involved. Traditional notions of standing must be revised; 405 new remedies must be designed; 400 and the
398. See section IE supra.
399. See text at notes 239--45 supra.
400. See note 215 supra.
401. See section IIA supra.
402. See section IIB supra.
403. See especially text at notes 320-29 supra.
404. The notion of "fluid class recovery" is a good example. See Homburger,
supra note I, at 371-73; CLASS AcrioN STUDY, supra note 280, at 28 &: nn. 215-16,
Critics, of course, saw the "fluid class recovery" as "creating a new substantive antitrust remedy," Homburger, supra, at 372, but it is clear that an effective system of
class actions cannot exist if the judge is limited to the remedial devices typical of
the traditional two-individual conception of litigation.
405. One powerful means to this end is the expansion of traditional conceptions
of "rights." "Human rights" and such new "public" rights as the right to health,
clean air and landscape, beauty, dignity, and security must be recognized and pro•
tected by the courts, even though these rights are not "owned" by any one individual
but belong to all alike. Cf. R. Buxbaum, supra note 238, 1st app. ("Topical Outline for
Technical Conference on Comparative Legal Aspects of Public Interest Activity in
the Environmental Sector"), sections II.A.l.b, II.A.2.d-e; T. Kojima, supra note I, at
23. This development, of course, is and will be encountering strong resistance, be•
cause it represents a revolutionary deviation from a long-standing individualistic conception of rights and civil litigation. Such deviation is unavoidable, however, if the
democratic ideal of citizens' participation in the modern "promotional" and welfare
state is not to remain empty.
406. The innovations must begin with mandamus and injunctive remedies, and
adequate sanctions in case of nonobservance. Such remedies are insufficiently available,
or not available at all, to noncommon-law judges, especially against the public administration. Cf. R. Buxbaum, supra note 238, at 7 &: 1st app,; section 11.A.2.c,
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fundamental guarantee -of a "day in court"~ertainly an essential
tenet of every civilized system of justice407-must be assured by developing appropriate standards for "adequate representation" of the
group, the community, or the public at large, in such .a manner as to
make reasonable the extension of the effects of the judgment to all
those who are thus represented.408 All of these changes are, of course,
easier to outline on paper than to. implement in the unforeseeable
circumstances of particular cases. This is the reason why, at this early
stage of doctrinal analysis, case law evolution-yet another form of
judicial activism-is more promising, perhaps, than abstract 1egislative intervention, at least in those countries in which law-making is
no longer considered to be the exclusive province of formal· legislation.
What lesson is to be learned from the comparative effort of a
worldwide team of national reporters409 and other experts who have
provided the basis for this article? I believe that the lesson is one of
pluralism.410 The needs of our time are so complex and demanding
that it would be foolish to rely upon any single governmental institution to solve them.411 The state itself, let alone one of its institutions,
is unable to meet all of those needs. Nor can they be met by a proliferation of governmental agencies or departments within or without
the Ministere public's office (or that of its analogues).
Exclusive reliance on the private initiative of individuals, 11:owever, would also be foolish. The "ideological plaintiff" is, in many
407. I do not know of a stronger affirmation of that guarantee than the couplet by
Seneca:
Qui statuit aliquid parte inaudita altera, aequum licet statuterit, baud aequus
fuit.
("Anyone who has made a decision without hearing the other party was unjust
even if the decision was a just one.") Medea, lines 199-200.
408. On the other band, in consideration of the public interests at stake, the too
rigid conception of the inalterability of res judicata-which prevails particularly in
civil-law countries, see, e.g., M. CAPPELLE'ITI, J. MERRYMAN & J. PERILLO, supra note
149, at 156-57-should be revised. Interestingly, section 4 of the Swedish Act of April
30, 1971, No. 112, which prohibits improper contract terms, see text at notes 243-44
supra, provides that "[n]otwithstanding any decision which has been made in regard
to the issuance of an injunction [prohibiting the use of certain contract terms], the
same matter may be reconsidered where a further examination is required in view
of new circumstances or for other special reasons." See Sheldon, supra note 239, at 43,
68.
409. See note 1 supra.
410. See E. REHBINDER, supra note 366, at 18.
411. Similarly, at the international conference mentioned in note 238 supra, the
majority of the participants agreed that to meet the needs of adequate environmental
protection, "a mix of forms would have to be established." These forms should include
"adversary [judicial] procedures" along with "ombudsmen and other quasi-governmental mechanisms,'' and even "active lobbying." R. Buxbaum, supra note 238, at 14.
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cases, more an ideal than a reality, albeit an ideal that ought to be
encouraged. Undoubtedly, too many gaps would remain if the whole
task were left to the haphazard existence, and to the will and whims,
of spontaneous "champions" of the common good.
"Private" and "governmental" action should supplement each
other. In addition, and most importantly, groups, communities,
organizations-even at the international level-should be encouraged to enter the arena of mankind's fight for survival. Pluralism is
necessary to fill most, if not all, of the gaps. Indeed, pluralism may
be the only effective way to reconcile the two conflicting ideasJudge Frank's perhaps too optimistic suggestion and Pietro Verri's
skeptical admonition-that I have chosen as the challenging mottos
of this article.

